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2Abstract
This thesis explores the relationship between subjective risk when
driving and drivers' subsequent memory for everyday driving situations.
Relationships are considered in the context of the wider literature on arousal
and memory. In the first study subjects drove a set route around Cambridge
giving verbal risk ratings; they then performed an unexpected free recall task.
Drivers tended to recall situations which they had previously rated as risky.
A series of laboratory studies explored this result. In these studies subjects
watched films of actual driving situations in a simulator and were given
subsequent recognition tests. In the first laboratory study subjective risk was
only associated with improved recognition sensitivity for the most potentially
dangerous situations. In generally safe situations feelings of risk appeared to
impair recognition. These results were replicated in two further laboratory
studies using different judgment tasks and stimuli. These results could be
explained by subjective risk causing the focusing of attention in driving with
a consequent enhancement of memory for central details at the expense of
memory for peripheral details.
To directly test the attention focusing hypothesis a laboratory study
defined central information with respect to risk in driving situations. Then
an on-road study found that drivers did indeed recall more central details
than would be expected from risky situations. There thus appear to be two
relationships between subjective risk and memory in driving. The first is an
overall tendency for subjects to recall risky situations. This is assumed to be
largely because such events are rare and distinctive. The second is a
tendency for subjects to recall central details of risky situations at the
3expense of peripheral details. This is consistent with recent studies on
attention focusing in eyewitness testimony. Some implications of these
results for eyewitness testimony and for the psychology of driving are
considered.
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Preface
Cognitive psychologists must make a greater effort to understand
cognition as it occurs in the ordinary environment ... pay more attention to
the details of the real world in which perceivers and thinkers live ... come to
terms with the sophistication and complexity of the cognitive skills that
people are really capable of acquiring, and with the fact that these skills
undergo systematic development. A satisfactory theory of human cognition
can hardly be established by experiments that provide inexperienced subjects
with bri ef opportunities to perform novel and meaningless tasks. (Neisser,
1976, pp.7-8).
It is important for psychologists to study driver behaviour.
Approximately half a million people die in traffic accidents every year and it
is almost always possible to trace the causes of a traffic accident back to
some form of human error. However, there is another reason for
psychologists to study drivers. This is alluded to in the quote above from
Neisser's 1976 book "Cognition and reality". The reason is that driving
provides a unique opportunity to study the nature and development of an
extremely complex cognitive skill for which humans have no obvious
evolutionary preparation and yet one which enormous numbers of people
acquire, often without any formal training.
This thesis attempts to make use of one particular aspect of driving
which makes it nearly unique in everyday life. This is the fact that driving
can be dangerous. It is one of the only everyday activities in which a
person's mistake or misfortune can lead to immediate injury or death. This
makes driving an ideal context in which to understand the concept of
subjective risk and explore its relationship with memory. Researchers in
other areas with an interest in the effects of emotional arousal on memory
have had to rely on staged events, rare occurrences or laboratory analogues.
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Driving provides an opportunity to study the effects on memory of an easily
identified, commonly experienced type of emotional arousal with real world
implications.
The aim of this thesis is to explore the memories that drivers have for
everyday driving situations and to decide how such memories may be
affected by the feelings of risk they experienced in the situation. This is
intended to both inform theories of driver behaviour and to provide a realistic
applied test of and extension to theories about emotional arousal and memory
which have been developed in other areas. Despite the somewhat aggressive
stance suggested by the quotation from Neisser, I assume that a mixture of
experimental and naturalistic research is necessary to understand real world
problems. The thesis contains a mixture of research in the laboratory and on
the road in an attempt to first observe phenomena in actual driving, then
explore them in a laboratory setting, before finally returning to actual driving
to attempt to validate the laboratory results.
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Chapter 1
The Psychology of Driving: Memory and Risk
This chapter discusses the types of involvement memory may be
expected to have in driving and reviews the role of subjective risk in driving.
In order to provide some context in which to discuss these issues a broad
overview of the driving task will first be introduced. This regards driving as
a combination of skills which can be grouped into a three level hierarchy.
The various skills in this hierarchy are considered particularly with regard to
the distinction between automatic and controlled processes, a distinction
which will be important when considering memory for driving.
The Driving Task
Driving is a task which has many components ranging from overlearned
perceptual-motor skills to complex aspects of judgment and decision making.
Individual components can themselves be divided further, McKnight and
Adams (1970) for example divide just the perceptual-motor components of
driver training into approximately 1,500 separate tasks. It is thus not
surprising that there is no single psychological theory of driving which
adequately describes all components of the task. A common approach to
understanding the relationship between different components is to regard
driving as a hierarchy of processes (e.g. Aasman, 1988; Michon, 1985;
Rockwell, 1972; Summala, 1985).
The most common division is a three level hierarchy similar to the one
described by Bötticher and van der Molen (1988; van der Molen & Bötticher,
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1988). The bottom level, the operational level, involves aspects such as
maintaining road position and the use of the car controls. The next level, the
tactical level, is involved in negotiating junctions and situations such as
overtaking. The top level, the strategical level, is required for tasks like route
planning and estimating travel time. Other researchers have used different
labels to describe the same distinction, for example, control, manoeuvring
and strategical levels (e.g. Janssen, 1979; Verwey, 1990). Clearly this
division of tasks into three types is only useful if there are clear
psychological differences between the tasks at different levels. One
psychological distinction which has often been used to contrast different
tasks in driving is the degree to which tasks can be performed automatically.
Automatic and Controlled Processes
There is relatively little controversy about the nature of the operational
level. In normal driving, performance at this level is assumed to be the result
of automatic processing. Automatic is used here to reflect the distinction
commonly made between automatic and controlled processes (e.g. Posner &
Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).
Controlled processes are generally assumed to be voluntary, flexible and
capacity limited while automatic ones are highly efficient, unavoidable,
resistant to modification, not subject to capacity limitations and able to occur
without awareness (LaBerge, 1981).
Theories of automatic processing assume that processes which were
initially controlled can often be converted into automatic ones with sufficient
practice. J. R. Anderson (1976, 1983; Neves & J. R. Anderson, 1981), for
example, assumes that this occurs through a process of knowledge
compilation in which repeated applications of declarative knowledge create
task specific procedures which can be activated without the need for
involvement from more general high level processes. Learning to drive is
often regarded as a prime example of this conversion. Aspects of driving
such as clutch control and gear changing are initially extremely difficult and
require considerable concentration, being easily disrupted by other tasks.
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However, with sufficient practice such tasks are performed automatically,
without the need for attentional resources. Indeed, performance of a
concurrent task appears to cause only very limited impairments to many
aspects of driving (e.g. Brown, Tickner & Simmonds, 1969; Duncan,
Williams, Nimmo-Smith & Brown, 1991) and in some cases a distraction
like listening to the radio may actually prove beneficial (Brown, 1965).
It is rather more difficult to categorise the nature of processing at the
tactical and strategical levels, even within the relatively simple dichotomy
between controlled and automatic processes. Tasks at these levels often
involve controlled processes, this appears to be clearly demonstrated by the
common observation that a driver may cease a conversation before carrying
out a complex manoeuvre. Here the task seems to be capacity limited and
the driver is acting to increase the resources available for the manoeuvre.
The demonstration that such tasks can involve controlled processes does not
mean that they always do, even tasks at the operational level may be
performed as controlled processes, for example, when starting to drive an
unusual vehicle. Moreover, some apparently higher level tasks may in fact
be performed automatically. Much recent research in social cognition has
stressed that many apparently complex tasks satisfy all or many of the
conditions for being automatic in this sense (e.g. social categorisation -
Higgins, Rholes & Jones, 1977; Higgins, 1989; causal attribution - Bargh,
1984; social interaction - Langer, 1978).
The possibility of automatization of tasks at the tactical or even
strategical level appears to be consistent with views of driver behaviour
which regard normal driving as being primarily controlled by the simple
maintenance of safety margins (e.g. Näätänen & Summala, 1976; Summala,
1988). However, it may also be consistent with more recent approaches
which stress a more cognitive view of driver behaviour. A number of
researchers have suggested that previous exemplars of complex driving
situations are represented as concepts or schemata which may be
automatically activated upon encountering new situations (e.g. Dubois, 1991;
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Fleury, Mazet & Dubois, 1988; Groeger, 1988, 1989; Riemersma, 1988).
This would provide a framework in which it would be possible to understand
automatic processing at the tactical level. The idea that driving situations
may be represented as concepts or schemata could also have important
implications for memory about driving situations. For instance it might be
predicted that aspects of situations which were highly inconsistent with a
pre-existing schema would be better recognised than relatively consistent
aspects, but less well recalled. The role of schema consistency in memory
research will be considered more extensively in Chapter 5. Another
approach is provided by researchers who have recently been attempting to
model driving using a production system architecture (e.g. Aasman, 1988;
Hale, Stoop & Hommels, 1990; Michon 1988). These researchers attempt to
provide simple rules which could be applied as productions at the tactical and
even strategical levels. Michon (1988) in particular suggests that driver
training should avoid providing information at a declarative level but rather
give rules which are easily proceduralized to minimize the need for the driver
to "think".
Driving and Memory
Despite the growth of research into everyday memory and memory in
applied settings (e.g. Gruneberg, Morris & Sykes, 1978, 1988a, 1988b) and
the research and theorising which has been done over some 50 years on the
psychology of driver behaviour, there has been virtually no research which
directly looks at memory in driving. Clearly memory plays some part in
many aspects of the driving task, one way to identify tasks in which memory
may play an interesting role is to look at situations in which a failure of
memory is observed. Reason and his colleagues have developed a
questionnaire which investigates the frequency of a number of behaviours
among normal drivers. This questionnaire, the driver behaviour
questionnaire (DBQ), was designed particularly to look at driving errors
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from the type of perspective Reason has adopted elsewhere (e.g. Reason,
1984, 1990; Reason & Mycielska, 1982), however, it additionally provides
an important insight into the frequency of various types of memory failure in
driving. Table 1.1 lists six items from the DB Q which appear to imply some
form of memory failure. The means given beside each item are taken from
Reason, Manstead, Stradling, Baxter & Campbell (1988) who had 520
drivers fill in the 50 item questionnaire. The DBQ is answered on a six point
scale from 0=NEVER to 5=NEARLY ALL THE TIME. Most of the mean
frequencies in this table fall between 1=HARDLY EVER and
2=OCCASIONALLY.
Item	 Mean
Forget which gear you are currently in and have to 	 1.48
check with your hand.
"Wake up" to realize that you have no clear recollection	 1.23
of the road along which you have just travelled.
Forget where you left your car in a multi-level car 	 1.14
park.
Lost in thought, you forget that your lights are on full	 0.99
beam until "flashed" by other motorists.
Intending to drive to destination A, you "wake up" to	 0.89
find yourself en route to B, where the latter is the more
usual journey.
Forget when your road tax/insurance expires and 	 0.48
discover that you are driving illegally.
Table 1.1: Selected items from the DBQ in decreasing order of reported
frequency (mean ratings from Reason et al. 1988).
Although all these behaviours appear to describe some form of memory
failure, the actual role memory is playing in the task in each case differs
considerably. It is possible to divide the behaviours into three main types on
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this basis, tasks involving prospective memory, those involving memory for
behaviour at the operational level, and those involving memory for behaviour
at the tactical level.
Prospective Memory Failures
Forgetting to renew tax or insurance, and forgetting that lights are on full
beam, and to some degree taking the more usual route by mistake, are unlike
the others in that they appear to represent failures of prospective memory e.g.
forgetting to do something. Here the failure may occur despite the fact that
the episode in question has been adequately stored and is potentially
retrievable (if actually asked at the time the drivers could have probably
correctly retrieved the information that they were uninsured / driving on full
beam / on the wrong route), the problem is instead that the driver fails to use
the knowledge available at the correct time. The study of prospective
memory is a topic which has attracted relatively little research and is not well
understood, however, there has recently been an increase of interest in this
area (e.g. Ccci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; Harris, 1984; Ellis, 1988).
Memory for Events at the Operational Level
The most common of the behaviours in Table 1.1, forgetting which gear
you are in, appears to be an example of lack of memory for a task at the
operational level which is normally performed automatically. The failure to
recall the current gear suggests that gear changing often does take place
without a specific episodic memory being formed, in fact it is likely that this
is the normal state of affairs, the relative infrequency of the failure being
reported probably simply reflects the fact that the need for conscious
awareness of the current gear is itself rare. It seems likely that this is typical
of tasks at the operational level, such tasks can be performed automatically
and no episodic memory for their performance is normally formed. The
importance of the procedural knowledge underlying the task only becomes
clear in unusual circumstances, where for example the performance of a
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procedure is interrupted or the precise requirements are changed, e.g. when
driving a new vehicle with different control characteristics.
Memory for Events at the Tactical Level
Forgetting where your car is parked seems to be an example of impaired
memory for a relatively complex event at the tactical level. The question in
the DBQ refers specifically to multi-level car parks, the assumption here
seems to be that such memory failures are particularly likely in this context
because of the similarity in appearance of different floors in such a car park,
however, there has been some work looking at memory for car parking in
situations where more information is available. Baddeley (1986) and Pinto
and Baddeley (1991) report studies of memory for parking locations in the
Cambridge Applied Psychology Unit's car park. For regular users of the car
park (members of staff) recall of parking position was extremely good the
same day, falling dramatically with the number of interpolated parking
episodes. For experimental subjects tested after retention intervals ranging
from 2 hours to 1 month memory was surprisingly accurate and was not
affected by retention interval unless other parking episodes were iterpolated.
When this was the case there was an interaction between retention interval
and interpolated parking episodes. These results were taken as supporting a
temporal discrimination hypothesis of the same type that has been used
elsewhere to describe short term verbal recency effects (e.g. Bjork &
Whitten, 1974).
The above research on car parking makes it appear that memory in such
situations is remarkably similar to memory in more traditional laboratory
paradigms. The other item from the Reason et al. study bearing directly on
memory for events at the tactical level, "waking up" with no recollection of
the previous road, however, is a rather more striking possibility and appears
to be related to phenomena which have recently attracted interest in the
literature on the psychology of driving.
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Highway Hypnosis and Driving Without Awareness
There has been recent interest in a phenomenon variously known as
"highway hypnosis" (Brown, 1991; Wertheim, 1991; Williams, 1963), DWA
- "driving without awareness" (Home, 1992) and DWAM - "driving without
attention mode" (Kerr, 1991). Unfortunately, despite recent discussion of
such phenomena there is almost no actual research into the nature or
frequency of these states. It may, however, be useful to make a distinction
between two different types of state to which such labels have been applied
relatively indiscriminately by different authors. The first type of state is the
case where monotonous driving on featureless roads, particularly
motorwayslhighways, has been claimed to lead to the driver falling into a
trance-like state in which they may fail to adequately respond to changes in
the road environment. Although the existence of such a state might have
important legal implications in cases where accidents take place, as Home
(1992) argues, such states have yet to be adequately differentiated from
simple sleepiness.
The second and for this thesis the more interesting suggestion is that in
an otherwise normal driving situation a driver may report "waking up" to
find that they have no recollection of having driven some previous part of the
journey, despite the fact that they completed relatively complex manoeuvres
during the period. It is this state whose frequency may be estimated by the
Reason et al. study. Another estimate of its frequency may be obtained from
the EPQ (Error Proneness Questionnaire) of Reason and Mycielska (1982)
which is concerned with more general absent-mindedness in everyday life.
The EPQ contains 30 questions about everyday errors, one of which is:
"How often in the course of driving a car, taking a walk, or some routine
activity, do you "wake up" to discover that, for the moment at least, you have
no recollection of the places you have just passed through or the things you
have just done?"
Reason and Mycielska refer to this as a "time-gap experience" and found
that more than half their sample of 85 psychology undergraduates and
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postgraduates reported such experiences as happening more than once a
month. Of course the question in the EPQ does not refer solely to driving
and the population they sampled are unlikely to be driving particularly
regularly. This suggests that such states may in fact occur in other situations
such as the ones they suggest (e.g. taking a walk or engaging in a routine
activity). Because terms like highway hypnosis, DWA and DWAM have
been used somewhat indiscriminately in the literature previously this thesis
will reserve them exclusively for the hypothetical trance-like state which
may be a precursor to motorway accidents and use Reason's term "time-gap
experience" to refer to this second phenomenon. There are of course many
questions which have not been addressed about such experiences. In
addition to deciding whether such phenomena really are characteristic of
some particular identifiable driving state further research is needed to decide
a variety of questions, for example: Do such experiences depend on the
driver being tired? Are all drivers equally likely to experience them? Do
they happen only on routes which are well known to the driver? What
generally causes the driver to "wake up"? How long do such experiences
last? Is driving actually impaired in such a state? How complex a driving
situation can be negotiated in this state?
It is possible that time-gap experiences represent driving at the tactical
level which is conducted without controlled processes being involved, the
assumption here is the common one that unless a stimulus event receives
conscious attention it will not be stored in long term memory (e.g. Bargh,
1984; Broadbent, 1958; Moray, 1959; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). There
are of course two major problems with taking time-gap experiences as
evidence for driving with automaticity. The first is the empirical problem
that without formally testing memory in such circumstances it is impossible
to know whether there really is a memory impairment in such circumstances
and if so how complete it actually is. The second problem is the more
general difficulty of defining exactly what relationship should be expected
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between automaticity and memory. The common theoretical assumption is
clearly stated by William James:
"Whatever future conclusion we may reach as to this, we cannot deny
that an object once attended to will remain in the memory, whilst one
inattentively allowed to pass will leave no traces behind." (James, 1890,
p.42'7).
The distinction in memory between events consciously attended to and
those not consciously attended to may not be as clear as was implied by
James. It has recently become clear that an action becoming automatic does
not necessarily mean that it cannot be remembered. It has been proposed that
some extremely simple aspects of the environment - spatial and temporal
location of information and its frequency of occurrence - may be coded
automatically without the requirement of conscious attention (Hasher &
Zacks, 1979, 1984). There is also currently much debate about the
possibility of a dichotomy between explicit and implicit learning and
memory (e.g. Lewandowski, Dunn & Kirsner, 1989; Nissen & Bullemer,
1987; Reber, 1989; Roediger, 1990; Schacter, 1987) with many researchers
suggesting that the acquisition of knowledge about even apparently complex
relationships proceeds without conscious awareness.
Even when the use of general attentional resources is required from the
subject it appears that the amount of cognitive effort does not directly
determine the quality of memory (Mitchell & Hunt, 1989). Moreover,
memory may be impaired for a variety of reasons, lack of initial attention is
not the only possible explanation. It is possible for example that time-gap
experiences simply reflect events which were so banal that they could not be
distinguished from other memories for similar previous driving. Without
exploring drivers' memories for driving in other circumstances it is
impossible to know what normal memory performance in driving would be
expected to be.
One area of driving research which has produced some serendipitous
results bearing on drivers' memory in normal situations results from attempts
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to investigate drivers' perception of traffic signs (e.g. Johansson & Backlund,
1970; Johansson & Rumar, 1966; Luoma, 1988, 1991; MacDonald &
Hoffmann, 1991; Milosevic & Gajic, 1986). Although this research has
largely been conducted with the intention of studying perception rather than
memory, the frequent use of recall tests gives some insight into the overall
levels of memory performance and the possible dissociations between initial
perception of road signs and subsequent memory for them.
Detection of and Memory for Road Signs
Johansson and Rumar (1966) stopped over 1,000 drivers by the roadside
710m along the road from a road sign placed there by the experimenters and
asked the drivers to describe the last road sign they had seen. If they were
unable to describe it they were then asked whether it was of a particular type.
For one of the road signs they used, as few as 17% of drivers were able to
correctly answer at least one of the two questions. Johansson & Backlund
(1970) tested a further 5,000 drivers and found broadly similar results.
Milosevic and Gajic (1986) found even lower recall percentages in a similar
study, with between 2% and 20% of drivers correctly identifying the
previous sign and never more than 6% of drivers able to correctly identify
the sign before last.
The conclusion given in both the Johansson studies was simply that the
probability of a driver actually detecting a road sign is extremely low, but
that some signs are more likely to be detected than others. Summala and
Hietamäki (1984), however, suggest that it is not the detection of signs but
memory for them which is likely to be faulty. They examined drivers'
responses to signs similar to those used by Johansson and Rumar by
measuring changes in speed in response to the sign. They found that there
were no significant differences between the signs in the frequency with
which they elicited some speed change from the driver (in the Johansson and
Rumar study there were very considerable differences in memory
performance depending on the sign used), although the degree of this change
was related to the information on the sign. Their conclusion was that most of
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the road signs in such studies are in fact initially detected and that differences
found between signs and the poor overall performance in the Johansson and
Rumar study must be to a large extent a memory effect. This interpretation
is strengthened by a recent study by Fisher (1992) who also found poor recall
for previous road signs although in this study drivers were not required to
stop since the experimenter was posing as a hitch-hiker. Fisher's study also
suggested that recall was not a good measure of whether a road sign had been
heeded. A similar dissociation between, eye fixations, behavioural responses
and actual recall of a sign is shown in Luoma (1991).
Another study by Luoma (1988) reports data for some details of the
environment other than road signs, in particular houses, roadside
advertisements and pedestrian crossing lines on the road. In this study the
experimenters recorded the driver's visual fixations and also asked the driver
questions about each target just after it had been passed. In fact the houses in
this study were never recalled, but as they were never fixated this is not
surprising; the roadside advertisements, the pedestrian crossing lines and
some of the road signs in the study, however, were often fixated without
being recalled immediately afterwards. Although the overall levels of recall
in this study are relatively uninformative because the subjects knew that
there would be subsequent memory questions, the dissociation between
fixation and recall strengthens Summala and Hietamiki's claim that low
levels of recall are not necessarily a result of failures of perception.
The implication for memory research of the above research on road sign
detection appears to be that even when objects have been initially detected by
a driver and the driver's behaviour has been appropriately modified by their
presence, the driver may not be able to describe the object even very shortly
afterwards. Indeed the general levels of performance in road sign recall tasks
appear to be extremely poor, even in tasks which would superficially appear
to be relatively easy.
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Memory at the Strategical Level
Clearly memory will also play important roles at the strategical level in
driving. One of the questions from Reason et al. (1988) not included in
Table 1.1 was "[how often do you] plan your route badly, so that you meet
traffic congestion you could have avoided?" Although the reference to
memory is not as direct as in the other questions it is clear that such decisions
at the strategical level are based on memory in at least two separate ways.
Much route planning will rely on some form of memory for the potential
routes available, either in terms of a cognitive map of the environment or
procedural knowledge of following the route (e.g. Evans, 1980; Thorndyke
& Hayes-Roth, 1982; van Winsum, Aim, Schraagen & Rothengatter, 1990).
In addition such strategical decisions may be based on episodic memories for
particular instances of driving the planned route, for example, the memory
that you encountered road works at a particular junction recently and that it
should thus be avoided until they have been completed.
Various aspects of memory in normal driving have been briefly
discussed above, although none of this research has directly explored drivers'
memories for everyday driving situations it is clear that there are likely to be
important differences in memory for different types of information which
would be potentially available to the driver. The evidence available suggests
that events at the operational level will be fully automatic in normal driving
and that there is unlikely to be any episodic memory available of them
subsequently unless unusual circumstances occurred to force controlled
processes to be used. The situation is not so clear for events at the tactical
level. Memory for parking a car appears to be generally very good at least in
allowing the driver to specify its current location several hours later. On the
other hand it appears that on occasions drivers may have no memory at all
for road signs which they have just seen or for relatively complex
manoeuvres which they have only just performed.
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Memory for Accidents
One special case of memory for driving situations which has obvious
practical significance is reports given about road traffic accidents to the
police and to accident researchers. Concerns are frequently raised about the
accuracy of reports given by drivers and other witnesses to accidents (e.g.
Hakkert & Hauer, 1988; West, Elander & French, 1991). There is often
relatively poor agreement between different witnesses' accounts of the
accident and where an objective record of an event is available dramatic
discrepancies between subsequent descriptions and the recorded event have
often been found (Egberink, Stoop & Poppe, 1988; Humphreys, 1981).
Researchers have noted that such reports appear to be easily biased by social
stereotypes (Diges, 1988) and the way in which data is collected (Sheehy,
1981). Surprisingly, few researchers have considered the potential
influences on memory of the traumatic nature of being involved in or witness
to a road accident. In the more general field of eyewitness testimony there is
a very substantial literature about the effects of such arousal on subsequent
memory, this area will be reviewed in Chapter 2. The fact that researchers in
the psychology of driving have not stressed the potential effects of such
arousal is particularly surprising given that feelings of risk are often
considered to be one of the most important variables in the control of normal
driving.
Driving and Risk
Many psychological theories of driving suggest that feelings of risk play
an important role in regulating behaviour, either as a quantity to be
controlled (Wilde 1982, 1988) or avoided (Naätänen and Summala 1976), or
as feedback in a learning theory approach (Fuller 1988). Much of the
interest in risk as a variable has arisen from the apparently contradictory
implications of two influential theories about the role of subjective risk in
driving, risk homeostasis theory (RHT) and zero-risk theory, thus these
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theories will be briefly described and the role which subjective risk plays in
them will be discussed.
Risk Homeostasis Theory
People are generally sensitive to many dangers, when drivers approach a
sharp bend in the road their natural reaction is to slow down. This awareness
of risks and subsequent action to lessen them has been labelled risk
compensation (e.g. O'Neill, 1977). RHT is a theory which explains risk
compensation as a result of individuals adopting a target level of risk. The
central implication of RHT is that people will not only act to reduce their
perceived level of risk when it exceeds the target level, they will also act to
increase it when it is below the target level.
RHT has been largely developed by Wilde (e.g. Wilde, 1982, 1988,
1989; Wilde & Murdoch, 1982) and has been offered as a model both of the
effects of safety legislation on population accident statistics and of individual
behaviour. There is some evidence for RUT at both these levels (e.g.
Adams, 1988; Tränkle & Gelau, 1992), and the implications of RHT for
accident countermeasures are considerable and often surprising (e.g.
McKenna, 1988; Wilde, 1989). However, for the purposes of the current
research the important point is not necessarily whether RHT is correct but
whether one of the main propositions underlying it is correct. This
proposition is stated by Wilde (1988) as "at any moment of time, an
individual road user experiences (or expects to experience) a certain amount
of subjective accident risk" (p.4 .44). This appears to be in conflict with
Summala's claim that "it is inconceivable that drivers would continually
operate under such emotional stress" (Summala, 1988, p.4 .94), and an
alternative description of driver behaviour developed by Näätänen &
Summala has been described as zero-risk theory.
Zero-Risk Theory
Zero-risk theory as described by Näätänen & Summala (1974, 1976;
Summala & Näätänen, 1988) suggests that a driver generally feels no
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subjective risk of accident, and stresses that normal control of behaviour is
governed instead by the adoption of adequate safety margins. The
assumption here is that "when [a driver] happens to feel subjective risk or
fear he often tends immediately to eliminate this feeling by certain
behavioural changes" (Näätänen & Summala, 1976, p.239), a major cause of
accidents is thus that drivers have too high a "subjective risk threshold". The
predictions of zero-risk theory in terms of accident countermeasures are
often at variance with those from RHT, thus there has been considerable
debate about the relative merits of the two theories (e.g. Evans, 1986a,b;
McKenna, 1982, 1985, 1988; Wilde, 1984, 1986). The central point in this
context is, however, the role of subjective risk in the two theories.
In fact the concept of subjective risk is surprisingly similar in both
theories, the differences lie largely in the role it is assigned in the control of
behaviour. Wilde (1988) does accept that like physiological arousal feelings
of subjective risk are not necessarily focal in the driver's consciousness but
he claims that there is continual level of subjective risk which the driver will
become aware of if asked to report on it or if there are sudden changes in
level. This level of subjective risk is similar to a crucial part of the Näätänen
& Summala model which is a "subjective risk monitor" which is sensitive to
the subjective probability of an adverse event and the degree of the negative
consequences associated with that event, the only difference is that while
Näätänen & Summala claim that the level of subjective risk output by this
monitor is generally nil, Wilde (1988) assumes that it is only
"psychologically nil" (p. 444).
The Concept of Risk
Before discussing the evidence from research into the subjective risk
experienced when driving it is worth clarifying the term subjective risk.
Summala (1988) distinguishes between three different types of risk
frequently referred to in the driving literature. The first of these is the
objective risk of an accident, normally assessed at a societal level by
considering accident statistics for different population groups or road
DRIVING: MEMORY AND RISK	 31
locations. The other two uses of the term risk both refer to a particular
person's assessment of risk, Summala uses the term "subjective risk" only for
estimates of risk made when no fear is actually experienced and uses the
term "ostensive risk" to describe situations where a person actually feels fear.
Although this terminology is consistent with the zeto-risk theory idea that
subjective risk is almost never felt, it has not been widely adopted. For this
thesis a similar three-way distinction will be adopted but using terms which
are slightly more consistent with their general use elsewhere in the literature.
"Objective risk" is used in Summala's sense to refer to the actual accident
likelihood. "Estimated risk" will be used for the cases where a person is
making an estimate of risk while not actually in a situation to experience the
risk they are estimating. The term "subjective risk" will be reserved for cases
where some degree of physical danger is actually experienced.
Subjective Risk
There are a number of studies which suggest that it is sensible to think of
subjective risk when driving as a continually fluctuating quantity which may
be related to both estimated and objective risk. Physiological measures
which have been equated with subjective risk when driving are galvanic skin
response (GSR) (e.g. Helander & Soderberg, 1973 - described in Näätanen &
Summala, 1976; Hulbert, 1957; Preston, 1969; Taylor, 1964) and heart rate
(Rutley & Mace, 1972), both of which are often used as measures of
physiological arousal. Taylor (1964) in particular noted that the distribution
of GSRs over distance travelled corresponded very closely to the distribution
of actual accident figures over the same distance. GSR as a measure can, of
course, be criticised for the fact that it is known to be closely related to the
subject's expectancies and preparations for action. Heart rate also appears to
increase in the subjectively dangerous situation of entering a motorway
(Rutley & Mace, 1972), however, this is harder to explain purely in terms of
increasing attention and expectancies since these would normally be
associated with a decrease in heart rate.
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Other measures which are clearly associated with subjective risk while
driving are cognitive load as measured by dual-task performance (e.g.
Harms, 1986, 1991; Hoyos, 1988) and verbal ratings of the chances of being
involved in a near miss (Watts & Quimby, 1980). The Watts and Quimby
study also demonstrated a relationship between subjective and objective risk,
there was a correlation of 0.37 between subjective ratings of the chance of
being involved in a near miss and objective risk, measured as accidents
divided by mean traffic flow at a site.
Estimated Risk
It is interesting to note that the correlation between objective and
subjective risk measured by Watts & Quimby (1980) is of a similar
magnitude to the correlation between estimated risk and objective risk
reported by Brehmer (1987) - Brehmer in fact uses the term subjective risk,
however, in this study subjects were not actually driving or even simulating
it, thus it seems more appropriate to regard this as estimated risk. Brehmer
had subjects attempt to estimate the number of road accidents occurring at
various junctions and compared these estimates with the actual figures. His
studies are particularly interesting in the fact that the accuracy of judgments
of estimated risk did not appear to be affected by driving experience. Indeed
there were no significant accuracy differences between driving instructors
and 13-year-olds with no driving experience; he concludes that such
judgments are based on general experience about the nature of moving
objects. Also of interest from the Brehmer studies is the observation that
accident statistics were almost universally overestimated.
The overestimation of estimated risk is at first sight surprising, both
because the common assumption that an underestimation of true risk might
be a major cause of road accidents (e.g. Evans, 1991, "among the factors
contributing to drivers' speed choice is a systematic underestimation of the
probability that they will be killed", p.152) and on the basis of previous
research on the estimation of risks. Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman
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and Combs (1978) for example in a study on the judged frequency of a
variety of lethal events found that the frequency of deaths from road
accidents was systematically underestimated in relation to other causes of
death. However, the Lichtenstein et al. result is best understood in the
general context of overestimation of low values and underestimation of high
values which has been observed in tasks as diverse as relative loudness
estimation (Stevens & Galanter, 1957) and the estimation of the relative
number of black and white dots in a stimulus (Varey, Mellers & Bimbaum,
1990). When considered in relation to the length of time you would have to
wait at any particular junction in order to observe an accident it is probably
accurate to characterise road accidents as low frequency occurrences.
In contrast with feelings of subjective risk, authors dealing with
estimates of risk have often regarded estimated risk as a multidimensional
concept (Glendon, 1987; Hale, 1987; Johnson & Tversky, 1984) in which
context can influence the relevance of different dimensions. Risk estimates
certainly appear to be relatively malleable, there is evidence that increasing
the availability in memory of risk-related information alters people's
subsequent assessments of risk both for the overall frequency of lethal events
(Lichtenstein et al. 1978) or specifically for the risks involved in traffic
situations (Groeger & Chapman 1990). Although it is not clear that
subjective risk can be biased in this way theories of driving which stress a
schematic or conceptual representation of the environment (e.g. Dubois,
1991; Fleury, Mazet & Dubois, 1988; Groeger, 1988, 1989; Riemersma,
1988) might suggest that biases in the perception of the environment would
indirectly lead to biases in subjective risk, either because risk is an important
aspect of such schemata or because subjective risk would result from the
inconsistency between the environment and pre-existing schemata.
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General Discussion
Memory clearly plays some role at all levels of the driving task,
however, there is relatively little research which looks directly at drivers'
memories for driving situations. It appears that memory in this sense can be
quite varied, for situations where memory is important, e.g. remembering
where your car is parked, memory appears to generally be fairly good.
However, for aspects of driving where memory for events is not so clearly
necessary it may be surprisingly poor. Drivers may normally have no
memory at all for actions performed at the operational level, moreover, there
is a suggestion that in some circumstances memory for actions and
information at the tactical level may also be almost entirely absent. There
has, however, been very little research which looks directly at this issue and
thus at this stage suggestions about the normal levels of memory
performance or about the variables which may influence it remain largely
speculative.
A variable which has played an important role in many theories of
driving behaviour is subjective risk and it seems likely that this may have
important influences on drivers' memory for situations for a number of
reasons. One possibility is that time gap experiences may cease when
something dangerous is likely to happen. The deviation of a situation from
expectations, the breaking of safety margins, or the recognition of a
potentially dangerous situation may produce subjective risk which is likely to
coincide with the need for attentional resources, which if provided might
cause an enhancement of memory.
This suggests another reason why memory might be related to subjective
risk, simply because it is advantageous to the organism to have memory
organized that way (c.f. J. R. Anderson, 1990). In order to learn from
dangers which have been previously encountered it may be necessary for
such events to be stored in memory even if more mundane ones are not, this
would provide an adaptive reason for situations in which subjective risk was
present to be specially treated in memory. Although driving itself is an
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extremely recent skill in evolutionary terms, such a link between potential
danger and memory may have proved useful in many other situations (e.g.
McGaugh, 1990).
However, the major reason to think that there is an important link
between subjective risk and memory is that in other areas of psychology
there have almost always been found to exist significant relationships
between arousal and memory. It has been suggested that subjective risk in
driving may have many similarities with emotional arousal in other
circumstances, thus the best way to make predictions about the potential
effects of subjective risk on memory for driving situations is to review the
general literature on the relationship between arousal and memory.
The assumption made above was that it would be useful for subjective
risk in driving to promote accurate memory and thus aid the driver in
avoiding such situations in the future. It can be seen by the same argument
that if the effect of subjective risk was to systematically alter memory in any
other way this would also have important consequences for the future
avoidance of dangerous situations. As will be discussed in the following
chapter there is evidence that in some circumstances arousal may in fact
impair or systematically bias memory. If this were the case in driving it
would have important implications for peoples' ability to learn to avoid
danger. On these grounds alone the relationship between subjective risk and
memory for driving situations clearly deserves some research.
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Chapter 2
Arousal and Memory
Although there is to the author's knowledge no previous research which
has investigated relationships between subjective risk when driving and
subsequent memory for driving situations, there have been numerous studies
which consider the influences on memory of constructs such as mood,
arousal or stress. There has recently been a very considerable interest in the
effects of mood on memory, see for example the volume of papers edited by
Kuiken (1991). There appear to be reliable effects of mood congruency in
recall (Blaney, 1986; though see Parrott and Sabini, 1990) and some
evidence for state-dependent learning with moods (Bower, 1981; though see
Bower & Mayer, 1985). Mood in such circumstances, however, generally
refers to a state such as depression typically continuing for relatively long
periods of time, often hours or days. Although moods are likely to be
important in driving, subjective risk as defined in the previous chapter
appears to be more similar to concepts such as emotional stress or arousal as
they are used in the memory literature.
This chapter reviews a wide range of literature which bears on
relationships between arousal and memory. A number of general theories
which have been used to account for such relationships are first described
and evidence bearing on them is discussed. Then a large number of results
from research on arousal and memory are briefly reviewed. These results
come from a wide variety of sources, ranging from laboratory experiments
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using electric shocks to analyses of one person's memory over a number of
years, from experimental subjects' memories of autopsy slides to normal
people's memory for hearing about Kennedy's assassination. Some of the
apparently contradictory findings from such studies are then discussed in
some detail and an attempt is made to reconcile the differences in results
from different types of research. Finally a few general relationships are
selected on the basis that they are likely to be relevant to the research on risk
and memory for driving situations which is described in the following
chapters.
A Consensus of Opinion?
An area in which much research on the effects of emotional stress or
arousal on memory has been conducted is that of eyewitness testimony.
Clearly it is of interest to know whether the memories of witnesses to crimes
are likely to be altered by the often stressful nature of being a witness to or a
victim of a crime. The general consensus of opinion on the subject - both
among potential jurors and among memory experts - appears to be that
extreme stress will impair memory, E. F. Loftus (1979) reported that 67% of
a sample of over 500 students felt this to be the case. Kassin, Ellsworth and
Smith (1989) found that 70% of a sample of 63 experts felt that this
phenomenon is reliable enough for psychologists to present in court-room
testimony - the experts in this study generally had a PhD in psychology and
over half of them reported having actually testified about eyewitness
testimony. This opinion is shared by Deffenbacher who concludes the
consideration of arousal in a recent review of research on eyewitness
testimony with the statement that "the effect of arousal on witness accuracy
is now also reasonably clear. In those studies where violence level or
intensity of personal threat has been successfully manipulated, accuracy has
been reduced for all or a major subset of witnesses" (Deffenbacher 1991,
p.395).
However, this may only represent one side of the story. In the most
comprehensive review of emotional arousal and eyewitness testimony to
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date, Christianson (in press) concludes that "in considering the Kassin et a!.
(1989) study, there is little evidence to support the view that emotional stress
is bad for memory. Such general statements seem unwarranted both in the
literature and practical settings." Indeed some recent papers in experimental
psychology have appeared to conclude that the effects of emotional stress are
exactly the opposite to those suggested by Deffenbacher. Heuer and
Reisberg (1990), for example, conclude a recent study on eyewitness
memory with the statement "we know from prior evidence that emotional
arousal triggers vivid recollection. The current study indicates that
emotional arousal in fact triggers vivid and accurate recollection" (p.505).
The prior evidence to which they refer is largely work on "flashbulb
memories" (e.g. Brown & Kulik, 1977) which will be discussed later in the
chapter. This does indeed seem at first sight to demonstrate that some of
people's most vivid, detailed and enduring memories are precisely the
memories they have about situations in which they experienced high levels
of emotional arousal.
Clearly there is no complete consensus regarding the effects of emotional
arousal on memory, the reason for this is that there is no single simple
relationship which holds for all types and degrees of arousal on all types of
memory performance. To decide which effects may be relevant to subjective
risk when driving the main findings in fields concerned with emotional
arousal and memory and some of the theories which have been used to
account for them will be briefly reviewed.
Theoretical Accounts of Arousal and Memory:
The Inverted-U Hypothesis
Attempts to explain relationships between emotional arousal and
memory have frequently used frameworks which were originally developed
as descriptions of the general relationship between arousal and task
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performance. Although there have been theories in this area which would
suggest a linear relationship between arousal and performance (e.g. Hull,
1943) the most common claim is that the two variables are related by the
curvilinear pattern known as the inverted-U hypothesis (e.g. Hebb, 1955).
This proposes that with increasing arousal task performance is improved
until an optimal level is achieved and that thereafter further increases in
arousal are associated with a decrement in performance. The inverted-U
relationship has been empirically demonstrated for a number of different
tasks (e.g. Courts, 1942; Stennett, 1957; Bélanger & Feldman, described in
Malmo 1959), however, it is often regarded as a purely descriptive
relationship rather than necessarily implying that arousal per se is affecting
performance.
The Yerkes-Dodson Law
An extension of the inverted-U relationship is known as the Yerkes-
Dodson law (from Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). This states that different tasks
will have different optimal levels of arousal and proposes that the optimal
level of arousal for a task is inversely related to its difficulty. Although the
inverted-U and the more specific Yerkes-Dodson law were initially related to
task performance generally, they have frequently been assumed to predict the
same pattern of results with performance in memory tasks. However, it is
important to remember that the optimal of level of arousal for performance
on a task is not necessarily the same as the optimal level for memory of the
task (e.g. Hamilton, Hockey & Rejman, 1977).
Although the Yerkes-Dodson law appears to be able to make more
detailed predictions than the simple inverted-U relationship, a major problem
in testing the Yerkes-Dodson law is to decide a priori which of two tasks is
the more demanding. This is made particularly difficult because no specific
psychological mechanism is necessarily proposed to explain the relationships
underlying the effect. However, a separate proposal was made by
Easterbrook (1959) which describes an underlying mechanism which is often
assumed to be responsible for both relationships.
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Easterbrook's Hypothesis
Easterbrook's hypothesis assumes that increases in arousal are associated
with a narrowing of the range of cues utilized by an organism in performing
a task. Initially this focusing of attention is hypothesized to improve task
performance by concentrating resources on the salient aspects of stimuli.
However, with increases beyond the optimal level relevant cues will be
ignored resulting in a decrement in performance. This can be seen to be in
accordance with the Yerkes-Dodson law if it is assumed that more difficult
tasks are those which require greater attentional capacity (c.f. Kahneman,
1973). There is an additional prediction about the relationship between
arousal and memory which is commonly made from Easterbrook's
hypothesis. At low levels of arousal it is assumed that attention is divided
among many cues so there will potentially be some memory for all cues. At
high levels of arousal, however, not all cues will be attended to and memory
will clearly be impaired for those which were not. This has led to
researchers making a distinction between central and peripheral information
in a scene and the assumption that arousal will impair memory for peripheral
details but improve it for central ones (see particularly Christianson, in
press).
A phenomenon from the eyewitness testimony literature which had often
been considered an extreme effect of attention focusing in line with
Easterbrook's hypothesis is known as 'weapon focus' (Johnson & Scott, 1976;
Kramer, Buckhout & Eugenio, 1990; E. F. Loftus, 1979; E. F. Loftus, G. R.
Loftus & Messo, 1987). It is suggested that when someone is threatened
with a weapon during a crime the victim may focus his or her attention on
the weapon to a degree which may subsequently hinder identification of the
assailant.
Empirical Evidence for the Inverted-U Hypothesis
Although the theories described above are all frequently cited in the
memory and eyewitness testimony literatures, all three theories have been the
subject of considerable criticism in the more general literature on arousal and
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performance. These criticisms take two main forms, the first is the difficulty
in actually finding data which unequivocally support any of the hypotheses,
the second is the problem of deciding exactly what is meant by arousal.
Before considering the status of arousal as a concept some of the problems in
obtaining empirical support for any of the three relationships will be
discussed.
As M. W. Eysenck (1982) points out, unless studies collect data over a
large range of different arousal levels, there are relatively few patterns of
results which are actually inconsistent with an inverted-U relationship. This
problem, as will be discussed later in the chapter, is particularly germane to
the memory literature where studies often employ only two levels of arousal
(for example those studies reviewed in Deffenbacher, 1983). This of course
provides a situation in which no possible combination of results could falsify
an inverted-U relationship. Moreover, even those studies where there does
seem to be a clear relationship over a number of data points at different
arousal levels (e.g. Courts, 1942; Stennett, 1957; Bélanger & Feldman,
described in Malmo 1959) can often be criticized for the possibility that the
task used to induce arousal actually requires greater levels of attention at
higher levels of arousal itself (Näätãnen, 1973). Although the Yerkes-
Dodson law provides an additional prediction which can be tested, it suffers
firstly from the problem that it is often impossible to define task difficulty a
priori and secondly that even when this is done successfully it is very hard to
be sure that task difficulty does not itself affect arousal. Such problems have
led Neiss (1988) to conclude that the inverted-U relationship is probably
true but only in the psychologically trivial sense that performance is impaired
when the subject is either sleepy or facing an imminent external threat.
Empirical Evidence for Easterbrook's Hypothesis
Tests of Easterbrook's hypothesis have generally involved dual task
paradigms in which the effects of arousal on a main task and a subsidiary
task are compared. The assumption is that increasing arousal should reduce
the number of peripheral cues used and thus impair performance on the
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subsidiary task while improving performance on a main task. M. W.
Eysenck (1982) reviews 49 such studies, most of which are compatible with
the idea that arousal reduces the range of cues utilized. Since the dual task
paradigm is the one normally considered in relationship to Easterbrook's
hypothesis it should be noted that at least one alternative paradigm,
perceptual dominance, produces completely contrary results, in non-aroused
conditions central stimuli dominate attention while with mild arousal
peripheral stimuli dominate (Shapiro, Egerman & Klein, 1984; Shapiro &
Johnson, 1987; Johnson & Shapiro, 1989; Shapiro & Lim, 1989).
Although the evidence from laboratory studies is sometimes equivocal,
the general principles which actually apply to performance of complex tasks
in real life appear to be relatively clear. In a summary of research conducted
in genuinely dangerous environments (e.g. parachute jumps, war, deep sea
diving), Baddeley (1972) concludes: "A dangerous situation will tend to
increase level of arousal which in turn will focus the subject's attention more
narrowly on those aspects of the situation he considers most important. If
the task he is performing is regarded by him as most important, then
performance will tend to improve; if on the other hand it is regarded as
peripheral to some other activity, such as avoiding danger, then performance
will deteriorate" (p.545). The conclusion that the effects of arousal will
depend on the subject's interpretation of the importance of the task at which
they are engaged is extremely important in interpreting studies of arousal and
memory which are discussed later in this chapter.
One other important point emerging from M. W. Eysenck's (1982)
review is that different methods of producing arousal appear to show rather
different effects on the main and subsidiary tasks. For example electric
shocks or anxiety generally impaired a secondary task and left the main task
unaffected, however, using incentive or noise as an arousal manipulation
often improved main task performance leaving the secondary task
unaffected. Although both these patterns of results are consistent with
Easterbrook's hypothesis the differences make it hard to actually predict an
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expected pattern of results for any new experimental manipulation of arousal.
This highlights the second major difficulty with the theories, the general
assumption that there is a unitary dimension of arousal.
The Concept of Arousal
The idea that arousal, or activation, constitutes a unitary physiological
dimension was important to a number of theorists particularly in the late
fifties (e.g. Duffy, 1962; Lindsley, 1951; Malmo, 1959), however, it has
since become clear that the numerous physiological measures which have
been taken as different indices of arousal are in fact not highly correlated
(Cattell, 1972). It has become more common to treat physiological arousal
as being based on two or three separate and partially independent systems
(e.g. Hockey, 1979; Lacey, 1967; Neiss, 1988, 1990; Vanderwolf &
Robinson, 1981; Venables, 1984), for example by proposing separate general
effects of arousal, activation and effort (Pribram & McGuiness, 1975).
To deny that there is single quantity that can be characterised as arousal
makes it much more difficult to generalize the results of research using any
particular measure or manipulation of arousal to other situations. Making
predictions about the effects of new stressors is particularly difficult given
that combinations of stressors may actually counteract each other rather than
being additive in their effects (Hockey, 1984). Despite such problems,
particularly in attempts to define specific neuropsychological correlates to all
its forms, the concept of arousal, or activation, continues to be widely used in
psychology (e.g. K. J. Anderson, 1990; Revelle & D. A. Loftus, 1990).
Despite difficulties in interpreting arousal as a unitary physiological concept,
it may make sense as a psychological one. Thayer (1986, 1989), for
example, has shown that self-report measures of how peppy, active or
vigorous a person feels correlate well with a broad range of physiological
measures of arousal, usually better than the intercorrelation of such measures
with one another. Nonetheless, Thayer distinguishes two separate
psychological dimensions of arousal, one ranging from feeling tired to
feeling energetic and the other ranging from feeling calm to feeling tense.
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One line of research which does appear to support the idea of arousal as
an important psychological construct while simultaneously making empirical
tests of its effects more complex is the work of H. J. Eysenck on individual
differences (H. J. Eysenck, 1967; H. J. Eysenck & M. W. Eysenck, 1985).
H. J. Eysenck proposed that a fundamental difference between introverts and
extraverts is their chronic levels of arousal, introverts having generally
higher levels of arousal than extraverts. Although it is not clear that the
extraversion-introversion dimension is the only personality factor related to
arousal (M. W. Eysenck & Folkard, 1980), there is now considerable
evidence that there are individual differences in both levels of arousal and the
effects of additional arousal (e.g. Blake, 1967; Colquhoun & Folkard, 1978;
Revelle, Humphreys, Simon & Gilliland, 1980). This of course means that
in principle the same minor arousal manipulation may impair the
performance of one subject and yet improve the performance of a different
subject and nonetheless remain consistent with an overall inverted-U
relationship. Despite this difficulty, when successfully controlled for,
individual differences can be used to provide an additional manipulation of
arousal and have been shown to produce the typical interaction between
arousal and retention interval in memory discussed below (Howarth & H. J.
Eysenck, 1968).
Other Theories of Arousal and Memory
In addition to the theories discussed above which are concerned with the
effect of arousal on performance generally, there are also a number of
theories which consider directly the effects of arousal on memory. One such
theory is the "Now Print!" mechanism (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Livingston,
1967a, 1967b) which has been proposed as a special memory mechanism
which operates only at times of great arousal to encode specific details of the
situation, this will be briefly considered when evidence about flashbulb and
vivid memories is discussed below. Another mechanism which has
previously been considered important is the repression of emotional events
(Freud, 1915/1 957), although there is some support for such an effect in the
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long term studies of personal memories discussed later, repression as a
mechanism has received relatively little attention in the recent literature in
cognitive psychology. It was, however, the dominant theory driving some of
the earlier experimental work on arousal and memory.
Laboratory Studies of Arousal and Memory
A classic study on short term verbal recall seemed to show that reading
highly emotional words impairs memory, a finding which at the time seemed
to support notions of repression. In the study (Levinger & Clark, 1961)
emotional words were shown to produce higher fluctuations in galvanic skin
response (GSR) than non-emotional ones, free-associates produced to these
words were less likely to be subsequently recalled than associates of non-
emotional words produced at the same time. This effect, however, appears to
interact with retention interval in a way that is not necessarily consistent with
repression interpretations. Subsequent studies (e.g. Kleinsmith & Kaplan,
1963, 1964; Parkin, Lewinsohn & Folkard, 1982) have found that recall for
associates to emotional words, or even nonsense syllables evoking high
GSRs, is worse after short retention intervals (e.g. 2 minutes) but better alter
longer intervals (e.g. 7 days).
One problem with the above studies which used GSR to different words
as a manipulation of arousal is that the words producing high arousal were
not necessarily the ones which would have been predicted a priori. This is
particularly clear given that the result was also obtained using nonsense
syllables rather than meaningful words (Kleinsmith & Kaplan, 1964). In a
study by Maltzman, Kantor and Langdon (1966) using a priori classifications
of high and low arousal words, recall for high arousal words was
significantly better than that for low arousal words both immediately and
after 30 minutes, this highlights the sometimes counterintuitive capacity for
artificial stimuli to elicit arousal. However, using more natural stimuli,
traffic safety films, Levonian (1966, 1967, 1968) has also shown that arousal
can impair immediate memory while enhancing performance on a delayed
memory questionnaire. This interaction between arousal and retention
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interval does appear to be robust. Revelle and D. A. Loftus (1990) review 24
studies using a variety of arousal manipulations and learning conditions, 18
of these studies show the expected interaction of arousal with retention
interval. Eleven of these studies actually show the striking reminiscence
effect where recall in the arousal condition is actually better after a delay
than immediately after learning. There is also some evidence for a similar
effect in more applied settings (Scrivner & Safer, 1988), however, this may
be more appropriately considered to be an example of hypermnesia with
repeated testing (e.g. Payne, 1987).
Theoretical Accounts of the Interaction with Retention Interval
The interaction between arousal and retention interval has been
interpreted as evidence for Walker's action decrement theory (Walker, 1958;
Walker & Tarte, 1963) which assumes that memory traces require a period of
consolidation which can be enhanced by arousal, but which initially inhibits
access to the trace. M. W. Eysenck (1976, 1977, 1982), however, reviews
evidence against this interpretation focusing particularly on a number of
cases where arousal appears to improve immediate retention.
A general information processing approach which appears to account
both for the effects of arousal on task performance and the interaction
between arousal and retention interval in the memory literature has been
proposed by a number of researchers (e.g. Broadbent, 1971; Hockey, 1979).
This view holds that arousal improves the rate of information transfer from
input to output but potentially impairs the use of information in short term
memory. According to this view the inverted-U relationship between arousal
and performance has two quite separate components. Improvements in
performance with increasing arousal at low levels are taken to be a function
of the increasing speed on information transfer. Decrements at high levels
are assumed to be the result of the impairment to short memory. This
approach has been extended into the "tick rate hypothesis" (Humphreys &
Revelle, 1984; Revelle, 1989) which considers the rate of information
sampling to be the important underlying factor. Increasing rate of
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environmental sampling with arousal improves information transfer but
creates interference in short-term memory from competing information being
sampled. Despite the interference in short term memory, the overall increase
in information sampled will improve long term memory. This theory has
also been phrased in terms of firing thresholds in neural nets (Revelle & D.
A. Loftus 1990). There does, however, appear to be very little evidence to
directly support such theories which thus remain largely speculative.
Studies Using Arousing Stimuli
Most of the studies discussed so far have used laboratory tasks, often
ones in which the source of arousal is artificial and quite separate from the
material to be remembered. Of course this is not necessarily the case in a
more complex setting such as memory for driving situations. In such a
setting arousal is expected to arise naturally from the situation confronting
the driver and it is likely to be memory for the source of arousal which is of
particular interest (e.g. memory for the behaviour of another vehicle involved
in an accident). Fortunately there have been a large number of more recent
studies which have used more meaningful manipulations of arousal. There
are number of different ways in which more naturalistic studies have been
conducted ranging from laboratory studies using slides and films to field
studies which have recorded people's memories for staged or naturally
occurring arousing events. A broad range of different types of research that
are relevant will be considered below. The first important difference
between such research and the earlier laboratory work is that in such research
the items to be remembered are generally themselves the source of arousal.
Studies which use arousing stimuli as the items to be remembered often
produce results which can be described simply in terms of von Restorff
effects. A von Restorff effect (Wallace, 1965) refers to the common finding
that a single distinctive item will tend to be remembered better than
surrounding ones, a phenomenon which has often been linked with an
impairment in memory for immediately preceding and following items in a
list (Brenner, 1973; Detterman, 1975, 1976; Erdelyi & Blumenthal, 1973).
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Thus studies which, for example, have involved showing subjects a series of
slides with just a few of them being arousing, e.g. autopsy slides (Kramer,
Buckhout, Fox, Widman & Tusche, 1991) or disfigured faces (Christianson
& Nilsson, 1984), have shown impairments in memory for paired associates
to the arousing stimulus or anterograde amnesia for subsequent slides.
Nonetheless, subjects in such studies will almost always remember having
seen the arousing stimuli themselves. It seems inappropriate to regard this
enhanced memory for the arousing slide as being evidence for arousal per se
affecting performance - the arousing stimuli are of course different from the
normal ones in numerous ways. Schmidt (1991) reviews a wide variety of
von Restorff-like effects and argues that many of them can be explained
using a single theory of distinctiveness. He defines distinctiveness as an
item's incongruity with respect to active conceptual frameworks. However,
Schmidt specifically excludes emotional stimuli from any general theory of
distinctiveness on the grounds that such stimuli "lead to both physiological
and psychological processes too complex and varied to be explained solely in
terms of incongruity" (Schmidt, 1991, p.537).
Although memory that an arousing slide has been presented is generally
likely to be extremely good, there is evidence that the types of details
remembered about such a slide may be different from those remembered
from more mundane slides. A number of studies have used a similar
methodology to the paired associate learning experiments but concentrated
on memory for details of the arousing slides themselves (Christianson & E.
F. Loftus, 1991; Christianson, E. F. Loftus, Hoffman & 0. R. Loftus, 1991).
In the Christianson and E. F. Loftus (1991) study subjects were shown a
series of slides with a critical slide showing either a woman cycling (neutral
condition), a woman lying on the ground near her bicycle and bleeding from
a head injury (arousal condition), or a woman carrying her bicycle (unusual
condition). The unusual condition was included to provide some control for
von Restorff effects. The critical memory test in each condition involved a
central detail (the colour of the woman's coat) and a peripheral detail (the
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colour of a car in the background of the slide), while watching the slides,
subjects rated the affective quality of the picture. Memory was tested by
cued recall, using slides in which both the woman and the peripheral car
were missing and subjects had to describe the missing details, and by
recognition, four-alternative forced-choice (4AFC) tested using an additional
three slides with the colours of the peripheral and central information
changed.
Both recall and recognition for the central colour detail was unaffected
by condition, but the peripheral detail was best recognized and recalled in the
neutral condition and worst in the arousal condition. The results from the
unusual condition fell in between those from the other two conditions. When
the recall instructions specifically requested the colour of the coat, however,
recall for this central detail was significantly better in the arousal condition
than in the other two. These results seem to be consistent with the idea of
attention focusing in the arousal condition, hence improving memory for the
central detail at the expense of peripheral information. Indeed, asking
subjects their first thoughts on seeing the critical slide confirmed that they
were more likely to be thinking about the woman than the general
environment in the arousal condition. Although the results from the unusual
condition were slightly equivocal, the difference in results between the
central and peripheral detail suggests that there is more than just a von
Restorff effect present.
Christianson et a!. (1991) explored this result further by considering the
role that eye movements play in the findings. They found that the same
pattern of results was obtained even when only one eye fixation per slide was
allowed, always on the central detail. In a separate experiment they actually
monitored the eye fixations of subjects while watching the slide and found
that in the arousal condition subjects fixated more often on central details,
though for less time per fixation. However, in that particular experiment
there was no significant difference between conditions in memory
performance for the peripheral detail although the central detail was better
BIBL
LONDEN
UMY
AROUSAL AND MEMORY 50
recalled and recognized in the arousal group. They interpret the studies as
showing that not only are central details more likely to be attended to in the
arousal condition, but that since even when only one eye fixation is permitted
the same results occur, there must be differences in the processing of
arousing material in addition to the original attentional effect. This argument
of course relies on the questionable assumption that eye movements
adequately describe the distribution of attention to a stimulus.
Although such studies give a great deal of information about the memory
for individual arousing slides, they may be unrepresentative of normal
situations. This is because the arousing slide in such studies comes as a
complete surprise to subjects rather than being part of a continuing series of
related events. The next extension from such situations to increase the
realism is to show arousing situations in a naturally occurring context, for
example by showing the build up to a crime or road accident.
Studies Using More Realistic Scenarios
A large number of studies have been conducted with particular reference
to eyewitness testimony in an attempt to decide what the effects of high
levels of arousal at the time of a crime are likely to be on the testimony of a
victim or witness. One of the most often cited studies is that by E. F. Loftus
and Burns (1982) in which 266 subjects watched a short film of a bank
robbery. There were two versions of the film, in the violent version a small
boy had been playing outside the bank and was shot in the face as the robbers
made their getaway. In the non-violent version of the film the same boy
appeared, but instead of showing the shooting incident the film continued
with scenes inside the bank. The critical test item in the memory phase was
the number 17 written on the boy's football jersey. Only 4.3% of the subjects
in the violent condition could subsequently recall the number on the jersey
whereas 27.9% in the non-violent condition were able to despite actually
having seen the boy for a shorter period of time. Similar results were
obtained when the memory test was a 4AFC recognition test using different
numbers as alternatives. E. F. Loftus and Burns interpreted these results as
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retrograde amnesia produced by mental shock, and suggested that the
impairment occurred at the time of storage of the memory. Similar results
have been reported from other studies using filmed events in the same way,
with arousal being manipulated by the violence of the incident depicted in
the film (Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Clifford & Scott, 1978).
One important caveat to the E. F. Loftus and Bums study is that the test
of memory could be considered to be one for a peripheral detail. When in a
separate study using the same stimulus material subjects who had watched
the film were contacted approximately seven months later, 46% of the
subjects who had viewed the violent film could still recall the essence of the
film while only 21% from the non-violent condition could (Christianson &
Loftus, 1987). Clearly then the arousal condition has not impaired all forms
of memory for the story, the arousing scenario itself appears to be more
memorable than the non-arousing version.
Other studies have used a series of slides making up the story instead of
a film. This typically increases the control the experimenter has over the
situation, however, the results of these studies have been much more varied.
One of the most interesting of these studies is by Christianson and E. F.
Loftus (1987). In this study subjects watched a series of 15 slides showing a
mother and 7-year-old son. The pair leave home and walk through town,
look for a taxi, take the taxi to school, and then the mother makes a phone
call and retums home. In the arousal condition the same beginning and
ending to the sequence was used, but in the middle the boy was hit by a car
and shown lying on the car bonnet bleeding heavily before being transported
to hospital. While watching the slides subjects wrote down the most
distinctive feature of each slide. Subjects were given a memory test after
either 20 minutes or 2 weeks. In the test phase subjects first attempted to
recall the features they had written down and then performed a 4AFC
recognition task attempting to identify the slide they had viewed from among
three distractors showing a slightly different view of the same scene. The
results appeared to show that irrespective of retention interval the recall task
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(assumed to be a test of central information) showed performance on the
critical slides which was best for subjects who viewed the arousing version
of the film. The recognition test (assumed to be a test of peripheral
information), showed the reverse result, with recognition performance being
worse for subjects in the arousal condition. Six months after the original
experiment 89% of subjects from the arousal condition could still recall the
essence of the story while only 51% from the neutral were able to.
Christianson and E. F. Loftus interpreted these results as supporting the idea
of attention focusing in the arousal condition consistent with Easterbrook's
hypothesis.
Although the Christianson and E. F. Loftus (1987) study appears to tell a
convincing story in terms of attention being focused on central information in
the arousal condition, other studies have not produced such clear results. An
earlier study using the same type of stimulus material (Christianson, 1984)
showed impaired recall of central events in the neutral condition, but only at
long retention intervals (2 weeks rather than 12 minutes) and no significant
difference between conditions on the 4AFC recognition test for peripheral
details. A critical difference in this study was that subjects simply sat and
watched the slides while physiological measures were recorded, a similar
procedure to one used recently by Heuer and Reisberg (1990).
Heuer and Reisberg performed a very similar study to the Christianson
and Loftus (1987) one. Here subjects watched a series of 12 slides, this time
a mother and son visit the father at his work-place, the mother calls a cab and
departs. In this study the difference between conditions was that in the
neutral set of slides the father was a car mechanic seen fixing an engine,
while in the arousal version the father was a surgeon operating on a badly
injured patient. In this study the subjects simply watched the slides while
their heart rate was recorded and they listened to a sentence describing the
event in each slide (e.g. "Father was able to find the broken connection"
versus "Father was able to restore the severed limbs"). The crucial memory
tests were administered two weeks later and consisted of a free recall phase
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and a 4AFC recognition test for a series of 120 specific questions related to
aspects of the 12 slides. The 120 recognition items were categorized into
central and peripheral details by four judges, using Rosch's (1978) basic level
as a criterion. The basic level "is that level of abstraction that is appropriate
for using, thinking about, or naming an object in most situations in which the
object occurs" (Rosch, 1978, p.43). Any detail falling below this level was
regarded as peripheral. Information given in the recall protocols was
categorized into central and peripheral using the same technique.
Although there were additional conditions in the Heuer and Reisberg
study the interesting comparison is between the arousal and neutral
conditions. Surprisingly the recall data appeared to show enhanced recall of
information in the arousal condition, both for peripheral and central
information, though this contrast only reached significance for the central
information. In the 4AFC recognition test memory was again enhanced for
the arousal group, particularly for the critical group of slides, this
improvement, however, was again present both for peripheral and central
details. Arousal in this study appeared to have a beneficial effect on memory
for both types of information quite contrary to the predictions of
Easterbrook's hypothesis and to the results of the Christianson and Loftus
(1987) study. Some possible interpretations of this difference are given at
the end of this chapter.
Staged Events and Field Studies
In an attempt to increase the realism of events used to study the effects of
arousal, several investigators have attempted to stage events which would be
expected to induce arousal. One of the most cited examples of such research
is an unpublished study by Johnson and Scott (1976) where subjects waiting
for an experiment overhear a violent argument next door followed by a
person coming through the room carrying a bloodied letter opener. Although
subjects in the study could almost all subsequently remember seeing the
weapon they were worse at identifying the person holding it than in a
comparable condition where the subjects had heard an ordinary conversation
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followed by a person passing through the room carrying a pen. A study by
Peters (1988) showed a similar result comparing subjects' memories for a
nurse giving them an inoculation with that for a researcher subsequently
encountered, they found that face recognition was impaired for the nurse,
another result suggesting memory impairment for an arousing event.
It is possible that the presence of the weapon, or the actual injection
taking place is important in such results. For comparison, Toglia, Payne,
Nightingale and Ceci (1989) found that the threat of taking a blood sample
alone did not appear to affect overall levels of performance at list learning,
face recognition for a nurse who did not in fact take a blood sample or cued
recall for an earlier conversation. In addition, Leippe, Wells and Ostrom
(1978) have used a staged theft methodology where higher levels of arousal
actually seemed to improve face recognition. It seems possible, however,
that the latter two studies were using substantially lower levels of stress than
the former two and this may well account for the difference in results.
The most realistic arousal conditions, although normally the least
controlled memory tests come from studies which have looked at memories
for actual crimes. Yuille and Cutshall (1986), for example, interviewed 13
witnesses to an actual shooting incident and found that the most highly
stressed witnesses actually gave marginally more detailed statements. This
methodology unfortunately confounds proximity to the actual events with
arousal since the most stressed witnesses were naturally the ones most
closely involved in the incident. However, it is clear that the high levels of
stress they reported experiencing did not have disastrous effects on their
ability to recall the event. Similar findings are reported in Yuille and
Cutshall (1989) and Fisher, Geiselman and Amandor (1989). Kuehn (1974)
in an analysis of victim reports of 100 crimes found that crimes in which the
victim was threatened by a weapon were neither more nor less completely
reported than those in which no weapon was used. However, he did find that
injured victims provided less complete reports than uninjured ones and that
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victims of robberies provided more complete reports than the victims of rape
or assault.
Although a number of researchers have argued that the only relevant
research in eyewitness testimony is that which involves actual crimes
(Clifford, 1978; Lindsay & Wells, 1983; Malpass & Devine, 1980), there are
major difficulties with carrying out such research. In addition to the lack of
experimental control and the near impossibility of determining the true
details of the actual event, the subjects in such studies are often difficult to
contact initially. A further problem is that in most cases the witnesses'
recollections of the events may have been biased by descriptions already
given in interviews with the police and discussions they may have had with
others. In other cases witnesses may not be prepared to relive the actual
events for research purposes (for example, the actual victim in the 1986
Yuille and Cutshall study).
An alternative source of personal memories of highly stressful events is
to interrogate subjects' autobiographical memories for any event which they
personally found highly stressful. One particular branch of such research
which has recently caused considerable activity and controversy is the field
of "flashbulb" memories and this will be considered first before more general
research on autobiographical memories is discussed.
Flashbulb Memories
In 1973 Esquire magazine asked a number of famous people where they
had been ten years earlier when they heard that John Kennedy was
assassinated. Brown and Kulik (1977) were struck by the fact that people
were generally able to answer this question without difficulty, the important
point being not that they remembered the assassination but that they
remembered apparently irrelevant details such as where they were and what
they were doing when they heard the news. Although the specific
physiological mechanism which they proposed to explain the effect, based on
Livingston's (1967a, 1967b) "Now Print!" theory has attracted little support,
the basic demonstration of a surprising ability to report such memories even
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after considerable delays attracted a great deal of interest and has now been
found in a large number of studies (e.g. Bohannon, 1988; Christianson, 1989;
Colegrove, 1899; McCloskey, Wible & Cohen, 1988; Pillemer, 1984;
Winograd & Killinger, 1983; Yarmey & Bull, 1978).
McCloskey et al. (1988) argue that it is not necessary to propose a
separate memory mechanism such as that proposed by Brown and Kulik
(1977) to account for flashbulb memories. They argue instead that flashbulb
memories can be regarded as an extreme but normal type of autobiographical
memory - though see also Schmidt and Bohannon (1988) and Cohen,
McCloskey and Wible (1988). Some variables which have been regarded as
important in forming flashbulb memories are the emotionality (Bohannon,
1988; Christianson, 1989; Pillemer, 1984), consequentiality (Brown & Kulik,
1977; Christianson, 1989) and surprisingness (Brown & Kulik, 1977;
Christianson, 1989) of the event and the amount it is rehearsed (Bohannon,
1988; Brown & Kulik, 1977).
Neisser (1982) also argued that it was not necessary to propose a
separate memory system for flashbulb memories, he suggested that rehearsal
was the most important component of the phenomenon, noting particularly
that such memories are not necessarily veridical, instead he emphasised the
role such memories may play as a connection between personal and public
history. However, several studies have suggested that rehearsal may not be
that important a factor (Pillemer, 1984; Winograd & Killinger, 1983).
Where it has been assessed, the variable which most consistently predicts
both degree of elaboration and the consistency over time of such memories
appears to be the emotionality of the original event (Conway, 1990). This
appears to be particularly important where long retention intervals are
involved (Pillemer, 1984).
Vivid Memories
The importance of emotionality in flashbulb memories is consistent with
research which has considered autobiographical memories generally rather
than memories associated specifically with newsworthy national or
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international events. These studies have indicated that people may have
particularly vivid memories for personal events of particular emotional
importance to them individually (Christianson & E. F. Loftus, 1990; Conway
& Bekerian, 1988; Pillemer, Goldsmith, Panter & White, 1988; Pillemer,
Rhinehart & White, 1986; Rubin & Kozin, 1984; Strongman & Kemp, 1991;
Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990). Indeed in the Rubin and Kozin (1984)
study subjects were asked to describe "flashbulb memories" without the
constraint that they had to be related to newsworthy events. In this study
only 4 out of a total of 174 memories reported were actually related to public
events. When asked to think particularly of traumatic events (Christianson &
E. F. Loftus, 1990, Experiment 1), rather than vivid memories per Se, the
main types of situations described were the death of relative (18% of the
memories that were described) divorce of parents or friends (14%) or traffic
accidents (14%).
Both flashbulb and vivid memories can be inaccurate and do show some
forgetting over time (McCloskey et al., 1988) and there certainly are
memories of this type which do not necessary involve emotional arousal at
the time. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to conclude, as Heuer and
Reisberg (1990) did, that many of peoples most vivid memories are related to
events of high emotionality. Such research of course suffers from the
problem that there is no suitable control in terms of memory for more
mundane events, nor are there adequate methods for actually determining the
accuracy of the memories reported. These problems can be addressed by
studies where individuals have conducted long term studies of their own
memories.
Single Case Studies of Autobiographical Memory
One of the most impressive techniques for investigating
autobiographical memory is the personal study of the experimenter's own
memory. In such studies records of a very large number of events are taken
over a considerable period of time and memory for the events is
subsequently tested. Unfortunately this method is enormously time-
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consuming and only two major studies have been conducted (though see also
White, 1982). Although the conclusions of such studies are in principle
limited to the memories of the two individuals who conducted them (Linton
1975, 1978, 1982, 1986, and Wagenaar, 1986), both researchers were
potentially interested in emotion as a factor in memory and the studies
provide an enormous database of everyday events for which memory has
been systematically tested.
Linton reports "small and unimpressive" (1982, p.87), though positive
correlations between emotionality and recall. These correlations, however,
apparently increase when emotionality ratings are made at the time of recall
and may increase with the age of the memory (Linton, 1986). She also
reports that "negative memories" were systematically less available than
others (1986, p.59). Wagenaar (1986) also found that memories rated as
unpleasant at the time were less well recalled than pleasant ones (for
durations of up to two years), despite this, events with higher emotional
involvement ratings ("moderate" to "extreme") were generally recalled better
than those with lower ratings ("nothing" or "little") at all retention intervals
studied, though again this was a relatively small effect, r(1603)=O.07.
The sampling of events in these two studies was not completely random
(see for comparison Brewer, 1988), nonetheless the studies do suggest that
although emotionally arousing circumstances can sometimes be well
remembered even after very considerable delays (c.f. Wagenaar &
Groeneweg, 1990) it seems unlikely that actual feelings of emotional arousal
at the time are either necessary or sufficient to cause dramatically enhanced
memory. Moreover, in the case of negatively valenced emotions there is
evidence that they may actually impair recall.
General Discussion
At the beginning of this chapter the apparently contradictory conclusions
from Deffenbacher (1991), Christianson (in press) and Heuer and Reisberg
(1990) were quoted. This final section will attempt to use the material
reviewed to reconcile these conclusions and provide predictions about the
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relationships between subjective risk and memory for driving which will be
explored in the experimental chapters.
Deffenbacher (1983) reviewed the literature available on the relationship
between emotional arousal and eyewitness testimony and concluded that the
results were consistent with the idea that the general inverted-U relationship
between arousal and performance could be used to account for the memory
findings. In his 1991 paper he reviews subsequent studies and states that
"there seems little reason to alter this interpretation at present"
(Deffenbacher, 1991, p.388).
Deffenbacher's argument is that those studies which show enhanced
memory in arousing circumstances are operating on the ascending portion of
the inverted-U function, while those which show impairment are operating
on the descending portion of the curve associated with high arousal levels.
This argument does provide a plausible explanation for the differences
between the results from some of the memory studies described earlier. The
assumption is that studies such as the Toglia et al. (1989) and Leippe et al.
(1978) studies are characterized by generally low levels of arousal, whereas
studies such as those by Peters (1988) and Johnson and Scott (1976) have
been successful in inducing the higher levels of arousal assumed to be
associated with violent crimes. Thus his argument is that although both
effects exist, the important effect as far as eyewitness testimony is concerned
is that high levels of arousal in actual crimes are I kely to lead to impaired
memory performance. It should, however, be remembered that the evidence
from studies of eyewitnesses in actual crimes is equivocal (Kuehn, 1974;
Yuille & Cutshall, 1986).
A more serious problem with Deffenbacher's approach in terms of the
ability to generalize the results to other settings is that his distinction between
studies which did and did not successfully manipulate violence level or
personal threat can be argued to be post hoc. It will not always be possible to
decide a priori whether any new arousal manipulation in a different setting
should operate on the lower or upper portion of the curve. Nonetheless his
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advice may be the most appropriate for expert witnesses to give in court
cases where the levels of arousal are clearly at the most extreme (e.g. rapes
and assaults, Kuehn, 1974).
If Deffenbacher is correct in his conclusion that effective arousal
manipulations result in an impairment of memory, how is it possible for
Heuer and Reisberg (1990) to conclude just the opposite, both from their
experimental results and a review of previous research? Although it can be
argued that the arousal manipulation in their particular study could be
operating on the lower portion of the curve, it does appear that numerous
studies on vivid and flashbulb memories have suggested that highly
emotionally arousing life events are remembered in surprising detail over
very considerable retention intervals.
If some special mechanism such as that implicated in the "Now Print!"
theory (Brown and Kulik, 1977; Livingston, 1967a 1967b) were operating in
cases of flashbulb memories it is likely that similar findings would have been
observed in the eyewitness testimony literature. There does not seem to be
any strong evidence for this. In fact, the most remarkable aspect about
flashbulb and vivid memories appears to be neither their detail nor their
accuracy but rather their longevity. This is consistent with the idea that the
importance of such memories is that they provide and anchoring point
between personal and public life (Neisser, 1982) or a coherent
autobiographical history for the individual (Conway, 1990). The fact that
these memories are often associated with emotional situations is interesting
but dangerous to interpret given that there is no easy way to estimate the
number of similar emotional situations which did not lead to such memories.
This problem is highlighted by the studies of Linton and Wagenaar which do
make some attempt to sample a range of autobiographical events, both of
which while showing slight memory improvements for emotional items
appear to show memory impairments if the items were regarded as
unpleasant.
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In understanding the effects which may be observed of subjective risk in
everyday driving the most important studies are likely to be those using
moderate levels of arousal. Generally the results from these studies can be
interpreted in terms of Easterbrook's hypothesis, however, before applying
the hypothesis indiscriminately to memory results it is necessary to
remember the limitations of the hypothesis with regards to task performance
generally. These limitations are well captured in the earlier quotation from
Baddeley (1972) and can be extended to memory research. In interpreting
memory results in terms of Easterbrook's hypothesis there appear to be three
important questions to ask and these will be considered in turn.
1. What task is the subject actually performing?
The importance of considering the task which the subject is actually
performing is made clear by the difference in results obtained from studies
using different tasks during the arousal manipulation. Christianson and
Loftus (1987) had subjects write down the central detail from each slide and
Christianson and Loftus (1991) had them evaluate the affective quality of
each slide, both these studies showed results which appeared to be consistent
with Easterbrook's hypothesis. Christianson (1984), Heuer and Reisberg
(1990) and Christianson et al. (1991, Experiment 3), however, all simply had
subjects watch slides without any particular task being specified, none of
these studies showed clear support for the hypothesis. This appears to be as
would be predicted from the Baddeley quotation - where the subject is
performing an important task arousal causes attention to be focused more
centrally on it, improving performance. However, where the task is not
regarded as important arousal has a different effect, merely causing
distraction. Thus attention focusing may only be observed where there is a
well-defined task which is regarded as important by the subject.
2. How is the task related to the source of the arousal?
The source of arousal is critical for a number of reasons, in addition to
the considerable literature suggesting that arousal is not a unitary
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physiological dimension, there is the problem that in memory tasks an
external source arousal may simply distract subjects while memory for an
arousing item itself may be subject to von Restorff effects. In fact, it seems
likely that many of the studies of memory for arousing stimuli (e.g.
Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Christianson eta!., 1991) are not showing any
effects at all which should be directly attributed to the subject's general level
of arousal. This is suggested particularly by the fact that there is no evidence
of retrograde or anterograde effects around the arousing slides. This may be
also true of studies which have used a series of slides as the arousing stimuli
rather than a single one. Christianson & Loftus (1987), unfortunately, report
their data in such a way that it is difficult to know whether retrograde and
anterograde effects were present, however, there was clearly no interaction of
effects with retention interval (20 minutes versus 2 weeks).
3. What defines central versus peripheral information?
The studies using arousing stimuli with many components and exploring
memory for different aspects of the stimuli separately (e.g. Christianson &
Loftus, 1987, 1991; Christianson et al., 1991; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990) have
the additional problem of deciding a priori which aspects of a stimulus are
central and which are peripheral. There is no clear single definition of this
difference and authors do not use the distinction consistently. Christianson
(in press) argues that the number on the victim's football jersey in the study
by Loftus and Burns (1982) is a peripheral detail, however, in his own study
(Christianson & Loftus, 1991) the colour of the victim's coat is regarded as a
central detail, this distinction appears to be essentially arbitrary. An
alternative approach was adopted by Heuer and Reisberg (1990) in their
study. Here details were categorized as either central or peripheral using the
distinction that items below Rosch's idea of a basic level of categorisation
(Rosch 1978) were regarded as peripheral. This method at least appears to
have some principled rationale underlying it, however, Rosch herself stresses
that the basic level is not necessarily fixed (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson &
Boyes-Braem, 1976), but depends both on the interaction required with the
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object and the expertise of the observer (Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). Moreover,
it should be noted that according to this distinction the central detail in the
Christianson and Loftus (1991) study might well have been categorized as a
peripheral detail.
It is clear that a standard definition of central and peripheral information
is necessary before studies using this distinction can be compared with one
another and a clear pattern of results described. If the central-peripheral
distinction is to be linked with Easterbrook's hypothesis it is necessary to
take into account the task which is being performed, thus central information
should be only that which is necessary for successful performance of a well-
defined task. In those studies where the subject's task is to simply watch
slides it is not clear how to make this distinction, and indeed such studies
have not shown clear differences between memory for central and peripheral
information. Where the task has been to make judgments of affective tone or
extract central information from a slide, differences have emerged between
central and peripheral details and this may well reflect the fact that attention
to arousing information or central information (which are assumed to be the
same thing) is explicitly required for task performance. Note that this
proposed definition of the central/peripheral distinction is completely
consistent with Rosch's notion of a basic level. Unlike Heuer and Reisberg's
use of the distinction, however, making explicit reference to the task
performed allows the definition of the basic level to depend on context in the
way Rosch suggests (e.g. Rosch et al., 1976; Rosch, 1978).
Conclusions
Research about vivid and flashbulb memories suggests that in
exceptional circumstances, for example serious car accidents, memories of
events are formed which are exceptional in their longevity. However, it is
not clear that such memories are completely accurate and it is unlikely that
arousal at the time of encoding is the only important factor in creating such
memories. Other factors such as the personal and public importance of the
event are equally likely to be of significance and it seems inappropriate to
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regard such memories as providing evidence for a general enhancement of
memory related to increased arousal or emotion.
If there is a single function relating arousal and memory it seems likely
that it takes the inverted-U shape which is often suggested to describe the
relationship between task performance and memory, with memory
impairments occurring at very low or very high levels of arousal. It is,
however, possible that applied research which demonstrates impairments in
memory at high levels of arousal does so because of differences in attention,
e.g. weapon focus, rather than general effects on all aspects of memory.
There is as yet little evidence that some effects which appear to be important
in the laboratory can be demonstrated in more applied settings, for example
the interaction between retention interval and arousal, and individual
differences in the effects of arousal on memory.
A special case of such research arises in the situations where the item to
be remembered is also the source of arousal. Here two separate effects may
be observed, firstly a distinctiveness effect where a single arousing item in a
series is likely to be well remembered simply because it is different from the
other items, and secondly an effect which has been described as similar to
Easterbrook's hypothesis in general task performance. The way
Easterbrook's hypothesis has been applied to memory research is by making
a distinction between central and peripheral information associated with the
arousing item. The assumption is that in cases of arousal, memory for
central information will be enhanced while memory for peripheral
information will be impaired.
Although these differences appear when the item to be remembered is a
source of arousal, it is not clear that memory differences for central and
peripheral information are actually related to general effects of arousal on
performance. Such memory differences appear instead to be limited to the
single arousing item and not appear for the immediately following ones
although general physiological arousal would be expected to still be present.
An additional difficulty with the central-peripheral distinction as it has been
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used by researchers is the rather ad hoc definition of the difference. One
possible approach to clarifying the distinction has been suggested. This is to
attempt to define information as either central or peripheral to the task at
which the subject is engaged during encoding rather than central or
peripheral per Se. This distinction may be relatively easy to make in memory
for situations encountered when driving. In this case it may be possible to
define the main task for the subject in terms of the demands necessary for
driving the car.
This chapter has reviewed a wide range of research which may bear on
relationships between subjective risk and memory for driving situations. A
general inverted-U function has been described which suggests that memory
may be best for intermediate levels of subjective risk, being impaired in
cases of either unusually high or low subjective risk. In addition, two
important effects have been described which relate to memory for the
arousing events themselves. Firstly, if they are isolated unusual events, risky
situations may be well remembered because of their distinctiveness in a way
which is analogous to a von Restorff effect. Secondly, when considering the
types of detail remembered it is likely that attention focusing as described by
Easterbrook's hypothesis may be important. It is possible that risky
situations may lead to enhanced memory for information centrally important
to driving in the situation but show impairments in memory for information
peripheral to the driving task.
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Chapter 3
Risk and Recall on the Road I
A distinction was made in the first chapter between three types of risk,
objective, estimated and subjective, and the assumption was made that
subjective risk is closely related to the concept of arousal as it has been used
in much memory research. One of the first questions which this thesis
attempts to answer is whether these three definitions of risk can be sensibly
used, and if they can, how are the three types of risk related to one
another? Since the role of subjective risk is of particular importance in
theories of driving, one part of this question is simply whether drivers are
aware of subjective risk, either as a feeling which is occasionally present in
immediately dangerous situations but otherwise non-existent (consistent with
a zero-risk theory of driving) or as a continually fluctuating levei which they
can be aware of when questioned and which they attempt to match to some
target level (consistent with RHT).
Previous research related to memory for driving situations has been
confined largely to exceptional situations (e.g. actual accidents) or memory
for specific items (e.g. road signs). The little evidence available about the
level or accuracy of memory in everyday driving situations suggests that it
may be surprisingly poor. However, testing memory for a specific item like
a road sign does not tell the researcher about overall levels of memory which
may have been quite good for other details. Some questions which need to
be addressed are what the overall quality of memory for driving is like, what
types of detail can or can not be remembered, and what variables, both
psychological and environmental, are related to memory?
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Study 1
Subjective Risk and Subsequent Recall
This study was intended to explore some of the previously discussed
concepts while subjects are actually driving a car in normal urban traffic
environment. It was designed to address three particular questions.
1. Are subjects aware of risk when driving?
This study differentiates between the three types of risk described in
Chapter 1, objective, estimated and subjective. Objective risk has previously
been measured in two different ways. The first definition, as in the studies
described by Brehmer (1987), is simply the total number of accidents
recorded at a particular junction, the advantage of this measure is that it is a
relatively easy number to obtain and easy for subjects to understand. The
second measure of objective risk is that used by Watts and Quimby (1980),
the total number of accidents occurring at a junction divided by the average
traffic flow at the junction. This second measure has the advantage of
corresponding more closely to the theoretical risk of accident faced by any
randomly chosen individual road user passing through the junction.
However, it is a more difficult number for subjects to actually understand
and make their own estimates of.
Making an estimate of the second measure of objective risk would mean
estimating the number of accidents per ten million vehicles (or some other
large denominator). In addition to sounding complex to subjects, this
appears to be a two step process, estimating both accidents and traffic flow
and combining the two estimates to make a final number. As the intention in
this study was to have subjects make estimates while they were driving it
was decided that this would be unnecessarily difficult. Instead the first
measure of objective risk, total accident numbers, was chosen as the number
for subjects to estimate. A preliminary exploratory questionnaire study made
it clear that subjects find it very difficult to give accident figures unless they
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have some anchors for their estimates. In this earlier study a group of
subjects gave unconstrained accident estimates for various manoeuvres at a
set of traffic lights (original statistics from Hall, 1986). This method
produced significant differences between mean estimates for different
manoeuvres, F(22,286)= 1.92, p<0.Oi. Moreover, these differences did seem
to reflect the objective figures - the correlation between mean estimate and
the actual figure across the 23 scenarios used was 0.702, p<O.Ol.
Unfortunately, the subjects found these estimates extremely difficult to
make and the differences between subjects' estimates was enormous. Annual
accident estimates for a single manoeuvre with an actual accident figure of
33 ranged from 0 to 450. To avoid some of the problems associated with
such a broad range of responses it was decided to limit the potential variance
in accident estimates for the following study. This was done by giving
subjects a maximum number of accidents which their estimates could not
exceed.
Measures which other researchers have described as corresponding to
subjective risk have been changes in heart rate or GSR and subjective
estimates of the chances of being involved in a near miss (Watts & Quimby,
1980). None of these measures directly assesses a driver's feelings of risk.
The first two are physiological measures which are related to arousal but
which the driver may not actually be directly aware of. Even as measures of
arousal they have problems, they are difficult to record and analyse, and they
may be dependent on things which are related only indirectly to either
arousal or subjective risk (e.g. preparations for action, expectancies, physical
effort involved in driving). Moreover, as was suggested by Thayer (1986,
1989), the simplest and most representative single overall measures of
arousal may be verbal ratings. The approach used by Watts and Quimby
does not have these problems, however, it encourages the subject to focus on
the external environment in order to answer the question, moreover it makes
the assumption that subjective risk is determined only by the chances of a
near miss, it may clearly relate to other factors as well (e.g. severity of
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consequences in an actual accident, presence of a police car, unpredictability
of pedestrians). In actually measuring subjective risk while driving it seems
appropriate to encourage drivers to think about the external environment in a
more normal way and answer questions about subjective risk with reference
to their internal states. Nonetheless, for subjects to use a scale reliably it is
necessary to anchor a scale of subjective risk estimates to possible outcomes,
the procedure used in this study to measure subjective risk is a compromise
between these requirements.
Assuming that it is possible to collect information about estimated and
subjective risk from subjects, it will clearly be of interest to see to what
extent other variables are related to these measures. This is done both in
terms of subjects characteristics (e.g. age, sex, driving experience, accident
history, previous knowledge of Cambridge roads) and situational factors (e.g.
speed driven, number of other vehicles present, time spent at junction).
2. What can drivers recall about situations they have driven through?
In an ideal memory study drivers would be unobtrusively monitored
during a range of everyday driving situations and subsequently questioned
about the events. There are, however, a number of problems with such an
approach. It would be extremely difficult to assess the accuracy of recalls
when the information available to the driver could not be exactly determined.
It would be problematic stopping drivers in the course of ordinary driving for
research purposes, and it would be impossible in such circumstances to
record variables such as subjective risk while they were actually driving. An
alternative approach, and the one which is adopted in this study, is to have
drivers explicitly performing a driving experiment, though not one that
appears to be related to memory, and to present them with a surprise memory
test later in the experiment. This approach clearly has the disadvantage that
subjects may not be driving in their normal manner, however, the
information available to the driver can be accurately recorded on video and it
is possible to have them give ratings of both subjective and estimated risk.
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Since there is relatively little research available on which to base
assumptions about the type of information a subject will have available in
memory it seems that recall should be as free as possible in terms of overall
content. However, since the study is conducted in an area known to most of
the subjects it is important that the memories reported should be specific to
the drive just completed rather than general knowledge about that area of
Cambridge. Many of the variables which may be related to subjective risk
may also be related to subsequent recall of situations. Making a video record
of the drive both makes it possible to check the accuracy of memories and to
record driving variables which may also be related to memory.
3. Is subjective risk when driving related to subsequent recall?
Although the primary aims of this particular study are to simply explore
the concept of risk in driving and the nature of memory for driving generally,
the principle aim of the thesis as a whole it to decide whether memory for
driving situations is related subjective risk al the time. In order to compare
risk and memory it is necessary to have the two available for the same well
defined events. This creates the constraint that the situations recalled should
be those at which risk ratings were given. Such situations should also be
those for which objective statistics are available. This means that the
fundamental unit of analysis, both for this study and for most of the other
studies reported in this thesis, is the junction. This has the advantage of
being an area for which accident statistics are routinely recorded as well as
being easy to specify to subjects and involving many of the more interesting
aspects of driving.
It is not completely clear what the predictions of the literature on arousal
and memory would be for this task. One possible prediction might be based
on the inverted-U relationship between arousal and performance, this would
imply that with increasing risk memory would first improve and then
decline. However, it is not clear where on this hypothetical curve normal
driving would lie, thus both enhancements or impairments of memory with
increasing risk could be explained within this framework. A more specific
Annual Mileage
Mean Age (Sd)
Mean Yrs
Licensed (Sd)
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prediction might be produced on the basis of Easterbrook's hypothesis, this
would state that memory for central details would be enhanced with
increasing risk, while memory for peripheral details would be impaired.
Although there has been some ambiguity in previous research about the
central-peripheral distinction, it is relatively clear in this case that central
should refer to the information which is actually required for the task of
driving, the remainder being peripheral.
Method
Subjects
These were 30 drivers who had responded to an advertisement placed in
a local newspaper. Subjects ranged in age from 21 to 61 and all had held a
full British driving licence for at least three years. They were divided into
three groups by reported average annual mileage and the groups were
balanced for age and the number of years licensed as shown in Table 3.1.
There were 5 men and 5 women in each group.
Group 1
0-5000
40.1 (13.1)
15.9 (9.1)
Group 2
5000-10000
39.6 (12.2)
20.2 (11.6)
Group 3
10000+
43.2 (12.4)
20.8 (10.6)
Table 3.1: Subject characteristics for Study 1.

RISK AND RECALL 73
Stimuli/Apparatus
Subjects drove a Vauxhall Astra along a 21.4 mile route in and around
Cambridge, see Figure 3.1. The route started with approximately 4 miles of
fairly quiet roads (not shown in Figure 3.1) to allow the subjects to get used
to the handling of the car and to practise performing the two judgment tasks.
The main route was chosen to include 40 junctions representing a range of
different junction types, traffic flows, and accident histories. Further details
of the 40 junctions including accident histories and mean annual traffic flow
figures are given with an enlarged map of the route in Appendix 1.1.
A Panasonic F- 10 video camera was attached to the passenger's seat head
rest and this was used to record an unobstructed view straight ahead through
the windscreen during the drive. The camera was focused on infinity and
positioned near the mid-line of the car.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a session lasting approximately 90
minutes. The main study consisted of two phases as follows:
Judgment Phase:
Subjects drove the car once around the route shown in Figure 3.1.
Directions were given by the experimenter who was seated in the rear of the
vehicle. At each of the 40 junctions the driver made two judgments. A
junction where judgments were required was signalled by the experimenter
sounding a tone when the vehicle was at the centre of the junction. The two
judgment tasks were described to them before the drive as follows.
Risk rating: "Give a rating on a scale from 1 to 20 to indicate the risk
you are feeling at the moment the tone sounds. A rating of 1 would
mean that you feel there is no possible way in which an accident could
occur in this situation, a rating of 20 would mean that you feel that you
could be involved in an accident at any moment."
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Accident estimate: "I have obtained the police accident reports for each
junction that you will drive through and have counted all accidents that
have been reported in the last three years on any part of the junction. I
want you to estimate this figure for each individual junction. I have
included all accidents involving at least one motor vehicle, sometimes
these will also have included pedestrians or cyclists. Remember that
minor accidents not involving injury are not normally reported to the
police. No more than 20 accidents have been reported at any junction on
the route, so your estimates should not exceed this figure."
Drivers were asked to give the risk rating immediately they heard the
tone and it was emphasized that this rating should be one of what they were
already feeling when they heard the tone rather than a subsequent assessment
of the risk present. They were, however, encouraged to delay their accident
estimate until they had thought specifically about how busy the junction
would normally be and how it might appear in other conditions. Although
subjects gave the risk rating immediately on hearing the tone it was stressed
that their safety should be the main consideration, thus they should not
attempt to perform any judgment task until they felt comfortable with the
driving situation. It was also stressed that they were free to terminate the
experiment at any time. The two judgment tasks were practised twice on the
roads preceding the actual test route, once when turning left at a large
roundabout and once when turning right at an unsignalized T-junction.
The drives were all conducted in daylight avoiding rush hours. Subjects
were told that the quality or safety of their driving was not being assessed
and they were encouraged to drive as normally as possible.
Before starting the drive and after completing it subjects filled in a
questionnaire in which they were required to rate their ability at 12 different
standard driving manoeuvres. These were the 12 different manoeuvres
required during the drive. These ratings were collected for ongoing research
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in debiasing (see for example Groeger and Chapman 1990) and they will not
be described further in this thesis.
Recall Phase:
The recall part of the experiment started approximately 50 minutes after
the first and 10 minutes after the last of the junctions had been driven
through (the exact times varied considerably depending on driving style and
traffic conditions). Subjects were asked to attempt to remember the 40
junctions for which they had given ratings. Subjects were asked to bring a
particular junction to mind and then describe the events at that junction in as
much detail as possible. Subjects were asked to continue describing different
junctions until no more stood out in their memory but not to attempt to recall
all the junctions, nor to deliberately recall them in the order they had been
driven through. These descriptions were tape recorded. Subjects were
finally shown a map on which the route was marked and they were asked to
indicate those sections of the route which they had previously known. All
subjects were paid for their participation in the study. The video records of
each drive were subsequently analysed to obtain various additional measures
described below.
Results
The drive through the 40 junctions (not including the practice section)
took an average of 40 minutes the shortest time being 34 minutes and the
longest being 57 minutes. The video records of two of the 30 drives were
incomplete following equipment failures, thus those measures requiring the
complete video record are reported for 28 subjects only. The results are
divided into two main sections. First the results from the judgment tasks are
reported and relationships between these judgments and a variety of
objective measures are explored. In the second section the recall results are
reported and relationships between risk and recall are analysed.
ng
stimate
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Judgment Tasks:
Subjects generally found the judgment tasks relatively easy to perform
and were able to give their first rating immediately upon hearing the tone in
almost all cases. One subject used a wide range of accident estimates but
gave a risk rating of one at all 40 junctions. He was the only subject who
gave this pattern of judgments. In view of the potential theoretical
significance of this pattern of responses this data was included in the
following analyses.
The overall mean risk rating was 4.20, standard deviation 3.89, the
overall mean accident estimate was 7.40, standard deviation 4.62. Table 3.2
gives the mean risk ratings and mean accident estimates for the 40 junctions
together with a number of other measures that will be described later. The
actual distribution of responses across the 20 possible risk ratings and 21
possible accident estimates is shown in Figure 3.2. In addition to
demonstrating the marked reluctance of subjects to use odd numbers in the
middle of the range, the figure makes it clear that the distributions of the two
ratings were rather different, the modal risk rating was 1 whereas the modal
accident estimate was 10.
400
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Figure 3.2: The number of times each of the ratings was used in the risk rating
and accident estimate tasks.
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71.5
22.8
47.5
30.3
24.2
43.2
22.5
49.2
22.6
23.1
35.3
64.1
59.2
26.4
22.8
66.0
42.6
35.1
50.0
31.8
55.1
40.6
39.0
29.7
43.9
62.0
31.0
19.5
37.4
385
47.3
26.8
73.0
33.2
44.2
63.8
71.7
19.4
42.7
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Junction
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
Actual	 Accident Risk
Accidents Estimate Rating
0	 7.87	 5.13
7	 7.97	 4.00
2	 4.90	 2.80
14	 8.20	 3.63
1	 5.27	 3.13
2	 3.83	 2.37
20	 8.73	 6.13
3	 4.80	 3.17
15	 8.60	 3.90
3	 5.67	 4.60
7	 7.00	 4.70
0	 5.30	 3.00
20	 10.1	 5.00
4	 10.3	 5.00
2	 4.90	 6.50
4	 6.90	 3.90
2	 6.90	 6.47
2	 8.67	 5.13
3	 7.67	 3.60
8	 8.00	 4.00
6	 6.36	 3.70
4	 8.53	 5.33
6	 5.70	 2.67
9	 6.53	 3.77
4	 4.87	 3.03
9	 8.93	 4.67
21	 11.9	 7.23
6	 7.17	 3.17
2	 6.63	 3.47
8	 8.23	 3.87
0	 6.67	 243
10	 11.0	 5.97
8	 5.57	 3.47
9	 12.8	 7.43
12	 5.23	 3.03
3	 5.80	 3.73
2	 8.27	 4.53
8	 10.0	 4.83
3	 5.57	 2.83
13	 8.63	 4.80
Vehicles Known
seen	 %Ss
28.8	 80.0
39.4	 83.3
8.50	 80.0
18.6	 86.7
14.9	 70.0
7.68	 66.7
21.1	 73.3
6.96	 60.0
21.3	 63.3
8.96	 56.7
9.93	 50.0
6.36	 43.3
20.7	 56.7
31.8	 76.7
9.18	 60.0
5.40	 63.3
12.6	 63.3
11.3	 70.0
18.0	 70.0
29.0	 70.0
18.6	 73.3
20.8	 80.0
8.60	 63.3
10.6	 63.3
11.3	 63.3
13.6	 66.7
30.0	 83.3
15.1	 86.7
9.97	 93.3
18.0	 86.7
14.5	 90.0
23.8	 90.0
11.8	 86.7
54.8	 93.3
19.8	 86.7
24.3	 86.7
31.4	 86.7
40.0	 86.7
11.0	 76.7
16.3	 76.7
Recall
%Ss
21.4
10.7
0
3.5
0
0
14.3
0
0
3.6
0
3.6
32.1
21.4
3.6
0
50.0
17.9
3.6
10.7
3.6
32.1
3.6
3.6
0
10.7
32.1
14.3
0
7.14
10.7
46.4
0
46.4
3.57
7.14
3.57
25.0
0
39.3
Table 3.2: Details of results for the 40 junctions.
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An analysis of variance with two within subject factors, judgment task
and junction, and two between subject factors, sex and annual mileage group,
shows that the overall difference between the two judgment tasks is
significant, F(1,24)=27.27, p<zO.Ol. As was expected there is also a main
effect of junction, F(39,936)=13.12, p<O.Ol, more importantly there was an
interaction between judgment task and junction, F(39,936)=3.89, p<O.Ol.
This suggests that subjects were able to dissociate the two scales where
appropriate, for example, junction 17, entering a dual carriageway from a
slip road, received the fourth highest mean risk rating of the 40 junctions,
6.47. However, it received a mean accident estimate, 6.90, which is below
the average for the 40 junctions. This appears to be an accurate assessment
of the fact that although joining high speed roads almost always feels
dangerous there had in fact been relatively few accidents recorded at that site
in the three year period studied.
There was also a significant sex by annual mileage group by junction
interaction F(78,936)=1.42, p<O.O5. This complex interaction is not large
and is difficult to interpret, more important is the fact that no other
interactions or main effects were significant at the 0.05 level. This indicates
that there are no large overall differences in the judgment tasks dependent on
the sex or annual mileage of the driver.
The Department of Transportation for Cambridgeshire County Council
provided police accident reports for each of the previous three years (1986-8)
over the entire route. These descriptions were analysed to calculate a
measure of the objective risk of accident at a junction. The measure used
was simply the total number of accidents reported at a junction in this period.
Accidents were included in the total if at least one motor vehicle was
involved and the reported site of the accident was within 50 yards of the
centre of the junction.
The Department also provided current (1989) traffic flow figures for
most of the roads used in the study. The figures available were measures of
the average total traffic flow recorded over a 16 hour period on weekdays
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(excluding Fridays). From these figures it was possible to calculate the
number of vehicles passing through each of the 40 junctions over the same
period. In a few cases data were not available for some of the more minor
roads entering a junction. In such cases estimates were made based on
overall patterns of traffic flow, site knowledge and data from similar roads
nearby. The total number of accidents and the calculated average traffic flow
at a junction are given for the 40 junctions in Table 3.2. An additional
measure of objective risk which is similar to the one used in the Watts and
Quimby (1980) study was obtained by simply dividing the number of
accidents by the traffic flow (note that the units of this measure are
essentially arbitrary).
Relationships between Measures
The first question of interest is whether the various measures of risk are
related to one another, this is initially addressed by calculating correlations
between the four measures. Rather than simply obtaining average values for
the 40 junctions and correlating the averages, hence obscuring the variance in
individual subjects' responses, the procedure described in Dunlap, Jones &
Bittner (1983) was followed and average correlations were calculated.
Correlations between pairs of measures across the 40 junctions were
calculated for each subject individually, the 30 correlations obtained in each
case were then averaged using Fisher's z transformation (Silver and Dunlap
1987).
Correlations calculated this way are generally smaller than those that
would have been obtained by correlating the averages but because they do
not average out the variance from different subjects they provide a more
realistic assessment of the size of an effect for any individual subject. These
correlations are given in Table 3.3 taking the degrees of freedom as the sum
of those for individual subjects (Guilford & Fruchter 1973). This naturally
produces very large degrees of freedom meaning that even relatively small
correlations may be significantly different from zero. The proportion of the
RISK AND RECALL 80
total variance such correlations account for is of course small and their
importance should be judged accordingly.
Accident estimates and risk ratings are strongly related for individual
subjects. Both are also related to the measures of objective risk. For both
measures (total accidents and accidents per 1000 vehicles) the correlation
with accident estimates is significantly higher than that with risk ratings (for
total accidents t(1 137)=4.23, p<O.Ol, for accidents per 1000 vehicles
t(1 137)=2.74, p<O.Ol).
For both accident estimates and risk ratings the correlation with total
accidents is significantly higher than that with accidents per 1000 vehicles,
t(l 137)=9.79, p<O.Ol and t(1 137)=7.13, p<O.Ol respectively. For accident
estimates this is as would be expected since subjects were specifically
estimating the total number. For risk ratings, however, it is interesting that
feelings of risk should be less closely related to a measure of objective risk
which corrects for traffic flow than one which fails to. Indeed, while it is
significantly greater than zero, p<0.05, a correlation of 0.076 accounts for an
extremely small amount of the total variance in subjects' risk ratings. To
better interpret these relationships correlations with a number of other
variables were considered.
RI SK:	 Objective	 Estimated	 Subjective
Accidents
over 3 yrs
Accidents	 1 .00
AccldentsNehs	 (0.839)**
Accident Estimate	 0.31 8**
Accidents I	 Accident	 Risk
1000 vehs	 Estimate	 Rating
1.00
0.156**	 1.00
	
0. 512**	 1.00Risk Rating	 0.201**	 0.076*
Table 3.3: Correlations between risk measures; except for the figure in brackets
values are means of 30 correlations using Fishers z transformation.
All correlations are sgnificantly greater than zero, df=1 140, * if
p<0.05, ** if p<O.01 (df=38, p<0.01 for bracketed figure).
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In addition to the judgment results a number of additional measures were
taken from the videos made during the drive. Individual junctions were
defined by two fixed points which could be readily identified from the video
record. The first point was always sufficiently before the junction such that
signposts for the junction were included in the video and the second point
was approximately 100 yards after the junction. The time taken to pass
between the two points was recorded from the video for each junction and
the number of vehicles visible in that period was also recorded. The time
taken to pass through a junction ranged from 11 seconds to 4 minutes 31
seconds, mean 41.4 seconds. The number of vehicles recorded at a junction
ranged from none to 105, mean 10.4. The distances between the two points
were measured for each junction so that the driver's mean speed at a junction
could also be estimated.
Table 3.2 gives the main measures for each of the 40 junctions, the
measure of recall is described later. The measure of previous knowledge
here is the percentage of the 30 subjects who reported knowing that junction
at least moderately well previously. Prior knowledge ranged from seven of
the subjects who previously knew all 40 of the junctions down to one subject
who previously knew just six, the mean number known was 29.6.
Table 3.4 is an extension to Table 3.3 including the correlations with
four further variables. Correlations with time at junction, average speed over
junction and the number of vehicles seen at the junction are calculated from
the video record for 28 subjects only. The correlations given with whether
the junction was previously known or not is a point biserial correlation with
data from all 30 subjects potentially available, data was coded as 1 if the
junction was previously known and 0 if unknown.
A more comprehensive table showing correlations between variables an
their associated degrees of freedom is given in Appendix 1.2. Once again
some of the correlations, while significantly greater than zero are still
extremely small. However, it is clear that a major factor in both risk and
accident estimates is how busy the junction was. The negative correlations
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between risk measures and the speed at junctions seem initially
counterintuitive, however, speed is strongly negatively correlated with the
number of vehicle seen, r(1064)=-O.564. It is likely that the important point
is simply that busy junctions take longer to drive through, thus they gave rise
to lower average speeds. Any tendency for driving fast to feel dangerous
was hence obscured by the more substantial effect of business.
Time at Junction
Speed at Junction
Vehicles Seen
Known Before
Actual Accidents
Accs /1000 Vehicles
Accident Estimate
Risk Rating
Junction	 Junction
Time	 Speed
1.000
-0 557**	 1 000
0 755**	 -0 564**
0 054	 -0 1 47**
0 .235**	 0.252**
0 105**	 -0 171**
0 354**	 -0 318**
0 .275**	 0.185**
Vehicles Known
Seen	 Before
1.000
0 107**	 1 000
0. 228**	 0.032
0.009	 -0.047
0 364**	 0 050
0 .274**	
-0.026
Table 3.4: Correlations between measures, those significantly different from zero
are marked * if p<0.05, ** if p<0.01, for a full table and degrees of
freedom see Appendix 1.2.
Summary of Judgment Results
Ratings of subjective risk appeared to be relatively easy for most
subjects to give. These ratings were significantly lower than the accident
estimates and interacted differently with junctions, nonetheless, risk ratings
and accident estimates were highly intercorrelated. Risk ratings and accident
estimates were both significantly correlated with the two measures of
objective risk, time spent at the junction, vehicles seen, and the average
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driving speed at the junction (negatively). In all cases the correlation of
accident estimate with the other variables was higher than their correlation
with risk ratings.
Recall Phase:
None of the subjects reported having expected a memory test and most
reported finding it extremely difficult. Several subjects reported that they
felt that they would be able to give far more information if they were
permitted to recall the junctions in the order in which they had been driven.
Coding the Descriptions
Each subject's descriptions were subsequently compared to the video
tape of the drive. Because these videos were not available for two subjects
the recall data is reported for 28 subjects only. The first process in scoring
the data was to assign descriptions to particular junctions, this was done by
the experimenter. About 80 percent of the total descriptions could be
unambiguously assigned to one of the 40 junctions, either because the subject
knew the road names or described the junction or events in sufficient detail
for the description to be uniquely associated with one situation on their
video. In nine cases a subject described a situation which was not at one of
the 40 junctions of interest, these were either descriptions of junctions on the
practice route or events which occurred between junctions on the route, these
were not coded.
This left a total of 171 descriptions of junctions from the 28 subjects. To
ensure that descriptions corresponded to memories for events from the drive
that subjects had just completed, as recorded on the video tape, descriptions
were eliminated from the analysis if they included no correct details about
the actual events at the junction. This was designed to be a very generous
criterion, minimal examples of correct details could be "We didn't have to
wait at the lights" or "There were several cars ahead of us". Simply
describing the junction itself, even in considerable detail, was not sufficient
for a description to be scored as a correct memory of the drive. This was
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specified because such descriptions might reflect only recruitment of
previous knowledge about the junction.
The reason that an extremely lenient criterion was adopted was simply
that subjects generally gave very little detail about the situations they
actually recalled correctly. Examples of the transcribed tape for two of the
subjects and the way in which they were scored are given in Appendix 1.3.
Because there was relatively little detail given and there were generally so
few junctions remembered correctly, no attempt was made to analyse the
types of information that were actually given in the descriptions, specifically,
no attempt was made to classify details as central or peripheral.
It was rarely possible to unambiguously identify incorrect memories,
where descriptions were produced which did not clearly correspond to any
junction on the video there was usually no way to decide what event the
description represented an incorrect memory for. Such descriptions may
have represented incorrect initial perceptions, confabulations, memories for
previous drives, confusions between events at two or more similar junctions
or correct descriptions of information not captured by the video camera.
Because of the ambiguity in interpreting data of this type and the relatively
small amount of it encountered the analysis will concentrate solely on
descriptions which were scored as correct recalls.
There were 136 descriptions of junctions that were coded as correct
memories of the drive. For the analysis of the recall data the basic unit of
analysis will simply be whether a junction was correctly remembered or not.
No distinctions will be made between the amounts and types of detail
actually given for particular junctions.
Recall Results
Subjects correctly recalled a mean of 4.9 junctions each (mm 2, max 8).
Some junctions were clearly recalled more often than others (Cochran's
Q=220.5, df=39, p<O.O1), ranging from junction 17, entering a dual
carriageway from a slip road, which was correctly recalled by 14 of the 28
subjects to 11 junctions which were never correctly recalled. Seven of these
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11 were junctions at which the driver had simply gone straight ahead past a
minor road.
To see which variables were related to a subject recalling a junction,
point biserial correlations were calculated with each junction being scored as
a 1 for a subject that recalled it and 0 for a subject that did not. Relationships
with all the variables obtained and the degrees of freedom used in assessing
significance are given in Appendix 1.2. Correlations across junction
variables are all calculated individually for each subject and then averaged
using Fisher's z transformation. Only those correlations which were found to
be significantly greater than zero at the one percent level will be discussed
here. The highest correlation of any variable with recall was the correlation
with risk rating, r(1064)=0.294. There were also significant correlations with
the actual accident statistics, r( 1 064)=0. 142, average weekday traffic flow,
r(1064)=0.236, accident estimate, r(1064)=0.278, the time spent at the
junction, r(1064)=0.246, the number of vehicles visible in the film,
r(1064)=0.201, and the average speed at the junction, r(1064)=-0.118, all of
which are to a large degree measures of how much would actually have been
happening at the junction.
Note that there is no significant relationship between whether a subject
recalled a particular junction and whether they had known it previously,
r(phi)=0.022, df= 1064. The recall instructions were specifically designed to
make it difficult for subjects to use previous knowledge in the task and
attempts were made to prevent them from mentally retracing the route, a
strategy which several of them would otherwise have adopted. The lack of
relationship between previous knowledge and recall suggests that the
procedure was successful in preventing this.
The most interesting relationship in the data is the relatively high
correlation between risk ratings and subsequent recall and it is worth
investigating this in more detail. The correlation between risk and recall
remains significant even when the effect of any other single variable is
partialled out. Nonetheless, there is more than one pattern of results which
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could produce a significant average correlation between risk and recall. One
possibility is that certain junctions are both intrinsically more memorable and
more risky than others. A second, and more interesting, possibility is that
subjects are actually recalling the situations in which they personally felt at
risk irrespective of any other features of the junction. If this were the case
then a junction would only be more likely to be recalled if the subject had
actually felt at risk even if they knew it to be a generally dangerous junction.
The first possibility can be assessed by using the mean risk ratings and
the percentage of subjects recalling a junction given in Table 3.2. There is a
very high correlation across the 40 junctions between risk and recall,
r(38)=0.791, p<0.01. Note that the actual magnitude of this correlation
coefficient is partly a result of reducing the variance in the data by
correlating averages rather than averaging correlations. This demonstrates
that there are indeed certain junctions which both tend to be rated as risky
and tend to be recalled by many subjects.
Simply calculating correlations across the 40 junctions there are also
significant correlations of recall with accident estimate, r(38)=O.722, p<O.O1,
the time spent at the junction, r(38)=0.690, p<0.Oi, the number of vehicles
seen, r(38)=0.517, p czO.0l, and the actual accident statistics at the junction,
r(38)=0.3 10, p<0.05. It thus seems likely that the junctions which are
recalled may be simply the large congested ones, ones which also happen to
be risky.
To assess directly the differences between situations which were recalled
and those which were not recalled each subject's mean accident estimate and
risk rating was calculated separately for situations which they recalled and
those they did not. These mean ratings, together with the number of vehicles
at the junction and the time spent there, are presented in Table 3.5. The
relationship found in the correlations is confirmed, risk ratings were a mean
2.6 points higher for the junctions subsequently recalled and accident
estimates were 2.9 points higher. Similarly, significantly more traffic was
seen and the junction took significantly longer to pass through. This
When	 When not
Recalled	 Recalled
10.0
6.4
25.7
55.8
7.1
3.8
17.3
39.3
t	 p
6.91	 <0.001
5.52	 <0.001
5.05	 <0.001
7.90	 <0.001
Accident Estimate
RIsk Rating
Vehicles Seen
Time at Junction
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confirms that although the junctions a subject recalls are the ones at which
they reported subjective risk, they are also the busy ones and the ones the
subject regards as likely to be the most dangerous in other conditions; this
means that actual feelings of risk may not be solely responsible for the effect.
Table 3.5: Some comparisons of the situations which were correctly recalled by
each subject with those which were not; d.f.=27.
However, the above pattern of results does not exclude the possibility
that feelings of risk were directly associated with the enhanced recall, to
assess this possibility directly it is necessary to use the junction as the unit of
analysis rather than the subject. Table 3.6 shows the comparison for each
junction of the occasions on which it was recalled correctly with those on
which it was not. To make this comparison the analysis was limited to the 29
junctions which were recalled by at least one subject. The effect of making
the comparison within junctions is to exclude any factors intrinsic to the
junction (e.g. its size, location, distinctiveness) from the results. If the
relationship between recall and other measures is entirely mediated by
characteristics of the different junctions we would expect to find that within
an individual junction there would be no consistent differences between
those occasions when it was recalled and those when it was not recalled on
any of the other variables.
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t
1.85
2.59
0.70
1.06
Accident Estimate
Risk Rating
Vehicles Seen
Time at Junction
When	 When not
Recalled	 Recalled
9.1	 8.0
5.5	 4.3
22.0	 20.9
49.3	 46.7
p
0.076
0.015*
0.492
0.297
Table 3.6: Some comparisons by junction of occasions when a junction was
correctly recalled with occasions on which it was not; d.f.=28.
In fact there is a significant difference in risk ratings, the difference
between ratings, 1.2 points, is smaller than that when the analysis is done by
subjects but is still present. The fact that there is a difference comes as no
surprise, after all, a completely empty, uneventful drive through a junction
would be expected to be both less memorable and less risky than an occasion
when the junction was full of traffic. The surprise is that there are in fact no
significant differences between any of the other three variables when this
comparison is made. The difference for accident estimates approaches
significance but the differences in vehicles seen or time at junction do not.
This seems to imply that drivers' ratings of subjective risk are related to their
subsequent recall of junctions in a way that is at least partially independent
of the actual amount of traffic present and their assessment of the likelihood
of accidents at the junction in other circumstances.
One final question to answer is what form the relationship between risk
ratings and memory takes. This is not trivial to assess since the measure of
recall is binary and there are relatively few points at the high levels of risk.
However, if the number of situations correctly recalled is divided by the
number not recalled at each level of risk it is possible to get some picture of
1-2	 3-4	 5-6	 7-8 9-10 1 1-12 13-14 15-16 17-18 19-20
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the relationship. The solid line in Figure 3.3 shows this relationship, data is
aggregated into pairs of adjacent risk ratings to avoid zeros appearing in any
category. For risk ratings above about eight this appears to demonstrate a
fairly clear inverted-U relationship, however, it should be remembered that
higher points on the risk scale are based on relatively few data points. The
total number of observations for each of the ten points in increasing order of
risk rating are as follows: 532, 230, 146, 75, 64, 24, 13, 16, 9, 11.
5
4
Ratio of
recalled	 3
sItuations
to not
recalled	 2
situatIons
1
0
Risk Rating Used
Figure 3.3: The number of situations correctly recalled divided by the number not
recalled for pairs of adjacent risk ratings.
A more important problem with this treatment of the results is that it
assumes that any particular rating means the same for all subjects. In fact,
the final point on this graph is almost exclusively attributable to one subject
who gave a rating of 17 or over on nine separate occasions during the drive.
With this subject's data removed the results look rather different (the dotted
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line in Figure 3.3), the three remaining occasions on which ratings of 19 or
20 were given (now from three different subjects) were actually never
recalled, however, it would be unwise to base any firm conclusions on results
from just these three situations.
Summary of Recall Results
The overall amount of information given in the descriptions was
relatively low. This may partly reflect the fact that many aspects of the
situation (road layout, signs, shops etc.) were deliberately excluded on the
basis that they could have been obtained from previous local knowledge.
The lack of detail in recalls made it impossible to adequately divide
information into central and peripheral, however, in the sense that most
information given was related to events on the road, the information which
was recalled should probably be categorized as largely central to the task of
driving.
The probability of correctly recalling a junction appears to be related to
many of the same things as subjective risk - traffic seen, time spent at the
junction, objective and estimated risk. However, the most striking result is
the relationship between the ratings of subjective risk themselves and the
subsequent probability of recall. Not only is there a significant relationship
between the two, but this relationship remains significant even when
comparisons are made within individual junctions, a procedure which leaves
no significant effect on recall of estimated risk, number of vehicles seen or
the time spent at the junction.
There appears to be some evidence that the relationship between ratings
of subjective risk and the probability of subsequent recall is not linear. For
risk ratings of eight or lower there does not appear to be any relationship,
recall being consistently rare, this of course constitutes the bulk of the data,
983 of the 1,120 situations scored. Above this point there is a dramatic
increase in the probability of recall with increasing risk ratings. Because
there were relatively few situations which received the highest risk ratings it
is not possible to clearly assess whether this increase continues for all
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ratings, there is some evidence that it may not since once one unusual
subject's data was removed the three situations receiving the highest
subjective risk ratings were in fact never recalled.
Differences Between Subjects:
Although individual differences are not the primary concern of this work
and the number of subjects is relatively small, it is interesting to see what
effects may by present. Three measures not previously reported were also
collected. The first of these was the free speed at which a subject chose to
drive on an unobstructed section of road. Since it was impossible to
guarantee that any section of normal roads would be free from other traffic,
speeds were calculated from the video on four separate sections of road. The
sections used were shortly after junctions 2, 4, 17 and 39. The driving was
considered to be unobstructed if there was no other vehicle immediately
ahead in the film. This was the case for at least one of the sites in all 28
films. For each subject the free speed was calculated as a proportion of the
prevailing speed limit at the site and where there was more than one site
available the average value was taken. Nine of the 28 subjects were found to
have been exceeding the speed limit on at least one of the four occasions.
The other two subject variables of interest were collected in a subsequent
experiment and were thus available for only 25 of the subjects from this
study. These were the number accidents the driver reported having being
involved in over the past five years and the number of near misses they had
experienced in the previous year. Both these numbers were given as part of a
short questionnaire about their driving histories.
In addition the following details were known about each driver: age, sex,
annual mileage, and the number of years they had held a driving licence.
Correlations between all these variables and the various measures used in the
study are given in Appendix 1.2, only the most potentially interesting ones
will be considered here. Correlations were calculated across the largest
number of subjects possible in each case, this can be 30, 28 or 25, see the
degrees of freedom in the correlation table in Appendix 1.2.
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There were no significant correlations between the number of junctions
recalled and any of the subject measures, the largest value was a correlation
of -0.367, d.f.=23, p=0.O71, with the number of accidents reported over the
last five years. This might suggest that people with better memories for
driving situations have fewer accidents. However, the number of subjects is
very small for such an analysis and self reported accident estimates
themselves are not a very reliable measure.
There was a significant correlation between the number of accidents
reported and the mean free speed, r(23)=0.620, p<0.Oi, and a negative
correlation with the number of years licensed, r(23)=-0.414, p<O.O5. The
number of near misses reported was significantly correlated with annual
mileage, r(23)=O.41 8, p<0.05 and with the mean accident estimate given
during the drive, r(23)=0.414, p<O.O5. These and the other subject
correlations in the appendix all appear to be broadly consistent with the
expectations for this type of study. Given the small number of subjects in the
sample and the fact that there are no significant correlations between subject
variables and either of the variables of particular interest, risk ratings and
number of junctions recalled, they will not be considered further.
Discussion
Types of Risk:
This study was designed to make a distinction between three different
concepts of risk: objective, estimated and subjective, the variable of
particular interest being subjective risk. One of the questions most central to
this research was whether drivers can generally report fluctuating levels of
subjective risk. In fact subjects generally found it relatively easy to
understand the rating required and found no difficulty in using it thus the
general conclusion from this study is that drivers do report fluctuating levels
of subjective risk. However, several caveats need to be attached to this
RISK AND RECALL 93
conclusion. The fact that subjects used a range of numbers may of course
only reflect the demands placed on them by the experiment. Given 20
numbers to use, subjects may have assumed that the quantity the
experimenter was interested in must vary in some way, if their own feelings
did not, they may simply have based their responses on aspects of the
environment which did vary, e.g. their speed, proximity to other vehicles etc.
In addition one of the subjects did not show any fluctuations in risk ratings,
in debriefing he explained that he certainly could imagine many risky
situations, but he had not encountered any during the drive. Although this
could be seen as evidence that subjective risk was not present for this subject,
it could equally be regarded as a self presentational bias on the part of the
subject who may have felt that feeling risk would imply dangerous driving.
Subjective risk ratings, surprisingly, were only very weakly related to the
objective risk of accident as assessed by the actual number of accidents
divided by the average traffic flow. The correlation of 0.37 reported by
Watts & Quimby (1980) was of course based on the averaging of ranked data
from all subjects. Applying this procedure to the data from this experiment
would give a correlation of 0.16, still rather lower than the figure from Watts
and Quimby. The reason for this may largely be the types of road used in the
two studies, the roads in the Watts and Quimby study were divided
approximately equally between rural and suburban areas and thus provides
much greater variations in traffic flow, and hence objective risk, than those
used in this study. Watts and Quimby also used many sites which were not
at junctions, sites which generally ranked extremely low on both subjective
and objective risk. These factors increase the overall spread in their data and
may have allowed a higher correlation between the measures.
The fact that subjects could report fluctuating levels of subjective risk
does little to discriminate between theories of risk in driving largely because
these theories do not make sufficiently specific predictions about this subject.
The fact that there were generally fluctuations in rated subjective risk might
appear to contradict zero-risk theory. However, the overall distribution of
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ratings, the majority being very low numbers with the occasional higher one,
might equally be seen as supporting the idea that subjects are generally
feeling no risk at all but occasionally give a high number with the activation
of the "subjective risk monitor" (Näätänen & Summala, 1976). Similarly,
although Wilde (1988) claims that a potentially variable level of subjective
risk is necessary for RHT, a prediction of RHT is that subjects would modify
their behaviour in order to actually experience constant levels of subjective
risk which would only alter if they changed their "target level of risk". The
success subjects should be expected to have in this matching process and the
situations under which they would change their target levels are not clear.
Subjects' estimates of risk appeared to be broadly sensitive to differences
in the actual accident statistics at the range of junctions encountered. The
average correlation observed, 0.32, between a subject's estimates and the true
figures is only slightly lower than the correlation of 0.4 reported in Brehmer
(1987) and any difference could be accounted for by the different range of
actual accident statistics used in the two studies. The variables which are
most highly correlated with estimated risk are the subjective risk rating given
at the same time (r=0.5 12) and average traffic flow as recorded by
Cambridgeshire County Council (r=0.398, see Appendix 1). Since the
intercorrelation of these two variables is only 0.251, it appears that risk
estimates may have been sensitive separately to both the feelings of danger
experienced and the general amount of traffic at the junction.
Recall Performance:
The generally low levels of memory which had been expected were
obtained. However, this may have largely been caused by the difficulty of
the actual recall task. The memory task may have been made inappropriately
difficult by preventing subjects from using strategies such as mentally
retracing the route and scoring as correct memories only aspects of the
situation which could not have been provided from previous knowledge.
Indeed, there is no doubt that with appropriate cueing subjects could have
recalled considerably more information about many aspects of the drive.
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In many cases the actual amount of information given in the recalls was
minimal, limited to whether a subject had to wait at the junction and whether
there was other traffic around at the time. This is consistent with the types of
variables which were correlated with recall of a particular junction - the
amount of traffic seen and the time spent there. It is also consistent with the
type of situation which was almost never recalled - going straight ahead past
a minor road. There are two clearly different ways in which the failure to
recall such situations could be explained. One could either argue that the
lack of action required by the subject at the time prevented any memories
from being encoded, or that the lack of aspects of the situation which were
specific to that particular drive made it extremely difficult to actually retrieve
a memory for it.
One surprising aspect of the recall results was that they did not seem to
be related to previous knowledge of the junctions, it had seemed possible that
even simple junctions would be memorable if they had not been previously
encountered. This could have been explained either as an effect of the
greater attention required to drive through unfamiliar junctions, or by the
novelty of the stimuli making them more distinctive in memory. Any such
effects may, however, have been countered by the difficulty in uniquely
describing a junction which was not previously known. This issue will be
discussed further in Chapter 5 where the predictions of schema theory in
relation to memory for driving are considered. If any relationship did exist
between recall and previous knowledge it may simply have been obscured by
the binary nature of scoring junctions as either known or not known and the
fact that most of the subjects actually knew most of the junctions previously.
Risk and Recall:
There is no doubt that subjects in this study were more likely to recall the
situations in which they had experienced risk. This result was particularly
striking when junctions were considered individually and it became clear that
this relationship was at least partly independent of the amount of time spent
at the junction, number of vehicles seen and the judgment of estimated risk
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made at the same time. A number of different theoretical accounts for this
finding will now be considered in turn.
Experimenter Effects
The simplest account for the relationship between risk and recall in this
study was that subjects recalled the risky situations because they knew it was
an experiment about risk, this knowledge could have affected their
performance both at encoding and at retrieval. While subjects were actually
driving around they were required to give risk ratings, this may have caused
them to concentrate unusually on the risky situations and think about them to
a much greater degree than they would have normally. Added to this, at the
time of retrieval subjects may have simply assumed that since this was an
experiment about risk, the experimenter really wanted them to recall the
risky situations. Because of this subjects may have ignored memories of
mundane situations and concentrated instead on recalling the ones which
they remembered as risky. With a study designed the way this one was there
is very little that can be done to decide whether this relatively uninteresting
possibility is the major factor determining the results, the studies in the
remainder of this thesis are, however, designed to address this problem.
A von Restorff Effect
Even if subjects are deliberately attempting to recall the risky situations
it would still be interesting that they are able to do so in a way that makes
them distinct from all the other situations encountered. One thing which
could account for a greater distinctiveness in memory of risky situations
would be the idea that risky situations constitute a small number of rather
unusual items among a large number of more similar ones. This would of
course be analogous to the typical von Restorff effect in which a single
distinctive item is better remembered than the rest of a list. Certainly risky
situations did appear to be unusual events, the top 50% of the rating scale
was only used for 6.5% of the situations encountered. Equally importantly,
those which were remembered appear to have been unusual in more than the
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fact that they were busier than other situations, risk appears to have had a
quite separate effect.
An Inverted-U Relationship
Some of the difficulties with interpreting results from many experiments
as supportive of an inverted-U relationship were discussed in Chapter 2.
However, if a full inverted-U is observed in a single experiment as in some
of the early experiments on task performance and arousal, the evidence
appears to be particularly clear. On initial inspection the curve in Figure 3.3
appears to show just such an inverted-U relationship, however, on closer
scrutiny it is clear that the points which represent a downturn in the curve are
not based on enough data to make them reliable. It is possible that there is
quite genuinely some impairment of recall for the most risky situations,
however, such risky events were simply extremely rare. The only way to test
this possibility would be to have data from many more such risky events. It
is perhaps fortunate that such events are in fact rare and it would clearly not
be ethical to increase their frequency, instead, the ascending portion of the
curve which is clearly present will be considered in more detail. This portion
of the curve is consistent with the idea that in normal driving levels of risk
are low and that the increases in this level observed in most of this study
correspond to levels still below the optimal level for performance on the
memory task.
Easterbrook's Hypothesis
A mechanism which was proposed in Chapter 2 for explaining the
inverted-U relationship was that of attention focusing occurring at higher
levels of arousal in line with Easterbrook's hypothesis. While this may
provide some explanation of improvements in memory with small increases
in risk, the clearer implication of attention focusing is that the types of detail
remembered in high arousal conditions should be more central than those in
low arousal conditions (Christianson, in press). Although it might have been
possible to attempt some form of categorisation of the types of detail which
RISK AND RECALL	 98
were recalled at different risk levels, it is not clear that the data from this
study are really powerful enough to support such an analysis. Relatively
little detail was actually available from the recalls and the between subjects
variability was extremely large. Another difficulty with making distinctions
about types of detail given is that the way the recall test was structured may
have encouraged subjects to report mostly central details and no attempt was
made to interrogate subjects' memories for details which may have been
peripheral. These problems are addressed in later studies.
Conclusions
The most important finding from this study was simply that drivers were
able to comfortably give ratings of subjective risk. These ratings seemed to
vary in a way which was related to variables such as the amount of traffic
present in the situation and estimated risk. Subjects were able to recall many
of the junctions they had driven through, though the quality of this recall was
variable. There was strong evidence for a link between the probability of
recalling a junction and the level of subjective risk reported by the subject
when driving through the junction. However, because of the limitations in
the design of the study it was not clear to what extent the link between
subjective risk and recall was caused by less interesting factors such as the
type of memory test used, the fact that risk ratings were previously given by
the drivers, and the expectations subjects may have had of what the study
was about. In order to control these factors and investigate the relationship
between risk and memory further, most of the remaining studies reported in
this thesis use simulated driving in a laboratory setting.
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Chapter 4
Risk and Recognition in the Laboratory
In the previous study subjectively risky situations were more likely to be
subsequently recalled than their less risky counterparts. However, the
reasons for this were not clear. Making risk assessments while they were
driving may have caused drivers to think about risks in the situations to a
greater extent than they would have in the course of normal driving.
Moreover, the use of recall as a measure of memory may have meant that
subjects were using thoughts about risk as a retrieval cue, indeed they may
have assumed that it was this information that the experimenter was most
interested in. Although risk seemed to be the variable with the most direct
relationship to the probability of a driver recalling a situation there were
many other aspects of each situation which were not analysed. Since such
information will differ from one drive to the next it is difficult to assess the
role which this variable information plays in memory.
The previous study allowed the collection of around 20 hours of video
tape of driving in Cambridge under normal conditions. The purpose of the
study described in this chapter was to use these tapes to explore drivers'
memories for these situations when they were viewed under laboratory
conditions. Using a recognition test to measure memory for the stimuli
makes it possible to assess any general biases in responding separately from
subjects' actual ability to correctly recognize individual stimuli. It has the
additional advantage that every subject can be shown identical films, thus
interpretations of differences in performance are not limited to comparisons
between junctions.
One problem with the type of on-road research used in Study 1 is that
each situation encountered is unique to a particular driver and can not be
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repeated. This meant that in order to have a measure of subjective risk for a
situation it was necessary to have subjects give ratings in each case. In a
simulated setting, however, it is possible to produce identical situations for
all drivers, this means that much greater control is available over the precise
testing circumstances for each subject. Additionally, if it is found that
feelings of risk in the simulator are similar to those experienced when
actually driving, and there is reasonable consistency between subjects in
assessments, it is possible to infer the feelings of risk a subject is likely to
experience when confronted with a particular situation without actually
asking the subject to give ratings at the time.
Study 2
Recognition Memory in a Video-Based Experiment.
The purpose of Study 2 was to carry out a laboratory task which allowed
measurement of feelings of risk and a controlled test of memory for driving
situations. The driving simulator at the Applied Psychology Unit allows
subjects to sit in the shell of a car and watch videos of driving situations
projected at near life size. To be able to compare results from the simulator
with those previously obtained on the road it was decided to have subjects
perform precisely the same judgment tasks that had been used in Study 1,
giving ratings of subjective risk and estimates of accident statistics.
To provide more easily quantifiable measures of memory performance,
Study 2 used a recognition paradigm. Piloting recognition tests for films
gathered in Study 1 made it clear that for subjects who know Cambridge
moderately well recognizing a particular Cambridge junction from among
distractors is relatively easy, thus to avoid ceiling effects it was decided to
use multiple different films of various individual junctions as recognition
stimuli.
5000-1 0000
42.5 (15.7)
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Method
Subjects:
The subjects were 36 drivers, 18 of them men, 18 of them women, who
had responded to the newspaper advertisement described for Study 1.
Twenty-five of these subjects had taken part in Study 1. They were divided
into three groups on the basis of self-reported average annual mileage and the
groups were balanced according to age and number of years licensed as
shown in Table 4.1. There were 6 men and 6 women in each group. All
subjects were paid for their participation.
Group 1
	 Group 2
Annual Mileage	 0-5000
Mean Age (Sd)	 41.5 (12.9)
Mean Yrs	 19.2 (11.2)	 20.1 (12.7)
Licensed (Sd)
Table 4.1: Subject characteristics for Study 2.
Group 3
10000+
39.8 (12.4)
18.4 (9.7)
Stimuli:
The stimuli in this study were videos recorded during Study 1. The
video in each case showed an unobstructed view through the windscreen of a
car during the drive through the junction. Each video started sufficiently
before the junction to allow signs for the junction to be seen and lasted until
the car was approximately 100 yards past the junction. The films were
selected to show only 10 of the possible 40 junctions, details of the junctions
chosen are given in Table 4.2.
The 10 junctions were chosen to represent a range of different junction
and manoeuvre types and a corresponding range of mean risk ratings and
accident estimates. For each of the 10 junctions six films were chosen as
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exemplars of that particular junction. These exemplars were chosen to
reflect a range of different traffic situations within each junction and were
intended to be representative of the full set of 28 films of each junction
available from the drives in Study 1.
Junction	 New	 Junction	 Manoeuvre
number from junction	 type	 type
Study 1
	
number
Crossroads
4	 1	 with traffic	 Ahead
lights
7	 2	 Roundabout	 Right turn
Crossroads
9	 3	 wilhtrattic	 Leftturn
lights
Unsignalized
11	 4	 1-Junction	 Ahead
on left
Unsignalized
12	 5	 T-Junction	 Ahead
on right
19	 6	 Roundabout	 Ahead
T-Junction with
22	 7	 trafficlights	 Rightturn
on right
Crossroads
23	 8	 with traffic	 Ahead
lights
Crossroads
27	 9	 with traffic	 Right turn
lights
31	 10	 Roundabout	 Left turn
Mean risk
rating from
Study I
3.63
6.13
3.90
4.70
3.00
3.60
5.33
2.67
7.23
2.43
Mean acc-
ident estimate
from Study 1
8.20
8.73
8.60
7.00
5.30
7.67
8.53
5.70
11.90
6.67
Table 4.2: Details of the 10 junctions used in Study 2.
Films were excluded if weather conditions made viewing difficult, if for
example the windscreen wipers were used, or if the total length of the film
would exceed one minute. Although the length of the film in seconds differs
between exemplars, the six films of any particular junction show exactly the
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same distance travelled by the car between two fixed points. Further details
of the 60 films used in this study are given in Appendix 2.
Individual films were separated by a 10 second featureless blue field.
Films had no sound track but those shown in the judgment phase had a 1.5
second tone recorded in the middle of the manoeuvre at the point in the
junction at which subjects had given ratings in Study 1. Four different tapes
were made, two for the judgment phase, two for the recognition phase. Each
tape contained 30 films, recognition tapes each contained 15 films from each
of the two judgment tapes.
Apparatus:
Films were shown in the Applied Psychology Unit's driving simulator.
This is the front half of a Vauxhall Astra mounted in a darkened room with
the driver's seat in its normal place but the windscreen glass removed. All
car controls are in place but subjects were not required to use them in this
experiment. Approximately four metres away from the driver's head position
is a large white screen (1.5 metres high by 1.7 metres wide). A Sony VPH-
1O4OQM video projector is mounted under the bonnet of the car and projects
onto the full extent of the screen. Films were played on a Panasonic AG-
6200 VHS video cassette recorder controlled by a Panasonic NV-A850 Auto
Search Controller.
Procedure:
Subjects were tested individually in the driving simulator. The
experiment consisted of two phases, first a judgment phase and then a
recognition phase, each phase lasted approximately 25 minutes in total.
Between the two phases subjects answered two brief questionnaires which
together required approximately five minutes to complete. The first
questionnaire was about their driving experience including the questions
about accidents and near misses that were reported in Study 1. The second
questionnaire was a revised version of the questionnaire given in Study 1 for
ongoing work on debiasing.
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Judgment phase:
Subjects watched 30 films, three exemplars of each of the 10 junctions.
When the subjects heard the bleep in the centre of each junction they
performed the same two verbal rating tasks that were used in Study 1, first a
risk rating, then an estimate for the actual accident statistics for the junction.
The phrasing of the questions and the scales used were as in Study 1.
Recognition Phase:
Subjects watched a further 30 films, again three exemplars of each of the
10 junctions. Fifteen of the films, the targets, were exactly the same pieces
of film that had been shown in the judgment phase. The other 15 films were
distractors, these were chosen from the exemplars of the same junctions
which had not been seen by the subject before. After each film was seen
subjects had to decide whether they had seen the film section before or not
and give a rating of their confidence in their decision.
Recognition Task: "For each film you must decide whether you saw
the film in the first part of the experiment, responding 'Yes' if you did
and 'No' if you did not. Remember it must be exactly the same film, not
just the same junction. Then give a rating on a seven-point scale to
indicate how confident you are in your response where 1 would indicate
a complete guess and 7 means that you are absolutely sure. Thus if you
see a film you definitely saw in the first part you should respond 'Yes, 7',
one you definitely have not seen before should be given 'No, 7' and if
you have no idea at all you could respond either 'Yes' or 'No' but your
confidence rating should be '1'.
Partial randomization of presentation order was achieved using the video
controller. On each tape the 30 stimuli were blocked into six groups of five
films and the presentation order of these six groups was randomized for each
subject with the constraint that no two exemplars of a single junction could
appear consecutively. Subjects were assigned to one of four different
conditions with three subjects from each annual mileage group assigned to
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each condition. The different conditions were shown different tapes as
shown in Table 4.3. This division of subjects meant that every individual
film was rated by 18 subjects in the judgment phase and by 18 in the
recognition phase, appearing to nine of the 18 subjects as a distractor and to
the other nine as a target.
Condition	 Judgment Tape	 Recognition Tape
1	 1	 1
2	 1	 2
3	 2	 1
4	 2	 2
Table 4.3: The four experimental conditions
Results
The results are divided into two main sections. In the first section the
risk and accident judgment results are reported and compared with the on-
road judgments from Study 1. In the second section the recognition results
are analysed using signal detection theory measures. Initially overall
relationships between risk and recognition sensitivity are sought. Then, in a
more exploratory analysis, relationships between risk and recognition within
the exemplars of individual junctions are examined.
Judgment Results:
The mean risk ratings and accident estimates for the 60 films are given in
Table 4.4 with the recognition results. To obtain a general impression of
differences among the stimuli and between the rating tasks the ten junctions
were compared in an analysis of variance. There were two within subject
factors, judgment task and junction (the ratings from the three different
exemplars of each junction were first averaged for each subject).
o Study I
• Study2
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Figure 4.1: Mean risk ratings for the ten junctions comparing Study 1 with Study
2, error bars show one standard deviation.
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
Junction Number
Figure 4.2: Mean accident estimates for the ten junctions comparing Study 1 with
Study 2, error bars show one standard deviation.
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There was a significant main effect of judgment task, F(1,35)=5.22,
p<O.05, mean accident estimates being 0.98 points higher than mean risk
ratings. There was also a main effect of junction F(9,315)=24.90, p<0.01
and an interaction between judgment task and junctions F(9,3 1 5)-4.362,
p<o.ol.
The data from Study 1 for the 10 junctions was used for comparison in
two analyses of variance, each with one between subjects factor, Study 1 vs.
Study 2, and one within subjects factor, junction. The data for risk ratings
and accident estimates were considered separately and are plotted in Figures
4.1 and 4.2 respectively. For risk ratings there was no significant main effect
of study, F(l,64)=0.59 and no significant interaction between junction and
study F(9,576)=1.77. There was, however, still a significant main effect of
junction F(9,476)=21.61, p<ü.0i. For accident estimates there was a
significant main effect of study (F(l,64)=7.88, p<O.Ol), the mean accident
rating from Study 1 was 2.1 points higher than that from Study 2. There was
also a main effect of junction F(9,576)=28.35, p<0.Ol but no significant
interaction between experiment and junction (F(9,576)=1.14).
For comparison Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the mean length of the films of
each junction and the mean number of motor vehicles visible in the films.
Error bars show one standard deviation to give some idea of the variability
among the six films. As can be seen from the graphs, there is relatively little
difference between the 10 junctions in the length of the films. However,
there are more substantial differences in the number of motor vehicles
visible. Across the full 60 films these two measures are nonetheless fairly
strongly related to each other (r(58)=0.45, p<0.0l). There are significant
correlations between risk ratings and both these measures, r(58)=0.32,
p<O.O5, with the length of the film and r(58)=0.39, p<0.Ol, with the number
of vehicles visible. Neither of the measures is significantly correlated with
accident estimates, r(58)=0.16 with length of film and r(58)=0.17 with
number of vehicles visible.
RISK AND RECOGNITION 108
60
C,,
50
C')
.	 40
a)
0
_j	 30
E
20
10
0
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
Junction Numbers
Figure 4.3: Mean film length in seconds for the ten junctions, error bars show one
standard deviation.
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Figure 4.4: Mean number of vehicles visible in film, error bars show one standard
deviation.
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Discussion of Judgment Results
Subjects appeared to make judgments which were remarkably consistent
with those given when actually driving. The interaction between risk rating
and accident estimate across the ten junctions suggests that subjects were
able to sensibly dissociate the two judgment tasks in the laboratory setting.
Moreover, the lack of interactions between study and junction suggests that
the stimuli used in Study 2 represent the full set of drives through the
junctions well and that the judgment tasks being performed in the laboratory
are similar to those performed on the road. Subjects in this study clearly
knew that they were not objectively 'at risk', nonetheless, their subjective
ratings are consistent with them experiencing similar feelings to those they
would have on the road.
The only significant difference between the studies in judgment task was
the main effect for accident estimate. As the 20 point scales being used are
essentially arbitrary it is not clear what interpretation should be put on this
difference. Groeger and Chapman (1990) have demonstrated that different
orienting tasks can dramatically alter the magnitude of accident estimates.
The use of both risk and accident scales may be calibrated by the subjects
with respect to the range of stimuli they encounter. Although subjects in this
study viewed the films in randomized orders the subjects from Study 1
always performed the rating tasks first on relatively empty roads. If subjects
rated these junctions as relatively low on accident estimates then the types of
transfer bias which Poulton (1989, p.238) describes could have caused the
first few low judgments to inflate subsequent ones. This would not
necessarily occur for the risk ratings since these may have been initially quite
high because of the drivers' unfamiliarity with the car when giving the first
ratings. Unfortunately the practice ratings from Study 1 were not recorded
so it is not possible to test this hypothesis.
Clearly, simply watching films in the simulator is not the same as
actually driving. Nonetheless it is an extremely engaging task - subjects
would often press the brake pedal as the film showed the rapid approach to a
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junction, and some even reported feeling "slightly car sick" by the end of the
experiment. The consistency of both ratings between actual driving and the
laboratory does suggest that subjects performed these tasks in the same way
in both cases. It also seems likely that subjects 'feel' subjective risk in the
laboratory in much the same way that they experience it when driving. This
suggests that it is sensible to explore aspects of subjective risk in the
controlled environment of even this relatively crude simulator.
Recognition Results:
No subjects reported having expected a memory test even though many
of them had already taken part in Study 1. This was a consistent finding in
all the research reported in this thesis, it seems to reflect the fact that even
simulated driving tasks are highly engaging and quite unlike the tasks
psychologists usually ask their subjects to perform. This meant that even the
more suspicious members of the Applied Psychology Unit's general subject
panel who took part in later studies appeared to be genuinely surprised when
they were given subsequent memory tests.
The mean number of hits was 9.2 and false alarms 4.4 (each out of a
possible 15 per subject). This makes it clear that the subjects found the
recognition task difficult. The overall hit rate (hits - false alarms), however,
is significantly better than chance (t=7.55, df=35, p<O.Ol). There were no
significant differences in hit rate between the three experience groups,
F(2,33)=O.57, or between males and females F(l,34)=O.06. The mean
numbers of hits and false alarms for the ten different junctions are shown in
Figure 4.5 (the maximum possible number of either is nine). To gain some
impression of the differences between junctions, the 60 values of hit rate are
treated as independent measures in an analysis of variance, this reveals that
there are no significant differences between the 10 junctions in hit rate
F(9,50)=0.48. There is no significant correlation between hit rate and either
risk rating (r(58)=0.13) or accident estimate (r(58)=0.05) across the 60 films.
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Figure 4.5: Mean hits and false alarms for the 10 junctions, error bars show one
standard deviation.
The number of hits and false alarms for individual films is given in Table
4.4. Although the hit rate does not differ significantly between junctions
there do seem to be substantial differences between individual films. In fact,
within individual junctions it looks as though there may be a relationship
between risk and recognition. The results for the junction which received the
highest risk ratings, junction 9, will be considered to illustrate this, see Table
4.4. For the most risky two exemplars, films 53 and 54, the corrected hit rate is very
high, for the least risky exemplars of the same junction, films 50 and 51, corrected hit
rate is extremely low. This raises the possibility that any effect of risk may
operate only within individual junctions and not across all junctions. Note
that for film 49, although the corrected hit rate is zero there does appeax to be a very
strong tendency to say 'yes' whether or not the film has been seen previously.
It would be useful to have a measure of such bias that is independent of the
actual hit rate. This requires the analysis of the data using signal detection
theory.
Hits
3
4
4
4
7
7
3
6
4
6
6
7
4
4
6
5
5
7
5
4
7
6
8
7
7
8
5
4
2
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
2
2
7
6
8
5
5
8
4
5
6
7
6
5
4
8
7
8
9
7
8
3
5
6
P(A)
048
0 67
0.57
048
090
0.59
0 49
0.81
0.59
0.86
0.67
0.89
0.62
0.49
090
0.60
0.87
0.96
0.55
0 63
0 72
0.43
0.66
0.80
0.81
0 95
0.62
0.48
056
0.84
0 57
0.76
051
081
0 67
0.65
0.59
0.52
0.84
0 73
0 75
066
062
088
05
0 70
0 78
079
056
062
069
080
083
0 91
0 87
049
096
0 69
060
064
B
3 57
3.33
3 67
300
3.25
3.00
4.83
4.00
3.30
3.40
2.80
3.33
3.40
3.00
3.67
4.20
4.29
3.40
3.29
3.14
200
2.57
2.57
2.50
2.67
4.00
3.67
3.00
3.71
3.20
2.60
3 20
3 00
4.00
3.33
3.20
4.11
400
2 80
3.25
240
3.00
3 67
3.00
3 33
3.00
3 20
2.33
2 25
3.00
3.75
200
3 25
3.50
243
220
3 50
3 63
3 20
2.75
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Risk
Rating
4 28
333
4 61
4 39
506
383
550
6.33
5 22
6 22
611
6.56
556
3.78
4 28
5 17
4 78
3.89
4 67
2.83
4.33
3.78
2.78
2.28
3.83
3.22
4.39
4.94
3.33
3.56
4.83
4.89
4.67
4 78
506
4.56
5.72
3.44
6.00
4 89
556
556
3 89
350
406
411
350
3.06
650
544
6 22
767
950
8 17
3 17
4 22
5 39
394
5 78
4 89
Film
Number
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accident
Estimate
611
383
583
5 28
7.78
4 61
7.17
6 28
7 28
5 89
7 28
5 83
600
406
6 44
400
6 39
3.11
5 17
3.22
5 67
4 17
5.17
3.50
633
3.67
6.33
5 67
5.33
4.28
5 39
4.89
5 67
4 28
656
4 72
8 22
4.72
806
500
706
5 39
4 44
3 67
450
356
5 28
3 39
10 50
7 83
10 78
8 33
11 83
844
4 72
4 39
6 39
450
606
4 11
False
Alarms
2
2
3
2
2
4
3
5
2
4
5
6
4
3
3
0
2
5
2
2
6
3
3
3
3
2
4
4
0
2
4
2
4
6
4
2
6
0
4
6
0
3
4
Table 4.4: Judgment and recognition results for all 60 films.
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Since confidence ratings were obtained in addition to Yes/No responses
it is possible to plot ROC curves for either subjects or stimuli and hence
calculate separate measures of recognition sensitivity (i.e. the ability of
subjects to discriminate targets from distractors) and response criterion bias
(i.e. the tendency to give particular types of response independently of any
knowledge a subject has as to whether a film was a target or distractor). In
this case calculating recognition measures for individual stimuli is initially of
more interest than doing so for individual subjects thus the data is aggregated
across subjects.
Each film appeared nine times as a target and nine times as a distractor.
It could receive a response 'Yes' or 'No' and a confidence rating from 1 to 7,
this gives 14 possible responses which any film could receive from a subject,
Table 4.5 shows the distribution of responses among these 14 categories. In
order to plot ROC curves for individual films it is necessary to have a
relatively large number of responses in each category. The 14 categories
were thus collapsed into six as shown in Table 4.5 to increase the number of
responses in each category.
The most common use of signal detection theory is to calculate
parametric measures of sensitivity (d') and bias (B). However, when each
subject only provides a single value for the estimate of signal detection
variables (as in this case where data is aggregated across subjects), Locksley,
Stangor, Hepburn, Grosovsky & Hockstrasser (1984) recommend that
nonparametric measures are used. Following McNicol (1972) a
nonparametric overall measure of recognition sensitivity for individual films
was calculated from the collapsed data, this measure, P(A), corresponds to
the area beneath the ROC curve plotted for a film, aggregating the data from
all subjects. P(A) can potentially range from 0 to 1 although numbers less
than 0.5 would indicate performance worse than chance. P(A) normally
ranges between 0.5 for chance performance (i.e. no ability to discriminate
between targets and distractors) to 1 for perfect recognition.
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Resp-	 Confi-	 Cate-
onse	 dence	 gory
YES	 7	 1
YES	 6	 2
YES	 5	 2
YES	 4	 3
YES	 3	 3
YES	 2	 3
YES	 1	 3
NO	 1	 4
NO	 2	 4
NO	 3	 4
NO	 4	 4
NO	 5	 5
NO	 6	 5
NO	 7	 6
Number of
times used
160
66
71
69
59
43
20
29
59
85
85
110
105
119
Category
total
160
137
191
258
215
119
Table 4.5: Use of the 14 categories and division into six categories for analysis.
A separate measure of response bias, the non-parametric measure B
(McNicol 1972) was also calculated. When calculated for an individual
subject this measure corresponds to the point on a confidence rating scale
where the subject is indifferent between targets and distractors. To
understand its meaning in this case it is necessary to consider Table 4.5. As
long as P(A) is greater than 0.5 (i.e. subjects are performing above than
chance level), category 1 in the collapsed scale should be used more often for
targets than for distractors, conversely category 6 should be used more often
for distractors than for targets. B is that notional point on the scale which
would be used equally often for both. Thus if a film received a value of B=2
it would mean that the responses 'Yes, 5', and 'Yes, 6' were given equally
often to targets and to distractors. Note that despite this tendency to give far
too many false alarms the subject's overall recognition sensitivity could still
be quite good, the subject has simply traded false alarms against misses. For
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the collapsed scale B can range between 1 and 6, unbiased responding would
give a value of 3.5. A lower number than this generally indicates a tendency
to make too many false alarms, ahighernumber generally indicates a
tendency to make too many misses.
For the 60 films the mean value of P(A) was 0.70 (range 0.43 to 0.96)
and the mean B was 3.21 (range 2.00 to 4.83). Analysis of variance across
the 60 films treated as independent measures shows that there are no
significant differences between the ten different junctions either in
recognition performance (F(9,50)=0.36) or in response bias (F(9,50)=1.84).
There is no significant correlation across the 60 films between mean risk
rating and either P(A), r(58)=0.14, or B, r(58)=0.07, or between accident
estimate and either measure r(58)=0.06 and r(58)=0.03. There is a
significant overall correlation between the length of a film and P(A),
r(58)=0.43, p<O.Ol, calculated over all 60 exemplars. There is, however, no
significant correlation between P(A) and the number of vehicles visible in
the film, r(58)=0.25. The lack of a correlation between risk and P(A) is the
same result that was observed using hit rate as the measure of recognition
performance. However, this is not what was expected from Study 1 where
recall seemed to be strongly related to ratings of subjective risk.
Relationships Within Particular Junctions:
Although there is no overall correlation between risk ratings and the
recognition measures, it was observed with the hit and false alarm data that
there were large differences between the various exemplars of an individual
junction, differences which may have been related to risk. The nature of
these differences can be crudely assessed by calculating the correlation
between the two measures across the six exemplars of each junction
separately. The correlation between risk and P(A) across the six exemplars
of each junction ranges substantially, from -0.67 to 0.88, though only one of
these ten is significantly different from zero with only four degrees of
freedom (for junction 2, r=0.88, p<O.O5). However, the magnitude and
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direction of the correlations appears to be related to the overall mean risk
rating for the junction.
Figure 4.6 shows the correlations across the exemplars of each of the ten
junctions plotted against the mean risk rating for the junction. Over these ten
points there is a correlation of 0.88 between the two measures, p<O.Ol, 8
degrees of freedom. When calculated the same way there is no tendency for
the mean risk rating for a junction to determine correlations with accident
estimates, r(8)=-0.047, nor is there any similar relationship between risk and
the response bias measure B, r(8)=-0.21.
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Figure 4.6: The relationship between the mean risk for the six exemplars of each
junction and the correlation across these exemplars between risk and
P (A).
The fact that the relationship between risk and P(A) is dependent on the
actual levels of risk involved is not unexpected. An inverted-U relationship
would have predicted different magnitudes and directions of correlation for
different risk levels. However, the directions that it would have predicted are
exactly the opposite of the ones actually observed in this study. The
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relationship observed in the previous study (see Figure 3.3) would also
predict different effects at different risk levels. In that study changes in risk
at lower levels seemed to be unrelated to recall performance while at higher
levels there was a positive correlation between the two. However, as can be
seen from Figure 4.7, there does not appear to be any overall relationship
between mean risk rating and P(A) in this study. The pattern evident in
Figure 4.6 is then not a general one, instead it only emerges when the
analysis is done within exemplars of each junction separately.
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Figure 4.7: The relationship between the mean risk and P(A) over all 60 films.
Moreover, rather than simply reflecting a stronger relationship between
risk and memory at higher levels of risk, the relationship visible in Figure 4.6
actually has both a negative and a positive component. There seem to be two
opposed relationships between risk and memory, each effect operating on a
different type of junction. For the three most risky junctions the mean
correlation between risk rating and P(A) is positive and significant, r=O.80,
df=12, pczO.O1. For the three least risky junctions the mean correlation is
negative and significant, r=-O.58, df=12, p<O.O5.
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All these correlations of course come from mean values for stimuli
aggregated across subjects and are thus likely to be overestimates of the true
size of any effect in individual subjects (Guilford & Fruchter 1973, Dunlap,
Jones & Bittner 1983). However, since the calculation of P(A) requires the
aggregation of data across subjects and each subject only rates 30 of the 60
stimuli it is not possible to calculate average correlations in this case.
To better illustrate the differences in performance for different junctions
Table 4.6 shows the results from Study 2 divided into categories by mean
risk rating. Junctions have been divided into three categories, three junctions
in each of the high and low risk categories and the remaining four junctions
in the medium risk category. Within each junction the exemplars were
divided into two categories, the three with the highest mean risk ratings in
one category and the three with the lowest mean risk ratings in the other.
The mean number of hits and false alarms in Table 4.6 are out of a maximum
possible number of nine.
6.56
2.00
0.81
3.20
6.86
7.77
High
JUNCTION
RISK
Exemplar
Risk
Mean Hits
Mean F.A.s
Mean P(A)
Mean B
Mean Risk
Mean Accs
HIGH
	
MEDIUM	 LOW
Low	 High	 Low	 High	 Low
	
4.56
	
5.64
	
4.90
	
5.67
	
5.89
	
2.78
	
3.21
	
2.10
	
3.33
	
2.33
	
0.62
	
0.69
	
0.70
	
0.63
	
0.74
	
3.35
	
3.22
	
3.38
	
2.95
	
3.15
	
5.43
	
4.84
	
4.13
	
4.18
	
3.10
	
7.33
	
5.56
	
4.73
	
5.01
	
4.25
Table 4.6: Results divided into sx categories by mean risk ratings.
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The results for high risk junctions illustrate roughly the pattern of
findings that would have been consistent with Study 1. The number of hits is
higher for risky exemplars than non-risky ones and the number of false
alarms is lower. This is reflected in the overall recognition sensitivity score,
P(A), being higher for risky exemplars. For the low risk junctions, however,
this result appears to be completely reversed, the high risk exemplars have a
slightly lower number of hits than the less risky ones and considerably more
false alarms, this corresponds to a higher P(A) for the least risky exemplars.
For all three junction types the mean value of B is lower than the 3.5
expected for unbiased responding despite the fact that overall subjects gave
more 'No' responses than 'Yes' ones. This reflects the type of confidence
ratings given, which were generally higher for 'Yes' responses than 'No' ones.
For each junction type the value of B is lowest for the most risky exemplars.
This suggests that subjects were generally more likely to respond 'Yes' to
risky exemplars than to less risky ones.
One other important aspect of Table 4.6 is the fact that the exemplars of
a junction differ in accident estimates. Although the accident estimate could
logically be independent of the actual exemplar of the junction that a subject
was shown it is clear that it is in fact strongly related to the risk rating given
to particular exemplars. Given that not all subjects knew the junctions well
previously this is not very surprising. If the subject does not know the
junction and is attempting to decide how risky it is likely to be in other
circumstances it would make sense to extrapolate from the information in the
film to decide for example how busy the junction generally is, or to simply
generalize from their current feelings of risk.
Discussion of Recognition Results
Unlike Study 1 there was no overall tendency for subjective risk to be
associated with better memory performance in Study 2. There are clearly a
large number of factors which could account for this difference. One
interpretation for the lack of overall relationship might be that the laboratory
simulation was not actually successful in producing levels of subjective risk
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of the same magnitude as those experienced by drivers in the first study.
Subjects may instead simply have given good estimates of the risk which
they would have felt had they been actually present in the situations. /
Alternatively, they may have experienced some risk, but only the lower
levels which characterize the flat lower part of the relationship shown in
Figure 3.3. These interpretations, however, are based on the assumption that
there were no effects of subjective risk in Study 2. In fact this does not
appear to be the case, substantial recognition differences were observed
between exemplars of individual junctions.
Clearly Study 2 differs from Study 1 in many more ways than the fact
that subjects were not actually driving - the range of situations used was
dramatically different, individual junctions were repeated, there was no
obvious navigational context, and so on. However, the most important
difference may be the type of memory test used. The theoretical differences
between recall and recognition are complex and have been the subject of
considerable debate (e.g. Kintsch, 1970; Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1976,
1983). However, there are clear practical differences between the measures
in their normal use, particularly in the fact that recall is normally enhanced
by providing additional retrieval cues. It was suggested in discussing the
results from the first study that subjects may have been deliberately
attempting to recall just the risky situations. Even if they were not
consciously doing so, feelings of risk may have acted as an important
retrieval cue in the context.
The other crucial difference between the types of memory test is that in a
recognition test there is generally a relatively well defined set of distractor
items. In the context of the current study the relevant distractor items are
likely to have been the other exemplars of a particular junction. The most
interesting results of the study were the relationships observed between risk
ratings and P(A) within these sets of items. It appeared that for exemplars of
the generally risky junctions risk ratings were positively correlated with
P(A). However, for exemplars of the less risky junctions a negative
RISK AND RECOGNITION 121
correlation was observed. This pattern of results was not expected and does
not seem to be an obvious prediction to make from any of the theories about
arousal and memory which were considered in Chapter 2.
One way in which the pattern of results might be described is that in each
case the exemplars which accorded most closely to the subjects' expectations
were recognized best. Thus at dangerous junctions risky events are easily
recognized, but a safer junctions non-risky events are best recognized. This
suggests that subjects expectations based on their previous may be important
in understanding the relationship between risk and recognition performance.
This idea will be examined more closely in the following chapter.
When attempting to interpret these results it must be remembered that
the correlations of interest all rely on relatively small numbers of responses.
Moreover, these correlations only achieved overall significance when the
junctions were grouped in a way which may make sense, but was clearly post
hoc. Thus, rather than discussing the results further now, a new study will be
described which was designed as an attempt to extend and replicate the
results from Study 2.
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Chapter 5
Exploring the Recognition Results I
The previous study used a recognition paradigm to test memory for
driving films viewed in a driving simulator. One of the reasons for using a
recognition task was that it seemed less likely than the first study which used
a recall test to be biased by the fact that subjects were aware that the study
was concerned with risk. Although the use of a recognition test may have
minimized the use of strategies based on risk-related information at testing,
subjects nonetheless still made risk judgments when they initially watched
the films. In addition to alerting subjects to the fact that the experiment was
concerned with subjective risk, this may have caused them to attend to the
stimuli in ways which unnaturally stressed risk-related aspects of the
situations.
A major advantage of using simulated driving is that the previous study
has now provided estimates of the subjective risk subjects are likely to
experience when viewing the films. This means that it is possible to
realistically estimate the subjective risk likely to be experienced by further
subjects watching the films without actually having them give new estimates.
The aim of the study reported in this chapter is thus to see whether the results
of the previous study are still obtained when subjects are not actually aware
that the experiment is concerned with subjective risk. The opportunity was
also taken to explore the suggestion made in discussing the previous study
that recognition results were related to subjects' previous knowledge about
driving situations and expectations about them. The theories in psychology
which appear to bear most directly on this possibility are those which suggest
that memory is based on schemas.
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Schema Theories
Bartlett (1932) stressed idea that memories are stored, not as isolated
traces but as part of pre-existing knowledge structures representing our
expectations about the world, he termed these structures schemata. Bartlett's
ideas on schemata became popular when the development of computers
meant that theories of this type could be programmed (e.g. Minsky, 1975;
Rumelhart, 1975; Schank, 1976). The attraction of schema theories for
memory researchers is that they predict that memory for stimuli will depend
on the degree to which such stimuli are similar to pre-existing schemata. The
problem with them, however, is that it is not always clear what predictions
they make for particular paradigms (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Brewer &
Nakamura, 1984). In fact, results showing enhanced recall and recognition
of schema-consistent information (e.g. Brewer & Treyens, 1981) and
impaired recall and recognition of such information (e.g. Pezdek, Whetstone,
Reynolds, Askari & Dougherty, 1989) have both been interpreted as support
for schema theories.
The reason that the overall effects of schemata are difficult to specify is
that they are thought to have separate effects on different processes. For
example, attention is often thought to be directed particularly to information
which is inconsistent with the currently active schema (e.g. G.R.Loftus &
Mackworth, 1978). However, schema-consistent information is assumed to
be more easy to integrate into existing memory structures and more likely to
be subsequently recalled since active schema guide and cue the retrieval
process (Brewer & Treyens, 1981). This may account for the fact that while
recall is almost uniformly greater for schema-consistent information,
recognition results have been markedly more mixed (Brewer & Nakamura,
1984).
Locksley et al. (1984) suggest that the mixed results obtained in
recognition experiments can often be explained by the fact that researchers
have concentrated on the effects of schemas on numbers of hits and false
alarms in different conditions. They argue strongly that the appropriate way
NEW JUDGMENT TASKS 124
to explore schema effects on recognition is through the use of signal
detection theory. They suggest that schemas are likely to have separate
effects on recognition sensitivity and response criterion bias and that these
effects are confounded when researchers simply report hits and false alarms.
Study 3
Recognition with New Judgment Tasks.
One of the possible reasons suggested for the relationship between risk
and recall in Study 1 was that performing risk-related judgment tasks while
driving had made that information particularly memorable. Although the
relationships between risk and recognition performance found in Study 2
were rather more complex it is still possible that all or part of the relationship
was caused by the explicit focus on risk during the judgment phase. The
purpose of Study 3 was to see whether similar recognition results would be
produced when subjects were not making risk judgments. Since the subjects
in Study 2 did not expect a recognition phase it was clearly not sufficient to
simply repeat the study without subjects making any judgments, instead
judgment tasks had to be found that were not related to risk and were still
sufficiently engaging for subjects not to suspect a memory test afterwards.
A subset of 24 films from the 60 used in Study 2 were used for 12
different judgment tasks in a study on risk perception (Groeger & Chapman,
1992, in preparation a). There were 64 subjects in this experiment, since 16
of these were newly qualified drivers who are not representative of the
population taking part in the recognition experiments, only the data from 48
of the 64 subjects is considered here. The correlation between risk ratings,
accident estimates and the other 10 scales were calculated in each case.
Using the method recommended by Dunlap, Jones and Bittner (1983)
correlations were calculated for each subject individually across the 24 films
used in this study, correlations were then averaged for the 48 subjects using
Fisher's z transformation (Silver & Dunlap 1987). Two of the judgment
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tasks were then selected which showed only small correlations with risk
ratings or accident estimates for the 24 stimuli used. The questions selected
were "How fast did you feel the driver was going in the film?", which gave
judgments with an average correlation with risk ratings of 0.09 (d.f.=1056,
p<O.Ol ) and with accident estimates of 0.09 (d.f.=1056, ptz0.01) and "How
well does this film show what normally happens at the junction?", which
gave a mean correlation with risk ratings of 0.11 (d.f.=1056, p<O.Ol) and a
correlation with accident estimates of -0.01 (d.f.=1056, p=0.79).
The speed judgment task was included simply to give subjects a task
comparable to that used in Study 2. The normality judgment task has an
additional purpose. It was suggested that the recognition results from the
previous study might represent recognition being superior for films which
were consistent with the subjects' expectations. However, no measure was
actually available of what subjects' expectations actually were, nor of which
films were in fact consistent with them. In order to see whether the
recognition results can be interpreted in terms of schema theories of memory
it is first necessary to have some measure of the schema consistency of
particular films. The normality judgment task was included to provide such
a measure. A second measure was also taken in this study which may
provide information relevant to subjects' expectations, this was a measure of
how well each subject previously knew the each of junctions in the films.
In this and subsequent studies seven point scales replace the previous 20
point scale. Although the previous scale had the advantage of corresponding
to actual measured accident statistics it proved relatively awkward for
subjects to use and is clearly subject to what Poulton (1989) terms
logarithmic response bias. The main dependent variables in this study (i.e.
those of memory performance) are nonetheless identical to those used in the
previous study, thus direct comparisons can still be made between the two
studies.
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Method
Subjects:
The subjects were 36 drivers taken from the Applied Psychology Unit's
subject panel, 18 male, 18 female. None of these subjects had taken part in
either of the previous studies. Mean age of participants was 43 years, mean
22 years licensed, mean annual mileage 9,295. All subjects were paid for
their participation.
Stimuli/Apparatus:
The stimuli and apparatus used in this study were identical to those used
in Study 2.
Procedure:
The procedure in this study was the same as that employed in Study 2
with the exception of the judgment phase, here two new verbal rating tasks
were performed in place of the risk rating and accident estimate tasks:
Speed Rating: "How fast do you feel the driver is going in the situation?
Use a seven point scale where 1 would indicate that the driver is going
much too slowly and 7 would indicate that the driver is going much too
fast. A rating of 4 would mean that the driver is going at the correct
speed for the conditions." This rating was given immediately the subject
heard the bleep in the centre of the junction.
Normality Rating: "How well does the film show the kind of things
that normally happen at the junction? Use a seven point scale where 1
would indicate that the situation shown was extremely unusual and 7
would indicate that the events were not surprising in any way". This
rating was given after the speed rating and subjects were asked to think
carefully about it before answering.
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After the recognition phase in this study subjects were given a map
showing the location in Cambridge of the ten junctions shown in the films.
Subjects were then asked to give a written rating to each of the junctions of
how well they previously knew it.
Familiarity Rating: "How well did you previously know the junction?
Use a seven point scale where 1 would indicate that you have never
previously driven through the junction and 7 would indicate that you
drive through the junction nearly every day".
Judgment Results:
The overall mean speed rating was 4.26 and mean normality rating was
6.3 8. The mean speed and normality ratings for all 60 films are shown in
Table 5.3 with the recognition results. Means for the 10 junctions are shown
in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
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FIgure 5.1: Mean speed ratings for the 10 junctions, error bars show one
standard deviation.
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Figure 5.2: Mean normality ratings for the 10 junctions, error bars show one
standard deviation.
Analysis of variance was used to compare the ten junctions for each
judgment task averaging each subject's responses for the three exemplars of
each junction. Both judgment tasks show significant main effects of
junction, F(9,315)=5.56, p<O.O l , for speed ratings and F(9,315)=13.83,
p<O.Ol for normality.
In the Groeger and Chapman experiment it was observed that, for a
subset of 24 of these 60 films, risk ratings and accident estimates were not
substantially correlated with either speed or normality ratings. The data from
Study 2 for the 60 films was compared with the new ratings to see whether
this holds for the full set of 60 films. Because subjects differ between the
experiments the correlations calculated here are simply correlations over the
60 films of the mean ratings. These and equivalent correlations from the
Groeger and Chapman study are given in Table 5.1. For purposes of
comparison these figures are also given as correlated averages rather than the
average correlations which were reported previously.
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Normality
Risk
Accident
Speed
Normality
Risk	 Accident	 Speed
1.00
0.79**	 1 .00(0.64**)
0.28*	 0.13
	
1.00
(0.27)	 (-0.19)
0.51**	 0.31*	
-0.14
(0.11)	 (-0.09)	 (0.07)
1.00
Table 5.1: Mean correlations between the four judgment tasks over the 60 films
(58 degrees of freedom). The bracketed figures are equivalent
correlations from the Groeger and Chapman study (22 degrees of
freedom). Starred correlations are significantly different from zero,
* if p<0.05, **Ifp<OO1
Note that although some of the correlations calculated for this study
appear to be markedly different to those observed in the Groeger and
Chapman study, the difference between correlations only reaches
significance in the case of the correlation between risk and normality
(z=2.64, p<0.01).
Discussion of Judgment Results:
Clearly the tasks as performed in this study were not, as intended,
completely unrelated to risk ratings. To understand why this is the case the
ratings from Study 3 were compared with the results from the Groeger and
Chapman study, see Table 5.2. Data from the Groeger and Chapman study is
presented as average ratings from 48 subjects, 24 male and 24 female.
Means from the current study are calculated from the data from 18 subjects
for each point. The characteristics of the 24 stimuli that were chosen for this
experiment are described in greater detail in Chapter 7.
Number
Junc-	 Film
tion
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
09
10
11
13
14
16
19
22
23
27
28
30
33
34
35
38
39
40
50
51
52
55
56
60
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Study 3
Norm-
a I Ity
6.72
5.89
6.56
5.78
6.61
5.78
6.83
5.89
6.39
6.67
6.56
6.61
6.61
6.28
6.78
6.06
6.39
6.39
6.33
5.56
5.56
6.39
6.39
6.26
Speed
4.33
4.11
4.50
4.78
4.56
5.17
4.22
4.33
4.06
4.39
4.33
4.33
3.11
3.94
3.61
4.28
4.11
4.22
4.50
4.39
4.67
4.50
4.22
4.28
Groeger &
Chapman
Norm-	 Speed
ality
	
4.93
	
4.42
	
5.42
	
4.38
	
5.33
	
4.52
	
5.21
	
4.79
	
4.78
	
4.88
	
5.25
	
5.25
	
5.38
	
4.71
	
5.35
	
4.63
	
4.92
	
4.40
	
5.46
	
4.60
	
5.27
	
4.34
	
5.40
	
4.52
	
5.04
	
3.85
	
5.15
	
4.27
	
5.13
	
4.17
	
4.81
	
4.46
	
4.73
	
4.38
	
5.10
	
4.27
	
4.19
	
4.50
	
5.04
	
4.21
	
5.29
	
4.42
	
4.71
	
4.92
	
5.10
	
4.40
	
5.19
	
4.50
Table 5.2: Details of the judgment results for 24 of the 60 stimuli incIudng ratings
from the Groeger and Chapman study.
One possible explanation for the lack of correlation between risk and
either normality or speed in the Groeger and Chapman study could be that
the subset of 24 stimuli used were not characteristic of the whole 60. In fact,
NEW JUDGMENT TASKS 131
for these 24 stimuli alone the correlation between risk rating from Study 2
and normality from Study 3 is still significant r(22)=-O.42, p czO.05, although
the correlation between risk and speed is not r(22)=0.16. Although it is still
possible that subjects' perceptions of the tasks could have been altered by the
different exemplars of a junction that were viewed in the different
experiments, it does not appear that the subset of 24 were unrepresentative of
the full 60.
The other likely source for the differences in ratings is that subjects
interpreted the normality task differently in the two situations. The two sets
of speed ratings given in Table 5.2 are highly correlated, r(22)=0.83, p<O.Ol,
and similar in magnitude. However, the two sets of normality ratings are not
significantly correlated r(22)=-0.06, and the ratings given in Study 3 are
much higher than those given in the Groeger and Chapman study. Thus it
seems that although the speed rating task was performed roughly as
expected, subjects on the normality rating task in fact performed a very
different task to the one used in Groeger and Chapman study.
The most likely explanation for the difference is the context in which
the judgments were made, clearly the normality of any individual film will
depend on the types of situation that are seen with it. Another aspect of the
context of a judgment is the other tasks that were performed at the same
time. In the Groeger and Chapman experiment the normality and speed
rating scales were presented along with 10 other judgment tasks including
both risk ratings and accident estimates. The fact that subjects answered all
questions for each stimulus may have caused them to restrict their
interpretation of individual tasks such that there was no overlap between
tasks. Subjects may thus have deliberately excluded any risk component
from their speed and normality ratings since they were reporting risk
separately.
There were also a number of other differences between the studies. In
the Groeger and Chapman study responses were made on a seven point
response keypad with the question repeated each time a rating was required.
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The actual question appeared each time on the screen in front of them with a
seven point scale with labels at the end points - 7=VERY WELL and 1=NOT
VERY WELL. Although the initial explanation of the scale was identical to
that used in the present study, it is possible that the labelling of the end points
may have encouraged subjects to use numbers nearer to the middle of the
scale.
The important finding which appears in Study 3 but which did not in
Groeger and Chapman study is the tendency for subjects to rate the risky
situations as significantly lower on normality but higher on speed. Both
these relationships are of course what might have been predicted a priori, in
fact it is more surprising that they did not appear in the Groeger and
Chapman study than that they do in this one. Thus although the rating tasks
performed in this study are not uncorrelated with the risk and accident
estimates previously obtained for the stimuli from Study 2 there is no reason
to assume that subjects were unnaturally concentrating on risks in the way
they may have been for Studies 1 and 2.
Recognition Results:
None of the subjects reported having expected a memory test. The mean
number of hits was 9.3 and false alarms 3.1. The data for hits and false
alarms for all 60 stimuli are shown in Table 5.3. As was found for Study 2
there were no significant differences between the 10 junctions in overall hit
rate, F(9,50)=0.77, Figure 5.3 shows the mean number of hits and false
alarms for the 10 different junctions. However, the overall hit rate was
significantly higher than that observed in Study 2, 6.2 compared to 4.8,
F(1,50)=6.65, p<O.05. This difference does not interact with junction,
F(9,50)=1.0l, suggesting that it is largely a general improvement rather than
one related to aspects of individual junctions.
The correlations between the recognition measures from this study and
those calculated from the previous study were compared. These correlations
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were significantly greater than zero in each case - for the number of hits
r(58)=O.32, p<O.05, for the number of false alarms r(58)=O.58, p<zO.Ol, and
for hit rate r(58)=O.45, p<O.Ol.
9
8
7
I..
a)
.0	 6
E
5
z
4
2
0
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
Junction Numbers
• Hits
OFas
Figure 5.3: Mean hits and false alarms for the 10 junctions (error bars show one
standard deviation).
The data was again analysed using signal detection theory, the
distribution of responses across the 14 possible ones is shown in Table 5.4. Since
this distribution is similar to that obtained in Study 2 these 14 categories
were divided into the same six categories that were used in that study.
Normality	 Speed
	
Hits
6 61
650
683
633
6.50
683
667
6.39
6.72
5 89
6.56
6.39
5.78
6 61
6 28
5 78
6.72
5.67
6.83
6.67
6 78
5 89
6.39
6.39
6 67
6.33
6.67
6.56
6.78
6.61
6.78
6 61
6 61
6 28
6.78
6.17
6.56
6.06
6.39
6 39
6.61
6.50
6.78
656
689
606
661
644
650
633
5 56
556
511
5 17
6 39
6 39
567
6 28
661
626
400
3 83
506
4 67
3 94
361
4.22
4.17
4.33
411
450
4.72
4 78
456
4 17
5 17
411
4 17
4.22
3.89
4.06
4.33
406
3.89
3 72
361
4 39
4.33
450
4.33
4 83
450
311
3 94
361
4 17
4 89
4 28
411
4 22
450
4.44
450
450
444
456
3 83
4 17
4 44
450
4.39
4 67
4 17
4 44
450
4 22
4 17
356
4 39
4 28
4
3
3
3
8
7
6
8
6
5
9
4
7
8
7
7
8
8
7
4
6
5
7
6
7
4
7
4
5
6
5
3
7
5
7
0
7
5
6
5
5
3
4
6
6
7
6
4
6
6
8
6
7
3
8
6
4
5
P(A)
056
0 67
046
044
0 91
091
0.72
1.00
0.59
0.87
0 97
0.74
0 87
0.83
088
0 67
090
0.95
0.84
0.68
0.63
0.56
0.81
0.81
0.84
0.77
0 72
0.49
0.86
0.67
0.67
0.75
0.72
0.56
086
0.89
0.80
048
0.94
0 59
080
0.63
0 78
048
0.70
0 65
0 85
080
0 76
0 78
0 92
0 65
0 93
088
091
046
093
0 81
068
061
B
3.75
4.11
3 42
340
400
2.75
4.00
4.00
2.67
4.50
1 83
3.67
4 13
2.75
3.67
2.50
2.75
3.50
3.00
3.50
2.00
3.00
3.33
4.00
3.00
3.67
3.00
3.20
4.00
3.50
3.33
3.63
4.00
3.75
4.00
4.17
200
4 50
3.25
3 50
3.33
3.67
3.80
3.67
3 43
2.75
400
300
3.00
450
4.17
2.50
400
5.10
2.50
4.00
450
400
3.75
2.80
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Film
Number
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
False
Alarms
2
3
4
0
3
0
0
4
0
2
2
0
3
2
0
2
7
0
2
4
0
2
0
2
0
4
2
2
2
0
4
2
3
0
5
0
0
2
5
0
2
5
Table 5.3: Judgment and recognition results for all 60 films.
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Response
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
Confidence
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Category
1
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
6
Number of	 Category
times used	 total
197	 197
86
69	 155
46
27
27
15	 115
24
39
65
64	 192
112
124	 236
185	 185
Table 5.4: Use of the fourteen categories and division into six categories for
analysis.
For the 60 films the mean P(A) was 0.75 (range 0.44 to 1.00) and the
mean B was 3.49 (range 1.83 to 5.10). The pattern of recognition results was
compared to that from Study 2. Over the 60 films there is a correlation of
0.51 (d.f.=58, p<O.Ol) in values of P(A) and a correlations of 0.31 (d.f.=58,
p<O.Ol) in values of B. Treating the 120 values of P(A) as independent the
values were compared in an analysis of variance with two factors, junction
and study. For P(A), although the mean value was 0.05 higher in Study 3,
this difference was only marginally significant (F(1,100)=3.62, p=O.06).
There was no significant interaction between junction and study
(F(9,100)=0.24). A similar comparison was made for values of B, here mean
values were 0.28 higher in Study 3 and this difference was significant
(F(1,100)=5.87, p<O.O5). Again there was no significant interaction between
study and junction (F(9,100)=1 .28).
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Considering just the data from Study 3, there were no significant
differences between the 10 junction in P(A), F(9,50)=0.99 or in B,
F(9,50)=0.7 1. The correlations with P(A) were not significant for either
normality r(58)=-0.20 or speed r(58)=-0.23, however, there were significant
correlations across the 60 films between mean B and both normality
rating, r(58)=-0.32, p<O.O5 and speed rating r(58)=-0.27, p<O.O5. Thus high
values of B seem to be associated with unusual situations and drivers going
relatively slowly (i.e. in these cases subjects are more likely to say 'No' than
'Yes' when they are in fact unsure whether they saw the film previously).
8
B
7
C)
c6	 • B
B
.	 5	
•	 B
• B .n
C)
DD .
3
2
-1	 0
Risk with P(A) Correlation
B Study 2
• Study 3
FIgure 5.4: Correlation between P(A) and risk for each junction in Studies 2 and 3
compared.
There was no significant correlation between P(A) and risk ratings taken
from Study 2, though there was a significant correlation between P(A) and
accident estimates from that study, r(58)=0.32, p<O.O5. Within the six
exemplars of each junction correlations of P(A) with the risk ratings from the
previous study were calculated. Only one correlation was significant,
r(4)=O.86, p<o.05 for Junction 7. Nonetheless, the pattern of correlations
over the ten junctions is extremely similar to that obtained in the previous
study, see Figure 5.4.
High	 Low
	
5.44
	
5.56
	
3.44
	
0.89
	
0.66
	
0.78
	
3.01
	
3.64
	
6.54
	
6.56
	
4.28
	
4.09
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Once again the relationship between risk and P(A) for exemplars of a
particular junction depends on the overall mean risk rating given to the
junction, r(8)=0.66 p<O.O5. They show the same tendency that was observed
in Study 2 for some junctions to have a negative correlation and others to
show a positive correlation. For risky junctions the risky exemplars show
best recognition, while for the least risky junctions the result reverses. The
mean correlation between risk and P(A) for the three most risky exemplars is
0.66, d.f.=12, p<0.üi, while for the three least risky junctions the mean
correlation is -0.48, d.f.=l2, p=O.O8. Although these correlations are lower
than those from Study 2 they are present despite the fact that a different set
of subjects from those who gave the risk ratings are giving the recognition
measures. It is particularly interesting that the relationship with risk remains
despite the fact that the actual recognition results from Study 3 are not
identical to those from Study 2. A summary of results from Study 3 is given
in Table 5.5. Films were categorized according to risk for both junction and
exemplar using the same categories as described for Study 2, these are shown
in Table 5.5.
LOWJUNCTION	 HIGH
RISK
Exemplar	 High
Risk
Mean Hits 6.33
Mean F.A.s 1.44
Mean P(A) 0.85
Mean B 3.59
Mean Norm 6.01
Mean Speed 4.42
MEDIUM
Low	 High	 Low
	
5.22
	
5.57
	
5.40
	
1.67
	
2.21
	
1.20
	
0.72
	
0.72
	
0.78
	
3.54
	
3.48
	
3.64
	
6.36
	
6.39
	
6.38
	
4.37
	
4.44
	
3.91
Table 5.5: Results split according to mean risk ratings.
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Figure 5.5 shows the mean familiarity ratings given to the 10 junctions
after the main experiment. There were significant differences between the 10
junctions in familiarity, F(9,3 1 5)=5.70, p<O.Ol. Post hoc tests show that
junction 10 was significantly more familiar to subjects than any other except
junction 9, p<0.05. And that junction 9 was in turn more familiar than
junctions 3, 4, 5 and 8, p<O.O5.
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
Junction Number
Figure 5.5: Mean familiarity ratings for the 10 junctions, error bars show one
standard deviation.
To decide whether previous familiarity with a junction is related to
recognition performance it is necessary to calculate new measures of
recognition. There are two aspects to the question, it could be that subjects
who know the route well perform differently to those who do not know the
route. Alternatively it could be that all subjects perform differently on
junctions they previously knew well compared to those they did not know
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well. To test the first possibility P(A) was calculated using the same
procedure as before but this time for individual subjects rather than stimuli.
The overall P(A) for a subject ranged from 0.45 to 0.97, mean 0.78. There
was no significant correlation between a subject's mean familiarity rating and
their P(A) - across the 36 subjects r(34)=-0.24. This is evidence that subjects
who knew the route well performed no differently in the recognition task
from those subjects who knew the route less well.
To see whether individual subjects performed differently on those
junctions which they personally knew well a recognition measure for each
subject on each junction was calculated. Each subject sees three exemplars
of each junction in the recognition phase, either two targets and one
distractor or one distractor and two targets depending on the junction. To
create an overall recognition measure from these three stimuli the total
confidence ratings for incorrect responses, misses or false alarms, were
subtracted from the total confidence ratings for correct responses, hits or
correct rejections. This gives a score that can lie between 21 for perfect
performance and -21 for the worst possible performance. Chance
performance would be zero. For each subject the correlation between this
score and their familiarity ratings for the 10 junctions was calculated. The 36
correlations were averaged using Fisher's z transformation to give a mean
correlation of 0.04, d.f =288. It thus appears that previous knowledge of a
junction had almost no overall effect on recognition sensitivity in this task.
Discussion of Recognition Results:
The recognition performance in Study 3 was generally better than that in
Study 2, subjects showed marginally greater recognition sensitivity and
significantly less response criterion bias. It is possible that this is a result of
the different judgment tasks that were used, certainly subjects reported
finding the normality judgment a more difficult task to understand than either
of the tasks from Study 2, it is possible that it also required more attention to
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the films generally. An alternative explanation for the general enhancement
of performance is simply that the subject populations differ between the
studies. Subjects in Study 3 were members of the Unit's subject panel, thus
most had participated in previous experiments at the unit, for a variety of
reasons they may be generally better at this type of task than those recruited
through a newspaper advertisement appealing specifically to drivers.
Despite the difference in overall level of performance the relationship
between risk and recognition performance in the two studies was remarkably
similar. Once again there is no hint of an overall inverted-U relationship or
indeed any overall relationship between subjective risk and recognition
sensitivity. To demonstrate this the mean risk rating for each film (from
Study 2) is plotted against the value of P(A) for that film (from Study 3), this
relationship is shown in Figure 5.6.
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FIgure 5.6: Mean risk rating (Study 2) plotted against mean P(A) (Study 3) for the
60 films.
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In fact there is no sign of any overall relationship between risk ratings
and P(A). Even when the results of Studies 2 and 3 are combined the best
fitting quadratic function accounts for only 0.096 percent of the total
variance across these 60 points, scarcely an improvement on the 0.043
percent obtained from the simple linear correlation coefficient. Nonetheless,
in both experiments there was a clear tendency for risky exemplars of risky
junctions to be recognized well but for risky exemplars of less risky
junctions to be recognized badly. Because there is no overall relationship
between risk ratings and recognition performance it is necessary to consider
the effects that may operate within individual junctions.
Schema Theory:
A framework for interpreting memory results for complex stimuli was
discussed in the introduction, this was the idea that memory results depend
on the type of schema subjects previously held for a situation. It was hoped
that the normality rating task would assist in deciding which stimuli were
inconsistent with the schema previously held. Unfortunately, the very low
variability in ratings on this scale makes it possible that the task was not
successful in measuring this. Moreover the lack of correlation between this
task from Study 3 and from Groeger and Chapman (1992, in preparation a)
raises serious questions about exactly how the task was interpreted in each
case. Thus although there was no significant relationship between normality
and P(A) from Study 3 it seems advisable to see whether this is also the case
using normality ratings taken from the Groeger and Chapman study.
Normality ratings are those given in Table 5.2 from 48 of the subjects in the
study. These ratings do not correlate significantly with P(A) from either
Study 2, r(22)=-0.04 or Study 3, r(22)=-0.13.
It remains possible that schemata play a general role in the recognition
part of these studies. It was previously suggested that one could describe the
pattern of results from Study 2 as recognition being best for situations which
accorded to subjects' expectations, e.g. risky exemplars of risky junctions or
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safe exemplars of safe junctions. However, as discussed in the introduction,
one could also predict that in a recognition test situations inconsistent with
the schema might be remembered best since schema-inconsistent information
would be more likely to have been noticed when initially viewing the stimuli.
Another problem with using schema theory in this context is the
assumption that subjects held schemata for individual junctions. One might
alternatively suggest that a single standard driving schema exists and
deviations from this are the appropriate measure rather than deviations from
junction specific expectations. Although the measure of schema-consistency
from these studies is not compelling, it seems unlikely that schema theory
could provide an adequate explanation of the sensitivity results that were
obtained.
Response criterion bias as assessed by the nonparametric measure B,
however, did appear to be related to normality ratings. Higher normality
ratings were correlated significantly with a bias in favour of 'Yes' responses.
This is exactly the prediction which is made by Locksley et a!., "the response
criterion for schema related items may be more biased in the direction of
OLD decisions (or, alternatively less biased in the direction of NEW
decisions) than the response criterion for schema-unrelated items" (1984,
p.425). This bias appears to be an effect which arises at time of retrieval and
is independent of recognition sensitivity, Locksley et al. suggest that with
appropriate feedback the effect could be eliminated.
Easterbrook's Hypothesis:
One possible process operating at the time of encoding which may
influence the relationship between risk and recognition sensitivity is the idea
of attention focusing as predicted by Easterbrook's hypothesis as discussed in
Chapter 2. In the standard experiments the effect of arousal is to change the
range of cues attended to by the subject, high arousal conditions thus show
best memory for central information while in low arousal conditions subjects
remember peripheral information best. An advantage of this approach is that
it does not necessarily mean that there should be any general factors which
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directly impair or enhance memory. Instead memory performance will
depend on how it is tested, in a recognition paradigm the important aspect
will be nature of the distractors competing with each target.
To apply the framework of attention focusing to the data from these
studies it is necessary to make some assumptions about the information that
is central and peripheral in the stimuli. In Chapter 2 it was suggested that
task-related information should be regarded as central. In risky situations it
would thus be predicted that attention would be focused on information
which was important to controlling risk, and information peripheral to this
task would be neglected. If this were the case then within an individual
junction we would expect risk related information to be best remembered for
risky exemplars and peripheral information to be best remembered for the
less risky exemplars.
To decide what effects such focusing would have on overall recognition
sensitivity it is necessary to make assumptions about the information present
in the different stimuli:
i) Films of risky junctions tend to contain a great deal of information
related to risk. The exact information present will vary greatly from one film
to the next.
ii) Films of non-risky junctions tend to contain relatively little
information related to risk. Where risks are present they will tend to be
single and are likely to be shared by other stimuli (e.g. the driver going too
fast).
Thus for risky junctions knowledge of the precise risk-related
information seen in the judgment phase will provide a useful way of
distinguishing targets from distractors in the recognition phase. Therefore
risk experienced at risky junctions may improve recognition sensitivity.
Knowledge of risk-related information from non-risky junctions will
thus also allow films seen in the judgment phase to be identified in the
recognition phase, however, it will also tend to cause false alarms because
the information may be shared by distractors. The overall effect on
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sensitivity may actually be negative because the focusing of attention on
redundant information may be at the cost of attention to peripheral
information which might have otherwise been useful. Thus at non-risky
junctions feelings of risk may actually impair recognition sensitivity by
increasing the number of false alarms made.
The above explanation of the results makes specific predictions about
differences between the relative roles of hits and false alarms in the observed
results. These can be tested from the data in Tables 4.6 and 5.5. The pattern
of hits and false alarms in the two studies is relatively similar, thus Table 5.6
shows the data grouped from the two studies to increase the number of
observations in each cell.
JUNCTION	 HIGH
RISK
Exemplar	 High
Risk
Mean Hits 6.45
Mean F.A.s 1.72
Mean P(A) 0.83
Mean B	 3.40
MEDIUM
Low	 High	 Low
4.89	 5.62	 5.15
	
2.23	 2.71
	
1.65
	
0.67	 0.71
	
0.74
	
3.45	 3.35
	 3.51
Table 5.6: Combined results of Study 2 and Study 3 split according to mean risk
ratings.
For risky junctions there is a significant difference in the number of hits
for risky exemplars compared to the number for less risky exemplars
(t(34)=2.64, p<O.Ol) though no significant difference for false alarms
(t(34)=O.85). For less risky junctions there is a significant difference in false
alarms (t(34)=3.57, p<O.Ol) but not for hits (t(34)=O.33). This seems to
suggest that the enhancement in performance for the risky junctions as
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demonstrated by the P(A) scores is because of an increased number of hits
for risky exemplars, whereas for the less risky junctions the decrement in
performance is attributable to an increase in false alarms for the risky
exemplars rather than an increase in hits for the less risky ones. This effect
can also be observed in the overall values of B which are around the 3.5
which corresponds to unbiased responding in all cases except for risky
exemplars of low-risk junctions. In this case B is significantly lower than the
other conditions (t(58)=2.58, p<O.Ol), corresponding to a tendency to give
too many 'Yes' responses. This pattern of results seems to provide support
for interpreting these results in terms of attention focusing.
General Discussion:
In Study 3 subjects performed judgment tasks that were chosen to be
unrelated to risk rating. Despite this the recognition results were extremely
similar to those observed in Study 2, at risky junctions risk improved
recognition because of a large number of hits while at less risky junctions
risk impaired recognition because of a large number of false alarms. The fact
that the tasks as used in Study 3 turned out not to be completely unrelated to
risk does not necessarily compromise this result, it may simply reflect the
fact that thinking about risk is an extremely natural thing to do in this type of
situation.
Although the judgment of how well a film shows what normally happens
at a junction was used differently in Study 3 and in Groeger and Chapman
(1992, in preparation a) there was no evidence in either case that this was
related to recognition sensitivity. Moreover, it is not clear that schema
theory would actually predict the reversal in results for different types of
junction. Nonetheless it is possible that the general relationship between
response criterion bias and normality ratings reflects the operation of some
form of schema at retrieval. One alternative explanation was put forward in
terms of attention focusing which might explain both effects in terms of
feelings of risk. This explanation seemed to explain the general recognition
results as measured by P(A) and had the additional advantage of predicting
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the differences in hits and false alarms. The attention focusing explanation,
however, relies on certain untested assumptions about the nature of the
information contained in different films, Study 5 was designed to explore
some of these assumptions. Before this is reported, however, Study 4 will be
described. Study 4 was an attempt to see whether the effects observed in
Studies 2 and 3 were specific to the particular stimuli which were used or
whether they can also be observed with a wider range of stimuli and a larger
number of responses contributing to the ROC curves to improve the
reliability of the recognition measures.
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Chapter 6
Exploring the Recognition Results II
The relationships observed between subjective risk and recognition
performance in Studies 2 and 3 are potentially of considerable interest.
However, there are a number of qualifications that need to be made about the
results. One problem is simply that the most interesting recognition
measures in these studies were based on ROC curves calculated from only 18
points. An additional problem is that the stimuli over which the relationships
were observed were just six exemplars each of only ten junctions. Although
an attempt was made to be representative in the choice of these films it is
clear that if the effects observed are of any practical significance it should be
possible to observe them on a more varied stimulus set. The following study
attempts to avoid the first problem by increasing the data available for the
calculation of ROC curves and to address the second problem by using a
much more varied selection of stimuli.
While memory for real situations may require people to discriminate
between memories for the same situation experienced in different
circumstances (e.g. the different exemplars of each junction) it is also likely
that discriminating between completely different situations (e.g. different
junctions) relies on similar mechanisms. This is particularly important given
that one of the explanations advanced for the recognition results was based
on attention to central rather than peripheral information in a film. Although
a definition of central information was attempted, no clear description of the
types of peripheral information available was previously offered. It was
argued in Chapter 2 that central information is that which is necessary to the
driving task, it is likely that much of the information specific to an individual
location (e.g. buildings, signposts, or trees) would thus fall into the
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peripheral category. Because multiple exemplars of each junction have been
used in the previous studies this information would have been
nearly identical in all six exemplars of each junction. The role it plays in
normal memory may therefore have been underestimated. Study 4 thus
increases the potential usefulness of peripheral information in the recognition
task by allowing both events (variable information) and junctions (fixed
information) to differ between all stimuli.
Because of this potential interest in the difference between fixed and
variable information in films, it was desirable to have some measures of the
amount of such information in the stimuli being used. When a subsequent
judgment study (Groeger & Chapman, in preparation b) was designed which
used the same films as Study 4, the opportunity was taken to include
questions about the amount of fixed and variable information in the stimuli.
The data from this separate study will be discussed with the results of Study
4 where they appear to provide useful additional information about the tasks
and stimuli used.
Study 4
Recognition Memory with a New Set of Stimuli
This study was an attempt to explore the generality of the results from
the previous recognition studies. The important changes in design were
firstly to increase the number of judgments in the recognition phase in order
to obtain better recognition data than was available for the previous studies,
secondly, to use a much more varied selection of driving situations, and
thirdly to show each location only once during the judgment phase of the
experiment.
The major concern in designing an experiment to meet the criteria given
above was to avoid obtaining ceiling effects. The possibility of making the
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recognition task too easy for subjects is especially difficult to guard against
in this type of study since a major expenditure of time and effort is required
to collect films and create stimulus tapes, this makes extensive piloting
unrealistic. Although it was desired to have as wide a selection of situations
as possible in the stimulus set, caution dictated against simply selecting a
random set of situations differing along multiple dimensions. This might
make the recognition task too easy for subjects. It was decided instead to
select a few films from each of a number of categories (i.e. types of driving
situation) and thus ensure that within each category there was enough
similarity to create sufficient potential distractors for each target.
Although the previous studies have not demonstrated any simple
relationship between previous knowledge of junctions and memory
performance, this may have been because multiple exemplars of each
junction were presented in the recognition studies. Even if there is no
consistent relationship present it does seem likely that previous knowledge of
some of the junctions will at least add noise to the data. Since a large
number of locations were needed for this study it was decided to use
locations which none of the subjects were likely to know rather than stimuli
filmed in the Cambridge area which would differ in the degree of previous
familiarity subjects had with them.
To create an experiment which yielded the maximum information
without becoming boring for the subjects the design is slightly altered from
that used in Studies 2 and 3. For Study 4 the total number of films watched
in the judgment phase was slightly reduced as was the mean length of a film
in order to allow the full stimulus set to appear in the recognition phase, this
effectively doubles the amount of information each subject gives in the
recognition phase, fortunately this was a part of the experiment which
previous subjects had generally found agreeably challenging and intrinsically
motivating.
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Method
Subjects:
The subjects were 40 drivers, 14 male, 26 female, all members of the
Applied Psychology Unit's subject panel, none of whom had taken part in
any of the previous experiments from this series. All subjects were paid for
their participation.
Stimuli:
The stimuli in this study were 48 videos each showing an unobstructed
driver's view ahead whilst driving through a junction. They were recorded
using a Panasonic WV-CD1E miniature video camera fixed to the bonnet of
the car directly in line with the driver and approximately 10cm in front of the
bottom of the windscreen. Video recording in each case began sufficiently
before the junction to allow signs for the junction to be seen and lasted until
the car was approximately 100 yards past the junction. Films were recorded
while either the experimenter or an assistant was driving the Vauxhall Astra
used in Study 1. The films were recorded in locations unlikely to be
identified by the members of the research panel. Of the 48 films 33 were
recorded in South London in and around Beckenham, seven in Wallasey near
Liverpool, four in Walsall and four on the Ml 1 just North of London. All
films showed bright dry weather conditions and moderate to light levels of
traffic.
Any particular location only appeared once in the 48 stimuli, however,
stimuli consisted of 24 pairs where the two films in any pair showed an
identical manoeuvre in similar traffic conditions although not at the same
location. The 48 films were made up of four films showing motorway
driving, eight showing bends in a road and four exemplars each of left turns,
right turns and driving straight ahead in each of three situations: signalized
crossroads, four arm roundabouts, and unsignalized T-junctions. Films
ranged from 14 to 41 seconds in length. Table 6.1 shows details about the 48
NEW RECOGNITION STIMULI 151
stimuli used, two sets of 24 films with the odd numbered films comprising
one set and the even numbered ones comprising the second set.
Individual films were separated by a three second featureless blue field
and were recorded in blocks of four for the purposes of randomization.
Films had no sound track but those shown in the judgment phase had a 1.5
second tone recorded in the middle of the manoeuvre. Three different tapes
were made, two for the judgment phase and one for the recognition phase,
each judgment tape contained 24 films, one of each pair, the recognition tape
contained the full 48 films. Each tape was made up in a random order with
the constraint that no two junctions of the same type should appear in
consecutive positions within any block.
Apparatus:
Films were shown in the Applied Psychology Unit1 s driving simulator as
described for Study 2.
Procedure:
Subjects were tested individually in the driving simulator. The
experiment consisted of two phases in which subjects watched films, first a
judgment phase and second a recognition phase, the first phase lasted
approximately 20 minutes, the second phase approximately 40 minutes.
Between the two phases subjects performed a short filler task answering two
brief questionnaires similar to those used for Studies 2 and 3.
Judgment phase:
Subjects watched 24 films. When the subjects heard the tone in the
centre of each junction they performed two rating tasks similar to those used
in Studies 1 and 2, first a risk rating, then an estimate for the actual accident
statistics for the junction. For this experiment, however, each rating was
given on a seven point scale.
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Film
number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
Junction
Type
Traffic Lights
Traffic Lights
Traffic Lights
Traffic Lights
Traffic Lights
Traffic Lights
Traffic Lights
Traffic Lights
Traffic Lights
Traffic Lights
Traffic Lights
Traffic Lights
Roundabout
Roundabout
Roundabout
Roundabout
Roundabout
Roundabout
Roundabout
Roundabout
Roundabout
Roundabout
Roundabout
Roundabout
T-Junction
T-Junction
T-Junction
T-Junction
T-Junction
T-Junction
T-Junction
T-Junction
T-Ju nction
1-Junction
1-Junction
1-Junction
S-Bend
S-Bend
S-Bend
S-Bend
S-Bend
S-Bend
S-Bend
S-Bend
Motorway
Motorway
Motorway
Motorway
Manoeuvre
Type
Left Turn
Left Turn
Left Turn
Left Turn
Ahead
Ahead
Ahead
Ahead
Right Turn
Right Turn
Right Turn
Right Turn
Ahead
Ahead
Ahead
Ahead
Left Turn
Left Turn
Left Turn
Left Turn
Right Turn
Right Turn
Right Turn
Right Turn
Right Turn
Right Turn
Right Turn
Right Turn
Left Turn
Left Turn
Left Turn
Left Turn
Ahead
Ahead
Ahead
Ahead
Right then Left
Right then Left
Right then Left
Right then Left
Left then Right
Left then Right
Left then Right
Left then Right
Overtaking
Overtaking
Overtaking
Overtaking
Film Length
(Isecs)
34
41
27
25
18
14
28
24
32
30
22
30
24
25
18
21
18
33
20
18
39
33
25
29
20
18
21
21
18
15
21
18
15
17
17
15
18
17
23
23
16
16
17
23
21
19
18
22
Table 6.1: Details of the 48 stimuli used in Study 4.
NEW RECOGNITION STIMULI 153
Risk rating: "Give a rating on a scale from 1 to 7 to indicate the risk you
would feel in if you were the driver in that situation. A rating of 1 would
mean that you feel there is no possible way in which an accident could
occur in the situation, a rating of 7 would mean that you feel that you
could be involved in an accident at any moment."
Accident estimate: "I want you to estimate the number of accidents that
you think actually occur at this junction. Use a scale from 1 to 7 where 1
would mean that you think virtually no accidents occur at the junction and
7 would indicate that you think a large number of accidents occur at the
junction."
Recognition Phase:
Subjects watched a further 48 films, 24 of the films, the targets, were
exactly the same pieces of film that had been shown in the judgment phase.
The other 24 films were distractors, the film from each pair that had not been
seen by the subject before. After each film was seen subjects had to decide
whether they had seen that precise film section before or not, making the
response either 'Yes' or 'No'. They also gave a confidence rating in their
decision on a seven point scale. The instructions and scale used were
identical to those used for Studies 2 and 3.
Partial randomization of presentation order was achieved using the video
controller. On each tape the stimuli were blocked into groups of four films
and the presentation order of these groups was randomized for each subject.
Any individual film was rated by 20 subjects in the judgment phase and by
all 40 in the recognition phase, appearing to 20 of the subjects as a distractor
and to the other 20 as a target.
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Results
The results section is again divided into judgment and recognition
results. The later recognition analyses are unlike those used in the previous
two studies where relationships between risk and recognition sensitivity were
explored within individual junctions. In this study junctions are divided
broadly into two categories depending on the accident estimates that were
given to them. Subsequently some more exploratory analyses are reported.
Firstly, stimuli are divided into two groups depending on the direction of turn
shown in the film. Secondly, new ratings of the stimuli, obtained from a
separate study, are used to explore the results further.
Judgment Results:
The actual mean risk ratings and accident estimates for the 48 different
films (ratings from 20 subjects contribute to each mean) are given in Table
6.4 with the recognition results. The overall mean risk rating was 2.15
(s.d.=l.22) and the mean accident estimate was 2.39 (s.d.=1.29). These
numbers are surprisingly low, no junction had a mean accident or risk rating
above the midpoint of the scale. This may reflect a general expectation on
the part of the subjects that an experiment concerned with risk would involve
more obviously dangerous situations, thus they have left themselves
'headroom' on the response scale. Alternatively or additionally subjects may
genuinely feel that there is greater subjective difference within the few films
they have given high ratings to than within the many they have given lower
ratings to and have been at least partially successful in avoiding what Poulton
(1989) terms equal frequency biases.
Since a separate group of subjects gave judgments on each set of films
the stimulus judgments are analysed for odd and even numbered films
separately. For both sets of stimuli there were significant differences
between junctions both on risk ratings, F(23,437)=3.95, p<0.01 (odd
numbered junctions), F(23 ,437)=5 .67, p<O.Ol (even numbered junctions),
and accident estimates, F(23,437)=4.74, p<O.Ol (odd numbered junctions),
F(23 ,437)=4.02, p<0.0 1 (even numbered junctions).
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Data on these stimuli are also available from a subsequent study using a
series of rating scales (Groeger & Chapman, in preparation b). Since data
from that study will be used to clarify both the judgment and recognition
results, the important points about that study will be briefly described. In the
Groeger and Chapman study the films were each viewed by 48 subjects who
had just completed a drive around Cambridge with a local driving instructor.
The subjects were broadly similar to those used in this study in terms of age
and driving experience. Each subject saw one set of 24 films and rated each
on eight different seven-point scales presented by computer, thus each film
was rated by 24 subjects. The eight scales used in this study were as follows.
1) How much risk would you have felt in that situation?
1 = No risk, 7 = High risk
2) How hard would you have to concentrate to drive safely in that situation?
1 = Not very hard, 7 = Very hard
3) If an accident had happened in that situation how serious do you think
it would have been?
1 = Very minor, 7 = Extremely serious
4) How stressful would it be to drive in that situation?
1 = Not stressful, 7 = Very stressful
5) Did you feel you had control over danger in the situation?
1 = No control, 7 = Good control
6) How fast did you feel the driver was going in the situation?
1 = Too slow, 7 = Too fast
7) How much was there to see in the film in terms of moving objects?
(Traffic, pedestrians etc.)
1 = Nothing to see, 7 = Much to see
8) How much was there to see in the film in terms of fixed objects?
(Buildings, road signs etc.)
1 = Nothing to see, 7 = Much to see
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The mean risk rating given in the Groeger and Chapman study was in
fact considerably higher than that given by subjects in this experiment
(mean=3.66, s.d.=O.74 as opposed to mean=2.15, s.d.=O.50). This difference
is significant for both odd, F(1,42)=70.92, p<O.Ol and even numbered
junctions, F(l,42)=59.17, p<O.Ol. This may simply be because subjects
assumed that the current study was essentially about risk and expected to
encounter some particularly dangerous situations. Most of the stimuli
presented actually showed very normal driving situations and these would
thus be rated as relatively low on risk. When subjects were performing a
variety of other judgment tasks they may have no longer expected to see
particularly risky situations and consequently would have been better centred
on the scale for risk ratings.
The difference between experiments also interacts with the film seen for
both odd, F(23,966)=2.35, p<O.Ol and even numbered junctions,
F(23,966)=2.13, p<O.Oi. Despite these interactions, when correlations are
calculated across the 48 films it is clear that the risk ratings in each case are
strongly related to one another, r(46)=O.742, p<O.Ol, see Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 shows the correlations between the ratings given in this
experiment and the eight ratings given in the Groeger and Chapman study.
In this case all values from each experiment were first averaged for each
stimulus and correlations between the measures were calculated across the 48
films. The correlation between the two sets of risk ratings is of comparable
magnitude to the correlations when a subset of the data from Studies 2 and 3
was compared with data from a similar rating scales study (Groeger &
Chapman 1992, in preparation a), r(22)=O.66 for risk ratings, r(22)=O.71 for
accident estimates and r(22)=O.83 for speed ratings (though risk and accident
estimates are on a 20 point scale in one case and a 7 point scale in the other).
Although there are again differences in the use of scales in different
contexts, there is generally a relatively high level of agreement between the
two sets of risk ratings. This contrasts with the normality ratings obtained
from Study 3 which were clearly used differently in the new context.
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Risk
Accidents
Risk
Concentrate
Serious
Stress
Control
Speed
Moving
Fixed
Recognition	 Rating Scales
Study:	 Study:
Risk	 Accs	 Risk	 Concen Serious
1.000
0 748** 1 000
0 742** 0 617** 1 000
0 629** 0 582** 0 890** 1 000
0 369** 0 335** 0 605** 0 620** 1 000
0 684** 0 629** 0 930** 0 937** 0 585**
-0 684** -0 603** -0 858** -0 689** -0 351*
0 273	 0 188	 0 549** 0 329* 0 524**
0 .469** 0 .579** 0 .647** 0 .738** 0.374**
0.150	 0.233	 0.129	 0.048	 0.539**
Stress
Control
Speed
Moving
Fixed
Stress Control Speed Moving Fixed
1.000
-0 778** 1 000
0 419** -0 548** 1 000
	
0 .764** 0.448** 0.063
	
1 .00S
0.163	 0.364* -0.107	 0.218	 1.000
Table 6.2: Correlations across the 48 junctions on the two judgment tasks and the
eight ratings from Groeger and Chapman (in preparation b).
Correlations marked by asterisks are signficantly different from zero,
* if p<O.05, ** if p.<O.O1.
NEW RECOGNITION STIMULI 158
The correlations with the various scales give some indication of what
types of situation subjects think of as risky, particularly those which require
high levels of concentration, feel stressful and make them feel they are not in
control. The factor structure underlying these scales is considered in detail in
Groeger and Chapman (in preparation b) and will not be discussed further
here. However, the last two scales concerning the amount of moving and
fixed objects were included in that study specifically to aid interpretation of
the recognition results from this study and will be considered below. Note
that the moving objects rating is significantly correlated with risk rating,
r(46)=O.47, p<O.O1 while that for fixed objects is not, r(46)=0.15.
Recognition Results
The mean number of hits for a stimulus was 13.94 and the mean number
of false alarms was 5.25, each measured out of a possible maximum of 20.
Over the 48 stimuli there was no overall correlation of hit rate (hits - false
alarms) with either risk ratings r(46)=0.27 or accident estimates r(46)=O.18.
The larger number of subjects in the recognition phase for each stimulus
increases the reliability of signal detection measures calculated for individual
stimuli so these measures were calculated immediately rather than using hit
rate for further analyses.
Using the same techniques as were used for Studies 2 and 3 measures of
recognition sensitivity, P(A) and bias, B, were calculated. The data were
again aggregated into six categories before these measures were calculated,
the number of response in each of the categories is shown in Tabae 6.3.
Once again it proved possible to aggregate the responses into the same
six categories, a comparison with Tables 4.5 and 5.4 shows that the use of
response categories by subjects has remained remarkably constalat
throughout the three recognition experiments. For the 48 films the mean
P(A) is 0.77 (range 0.52 to 0.94) and the mean B is 3.07 (range L6 to 4.38),
see Table 6.4. These mean values of P(A) and B are very similar to those
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from Studies 2 and 3, P(A)=O.68, B=3.21 and P(A)=O.75, B=3.49
respectively. This reflects success in avoiding ceiling effects for these
stimuli although it is not immediately clear exactly which factors if any have
interacted to produce a recognition test of comparable difficulty to those used
previously.
There is no significant correlation across the 48 junctions between mean
risk ratings and either P(A), r(46)=O.24, or B, r(46)=O.12, or between
accident estimate and either measure r(46)=0.16 and r(46)=O.09. The actual
length of the film, however, is significantly correlated with P(A), r(46)=O.44,
p<O.0l, though not with B, r(46)=O.06.
Resp-
onse
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
Confi-
dence
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Cate-
gory
1
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
6
Number of
times used
338
153
129
102
87
63
49
87
74
95
139
171
125
308
Category
total
338
282
301
395
296
308
Table 6.3: Use of the 14 categories and division into six categories for analysis.
Hits
15
17
17
16
10
14
12
12
16
18
16
14
12
11
17
9
11
15
17
8
19
16
12
11
16
15
14
9
12
17
17
12
13
14
11
18
13
11
18
17
11
9
13
9
15
16
17
17
P(A)
.89
.89
.90
.85
.72
.68
.66
.71
.81
.86
.86
.84
.79
.62
.76
.61
.52
.77
.94
.67
.94
.87
.71
.80
.77
.75
.84
.67
.78
.80
.93
.70
.80
.65
.69
.88
.64
.60
.90
.75
.74
.61
.78
.73
.72
.74
.90
.81
B
3.2
2.8
3
3
3.67
2.5
3
3.43
2.5
2.4
2.71
3.5
3.5
3.10
2.44
3.31
2.8
3
3.25
3.91
3.5
3.67
3.38
4.38
2.57
2.82
3.57
3.62
3.63
2.91
2.75
3.5
3.3
2.45
3.07
2.7
2.7
3.1
2.25
1.6
3.54
3.38
3.33
4
2.67
1.88
4
2
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Film
number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
Risk
rating
1.8
2
2.05
2.25
2.2
2.1
1.7
1.9
2.65
3.95
1.85
2.05
2.2
2.2
1.8
1.65
2.55
1.65
2.65
2.75
2.75
2.75
1.95
2.35
1.3
2.3
2.75
1.05
1.95
1.7
1 55
1.85
2.65
2.7
1.55
2.3
1.4
2.05
2.3
2.45
2.1
1.55
1.4
2.85
2.1
18
2.8
1.9
Accident
estimate
1.85
2.2
1.9
2.8
3
3.6
2.2
2.3
3.5
3.2
2.2
2.5
2.2
2.7
1.9
2.05
2.2
2.25
2.95
3.3
3.05
3.25
2.55
2.65
1.85
2.3
2 55
2.3
1.85
2.2
1.7
2.15
2.7
2.95
1.9
2.25
2.4
1.55
2.6
2.7
2.2
1.7
1.6
2.9
1.95
2.35
2.45
2.25
False
alarms
3
4
3
4
2
10
8
2
6
5
6
3
2
8
12
7
11
5
2
2
1
2
5
2
7
7
2
3
3
4
4
5
4
12
8
5
10
8
5
13
2
5
4
3
7
11
1
4
Table 6.4: Judgment and recognition results for all 48 films.
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Relationships Within Different Types of Junction:
The results thus far parallel those of Studies 2 and 3 in showing no
overall relationship between risk and recognition performance. In both those
studies it was possible to split the films into those showing different
junctions and look at relationships between measures within each junction.
When this was done opposite effects emerged for generally risky and
generally non-risky junctions. Here each film shows a different junction so it
is necessary to use a new method of dividing the data. The mean accident
estimate was thus used to split the data into the 22 junctions with the highest
accident estimates and the 23 with the lowest (3 junctions with the median
score of 2.3 were not included in this analysis). Table 6.5 shows the data
split this way.
High Accs	 Low Accs
mean risk:	 2.468
	
1.850
mean accs:
	 2.802
	
2.004
mean P(A):	 0.783	 0.759
mean B:	 3.113
	
2.995
n
	 22
	
23
risk. P(A)
correlation:	 0.428	 -0.105
Table 6.5: Summary data for films split according to mean accident estimate.
In this case the positive correlation between risk and P(A) for the 22
junctions rated highest for accidents is significant, r(20)=O.43, p<O.O5. The
negative correlation for those rated lowest is not significant, r(21)=-O.1 1. It
is, nonetheless, significantly different from that for the high rated films,
z=1.75, p<0.05. This suggests that, as expected, for the generally more
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dangerous junctions feelings of risk are associated with improved subsequent
recognition, whilst for the less dangerous ones this is not the case. In this
analysis, however, there is no evidence for an actual reversal of the effect.
Whereas in the previous studies subjects have had prior knowledge of a
junction and multiple exposures to it, in this study subjects only see a
junction once, in just one set of traffic conditions and at the same time as
making a risk assessment. It is thus not clear that these accident estimates
are particularly stable assessments of the objective danger at the junction;
they are likely to be strongly determined by risk ratings. The high
correlation between accident estimate and risk rating observed, r(46)=O.75,
p<O.Oi, may reflect the objective correlation that should exist between these
measures or it may simply be that subjects were not completely successful in
dissociating the two scales.
Certainly in Study 2 there was a significant relationship between risk
ratings and accident estimates, even within exemplars of individual
junctions. The accident estimates from Study 2 as shown in Table 4.6 make
it clear that subjects do rely on the precise conditions in the film viewed
when making accident estimates for a junction, even though most subjects
previously knew the junctions concerned. Nonetheless, it is clear that
accident estimates still provide additional information. If the films are
divided simply on the actual risk rating given there is no evidence of
differences in relationships for the two types of film - for high risk films the
correlation between P(A) and risk, r(22)=O.265, and for low risk films
r(22)=O.166. Neither of these correlations is significant nor is the difference
between them, z=O.33. Clearly accident estimates are measuring an
important aspect of the stimuli which risk ratings alone do not. The fact that
dividing the stimuli up by risk ratings produces no dissociation is consistent
with the results of Studies 2 and 3 which showed that there was no simple U-
shaped or i-shaped relationship between risk ratings and P(A). This also
appears to be true for this study, see Figure 6.1, here values of P(A) for the
48 films are simply plotted against the mean risk rating in each case. The
(r(46)=0.24).
1.0
0.9
0.8
P(A)
0.7
0.6
0.5
1	 2	 3	 4
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best fitting second order polynomial accounts for only 0.056 percent of the
variance in this case, no improvement on the fit given by a straight line
Mean Risk
Figure 6.1: P(A) plotted against mean risk rating for the 48 films.
Differences between Right and Left Turns:
Since no objective accident data were available for the areas shown in
the films used in this study, it is not possible to define certain films as
exemplars of risky junctions a priori. As discussed previously, the accident
estimates given by subjects are only a crude measure of objective risk which
is clearly related to subjective risk even in situations where this is
inappropriate (e.g. multiple estimates of objective risk for the same junction).
One objective distinction which can be made between films is the manoeuvre
being performed by the driver. One would, for example, assume right turns
to be objectively more dangerous than left turns. Data from Hall (1986)
confirms that this is true for the objective risk of accidents at traffic lights.
NEW RECOGNITION STIMULI 164
In the Hall study accidents at 177 signalized crossroads were analysed over a
period of four years, over this period accidents involving a vehicle turning
right outnumbered those to vehicles turning left by a ratio of 6.6:1 (accidents
involving one vehicle turning in each direction were excluded from the
analysis).
This method of examining the data has not been employed in the
previous studies because no attempt had been made in those studies to be
representative in the sampling of direction of turn at each junction (see Table
4.2). In this case, however, the sampling is better balanced, there are equal
numbers of each type of turn at three different types of junction in
comparable traffic conditions. On this basis then the 24 films which showed
turns were analysed separately. The films were split into the 12 showing
right turns and the 12 showing left turns. A summary of the data split this
way is shown in Table 6.6.
Right Turns	 Left Turns
mean risk:	 2.392
	
2.063
mean accs:
	 2.658
	
2.279
mean P(A):	 0.809	 0.800
mean B:	 3.217
	
3.145
n
	 12
	
12
risk, P(A)
correlation:	 0.462	 -0.357
Table 6.6: Summary data for films split into right and left turns.
The difference in accident estimates between right and left turns,
t(22)=1.89, p43.05, suggests that subjects may indeed have used feelings of
risk inappropriately when giving their accident estimates (alternatively, it is
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of course possible that the right turns used in this study actually did come
from objectively more risky junctions than the left turns). Although neither
the correlation for right nor left turns is significant in its own right (10
degrees of freedom) they are both in the direction predicted, moreover, the
difference between these two correlations is significant, z=l.85, p<zO.05.
This seems to support the previously observed dissociation between
generally dangerous and generally safe situations in the relationship between
risk and recognition performance.
Fixed and Variable Information
Of the additional data collected about these stimuli in Groeger and
Chapman (in preparation b) the first six scales were chosen to be directly
concerned with aspects of risk. However, the last two scales, concerning the
amount of moving and fixed information in the film were added to aid the
interpretation of the current study. They were designed to allow some
comparison of the films in terms of the type and amount of information
actually present. It was previously suggested that fixed information will tend
to be peripheral to the driving task and variable information is more likely to
be central, it is thus possible that the amount of these types of information
will constrain any effects of attention focusing.
The division of the stimuli into right and left turns demonstrated separate
positive and negative relationships between risk and recognition sensitivity.
This was done for just 24 of the stimuli, all showing junctions. The division
of the stimuli by accident estimates used almost the entire set of 48 stimuli.
Films with high or low accident estimates thus additionally included
instances of passing a vehicle on a motorway and driving ahead along a
curving road. These situations were unlike the others in the study in that
they were filmed in rural areas while the films showing junctions were
generally in urban areas. This may have meant that these stimuli contained
relatively little pefipheral information.
If films have little peripheral information in them then it may be that
memory for such information is largely irrelevant. It was previously
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suggested that one reason attention focusing might actually impair
recognition of non-risky junctions is that it would prevent subjects from
attending to useful peripheral information. If there is little peripheral
information in the non-risky exemplars, attention focusing would have no
general effect on recognition sensitivity. It may be that a prerequisite for
obtaining reversals in the effects of risk on recognition is that there is a
reasonable amount of peripheral information available in the situation.
To see whether the junction films actually did have more fixed
information in them than the others, a comparison was made of the ratings
from Groeger and Chapman (in press b). This shows that one of the major
factors that distinguishes the films of motorways and bends in roads from
those of junctions is that they were rated as having less to see in them. There
was a small difference, though not a significant one, in terms of ratings for
moving objects (mean rating 3.91 vs. 4.37, t(46)=l .28) but a much larger one
for fixed objects (3.31 vs. 4.87, (46)=6.03, p<O.Ol).
Across the 48 stimuli there is a significant correlation between the rating
for moving objects and P(A), r(46)=O.43, p<O.Ol, though not for fixed
objects and P(A), r(46)=O.03. There is a significant correlation between B
and the rating for fixed objects, r(46)=O.40, p<O.Oi, though not between B
and moving objects, r(46)=O.14. The first result, that situations with many
moving objects feel more risky, is what would be expected. The second
correlation requires deeper consideration.
B relates to the collapsed category scale in Table 6.3. High values of B
represent a tendency to call films distractors. The positive correlation
between B and the ratings of fixed objects thus means that subjects tended to
mistakenly categorise films containing many fixed objects as distractors.
Since the ratings for the number of fixed objects in a film are not related
to actual recognition sensitivity it seems likely that this information is not
assisting subjects in the recognition phase. One possible reason for this
would be that fixed information may simply not be attended in the judgment
phase, alter all, we have already seen that the amount of such information
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present does not appear to be related to risk ratings (r(46)=O. 15 between
studies, r(48)=O.13 within the ratings scales study alone) or accident
estimates (r(46)=O.23 between studies). If such information was not attended
to in the judgment phase then it is possible that when it is seen in the
recognition phase it will be noticed for the first time. Because of the
unfamiliarity of this fixed information subjects may regard the film as a
whole to be unfamiliar, and the more fixed information is present, the more
unfamiliar the film will appear. This may have caused the general tendency
for films with a large amount of fixed information to be judged as distractors
and hence the overall correlation with values of B.
This relationship may depend on the amount of variable information in
the scene. To test this possibility the data were split according to the mean
ratings for the amount of moving objects in the film. For generally busy
scenes there was no correlation between B and the amount of fixed objects,
r(20)=-O.053, while for the generally empty ones there was a significant
correlation, r(21)=O.612, p<O.Ol. The difference between these correlations
is significant, z=2.38, p<O.Ol. This dissociation also appears if the data are
split on the basis of mean risk ratings (which were of course strongly related
to ratings for number of moving objects - r(46)=O.47, p<O.Ol across studies
and r(46)=O.65, p<O.Oi within the rating scales study). There is once again a
significant difference between the correlations, z=2.1 8, p<0.05, for the
riskier films r(22)=O.211, while for the less risky films r(22)=O.711, p<zO.O1.
The relationship between B and ratings for the amount of fixed information,
however, appears to be unaffected by splitting the data according to accident
estimates, r(20)=O.39 across films given high accident estimates, and
r(21)=O.39 for those with low accident estimates.
This seems to suggest that for films with many moving objects or with
high levels of subjective risk subjects ignored the fixed information in the
recognition phase and were thus not biased by it. It would thus be only for
those films with generally low levels of subjective risk or few moving
objects that subjects actually looked at the fixed information even in the
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recognition phase and were thus able to be biased by it. The general
implications of this would be that fixed information is very seldom attended
to in the judgment phase (and possibly in normal driving) and on those
occasions in recognition tests when it is attended to, rather than aiding
recognition sensitivity, its unfamiliarity simply biases subjects towards
calling all stimuli distractors.
The small role of fixed information appears consistent with the general
finding that previous knowledge of a junction does not affect recognition
performance. This finding is strengthened by the fact that the general results
from this study in which all films showed unfamiliar junctions are broadly
similar to those from the previous two studies in which most of the junctions
were previously known by the subjects.
General Discussion
The results from Study 4 seem to be generally in accord with those from
Studies 2 and 3. In this case it was not possible to explore the effects of
different levels of risk on recognition of different exemplars of the same
junction. However, it was once again observed that risk only enhances
recognition performance in certain situations. These situations may be
characterised not by the actual risk felt in the situation but by the potential
for risky situations to occur at the junction. Thus situations which were
given high accident estimates tended to show an improvement in memory
when risk was experienced. Similarly for right turns at junctions.
In Studies 2 and 3 there was evidence that this effect actually reversed
for generally non-risky junctions and subjective risk in the judgment phase
actually reduced subsequent recognition sensitivity. There was no evidence
in this study of a general reversal of this type for situations with low accident
estimates, however, there did appear to be a reversal for left turns. The lack
of reversal when splitting data by accident estimates may have been caused
by a number of films with very little peripheral information in them, or it
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may simply have been an effect of the high correlation between risk and
accident estimates.
In discussing the rating tasks from Groeger and Chapman (in
preparation, b), there has been a tendency to assume that the distinction
between variable and fixed information corresponds to the distinction
between central and peripheral information. While this often may be true,
there are also frequent exceptions. Some fixed information is clearly central
to the driving task (e.g. the actual layout of the junction) while much variable
information is likely to normally be peripheral to it (e.g. the colour of other
vehicles). It would thus be preferable to have more specific information
about the details of stimuli which subjects are actually attending to.
To decide what precise details in a situation are important it is necessary
to use a methodology which either systematically manipulates those details
present or else one which provides information about the details of the
stimuli which were in fact remembered. Clearly the amount of potential
information in any film is sufficiently large that systematic manipulation
would be extremely difficult. However, it may be possible to get some idea
about the information that was likely to have been used in the recognition
studies by simply asking people to describe the films. This approach is used
in Chapter 7 to attempt to understand the basis for the recognition results.
The obvious alternative method of determining which aspects of a stimulus
are remembered is to use a modified recall paradigm and this approach is
adopted in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 7
Exploring the Recognition Results III
All four studies reported in this thesis so far have demonstrated some
form of relationship between subjective risk and memory. Study 1
demonstrated that drivers were substantially more likely to recall those
situations in which they had experienced risk. Three subsequent laboratory
studies, however, have failed to show any overall improvement in
recognition sensitivity for films which were given high risk ratings. These
laboratory studies have nonetheless provided some evidence of relationships
between risk and sensitivity. Specifically, those situations in which drivers
might normally expect to experience risk (e.g. generally dangerous junctions
or right turns) showed the expected effect, recognition sensitivity was better
for risky exemplars than less risky ones. However, for the situations which
would not normally be associated with risk (e.g. generally safe junctions or
left turns) recognition sensitivity was highest for the least risky exemplars.
Two possible interpretations of this effect were advanced in Chapter 5.
One interpretation was based on the fact that in each case memory appeared
to be best for situations which accorded with the subjects' expectations about
the junction, an attempt to test this was made by considering subjects' ratings
for how normal the situation was. Normality ratings did not clearly support
this position. Moreover, it is not clear that this pattern of results is what
would be predicted on the assumption that subjects had schemas for
situations previously available. An alternative interpretation of the data was
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given using the idea of attention focusing. This interpretation was based on
assumptions about the types of information available in different stimuli.
The study in this chapter was designed to allow some assessment of the
information which was in fact present in the stimuli used in order to explore
these assumptions.
The result of attention focusing is assumed to be that memory for
situations in which a driver experienced risk will be concentrated on central
information. It has been argued that an appropriate definition of central in
this context would be information related to risks and potential risks in a
situation. On this basis the specific assumptions that were made for giving
an attention focusing interpretation of the recognition results were that the
types of risk present at generally dangerous junctions are of a different order
to those at generally safe junctions. The attention focusing interpretation of
Studies 2 and 3 assumed that risks at dangerous junctions provide better
recognition cues than those at safer junction. This could be because risks at
dangerous junctions tend to be multiple and often specific to individual films
while risks at safer junctions are often single and common to many
exemplars. The argument was that knowledge of multiple specific risks
enhances recognition while knowledge of a few general risks does not, in
fact attending to these risks will cause subjects to make false alarms in a
recognition test when similar risks appear in films which had not been
previously viewed, hence impairing recognition sensitivity.
Studies using recognition measures have advantages over those using
recall. It is much easier to score the data and, having scored it, it is possible
to calculate precise measures of performance and accurately assess any
response bias. However, one problem with using recognition as a method of
assessing memory is that although it gives good overall measures of
performance it does not make it clear exactly which details of a stimulus
were remembered. This is particularly important given that the explanation
of the data given in Chapter 4 in terms of attention focusing relied on
assumptions about memory being enhanced for some aspects of the stimuli
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and impaired for other aspects. In standard laboratory research it is usually
possible to create stimuli which systematically manipulate the details of
interest. Systematic manipulation of information in films of the type used in
Studies 2, 3 and 4, however, is not possible, firstly because of the difficulty
in setting up appropriate driving situations for filming and secondly because
it is not yet clear exactly which details are the important ones. Study 5 was
thus conducted to allow some quantification of the actual information
contained in the stimuli that were used in Studies 2 and 3. This was done by
having drivers themselves indicate what the important details of the stimuli
previously used in fact were. This was intended both to inform future
research and to allow the reinterpretation of the results of Studies 2 and 3 to
see whether the assumptions made about the distribution of information
concerning risk were in fact correct.
A paper by Hughes and Cole (1986) describes two studies which use a
methodology similar to the one which will be used in the study described in
this chapter. Hughes and Cole had drivers report objects that "attracted their
attention" while actually driving a car and while watching a film of the same
route. They found that there was relatively good agreement between reports
given on the road and in the laboratory, the main difference was that the total
level of report was 21% higher in the laboratory. Subjects in their laboratory
study gave approximately nine verbal reports per kilometre. They chose to
divide verbal reports into eight different categories, however, they
subsequently divided reports into two general types which are of particular
interest in this context. These were reports of information which was related
to driving, and information which was not. The former category included
information about road layout, traffic control devices, vehicles, and people.
The latter category included information about the immediate road surrounds
(litter bins, post boxes etc.), general road surrounds (houses, shops etc.),
vegetation, and advertising.
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Hughes and Cole make no reference to differing levels of risk, nor do
they report information specifically for junctions. Their particular interest
was the relatively high levels of report for advertising contrasting with
relatively low levels of report for traffic control devices. However, their
division of information into driving-related and driving-unrelated is of
considerable interest in the context of the previous discussion of attention
focusing. The amount of report in each category was highly dependent on
the type of roads (which they divide into residential, arterial and shopping).
The overall level of driving-unrelated report remained approximately
constant between these three road types (although there were substantial
differences in the actual categories used). Driving-related report, however,
was highest in shopping areas, then arterial roads, and lowest in residential
areas. Importantly, the relative proportions of different types of information
in different road types were largely the same for subjects who were actual
driving and those who were watching films of driving.
The levels of report in the Hughes and Cole study were all calculated per
kilometre travelled. This was clearly necessary for their analysis since it
allowed them to aggregate data over different drivers. However, the actual
time taken to cover a kilometre will almost certainly have varied
substantially between road types, thus it is possible that their subjects did not
actually have more to report in the shopping areas. They may simply have
spent longer in such areas and by giving reports at an approximately constant
rate have produced the effects observed. Note that a difficulty in the
interpretation of such a study is that it is not clear what the objective
frequencies of the various information types would actually have been. Thus
it is not possible to say that drivers attend to information differently for
different road types. It is almost certain that the distribution of information
varied significantly between the road types and differences in report may
simply have reflected these objective changes.
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Study 5
Descriptions and Potential Risks
Study 5 used a methodology relatively similar to that of the Hughes and
Cole (1986) laboratory study to describe the information which was available
in some of the films which were used in Studies 2 and 3. There were,
however, two important differences in the aims of this study compared to
those of Hughes and Cole. Firstly, in addition to looking for a general
description of the information available in the films, this study was
concerned particularly with information which is related to risks and
potential risks in the scenes. Secondly, this study aimed to discover as much
as possible of the information which is potentially available to drivers, not
just the occasional item of particular interest. These differences in aim
required a number of differences in methodology.
Study 5 had two conditions, one set of drivers described fully all the
salient information in a film, a second set of drivers described specifically
the types of risks that were present in the film. This was done to allow a
comparison of risk-related information to other information in order to test
the assumption that the recognition results relied on attention focusing
causing specific memory enhancements for risk-related information.
Collecting further data on the stimuli may also allow other possibilities to be
tested, there may be simple aspects of the stimuli relating to the recognition
results which were not previously appreciated.
In a pilot experiment subjects attempted to describe films as they
watched them in the way described by Hughes and Cole. The films used in
this study were, however, relatively short and it was clear that subjects were
not describing anything like the total amount of information that was
available. Typically subjects either described at length one feature of interest
ignoring all others, or else they gave several brief cryptic comments which
could not unambiguously assigned to particular objects in the film. As an
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alternative subjects were instructed to wait until the end of a film before
giving any description. Using this procedure subjects gave more intelligible
descriptions. There is, however, a substantial memory component to such a
task, particularly for longer films. Since the study was intended to provide
an objective description of the films in order to understand memory
performance it was clearly desirable to have as small a component of
memory in the description task as possible. The films were thus split into
sections of five seconds each, this interval appeared to be long enough to
give subjects a feeling for what was going on while still allowing them to
give fairly comprehensive descriptions of the objects and events contained
within each film section.
An additional advantage of this method of presentation is that it made the
situation less realistic for subjects. If subjects actually experienced risk
while watching the films then it is possible that attention focusing might have
taken place and systematically biased the information subsequently described
by subjects. As the aim of the study was to obtain objective descriptions of
the films with which to interpret memory performance it is clearly desirable
to minimize any such feelings of risk, pausing the film every five seconds
appeared to be an effective way of doing this.
The method of coding the data in this study was rather different from
that used by Hughes and Cole. In order to retain as much information as
possible, each type of object reported was initially coded separately.
Because this study was designed to facilitate the interpretation of recognition
results a fundamental distinction was made between information which
would be shared by all exemplars of a particular junctibn (fixed information)
and that which could potentially differ between exemplars (variable
information), the assumption was that the fixed information would be
relatively unimportant to recognition performance.
A secondary purpose of the study was to explore the possibility that the
act of describing a film or specifically describing potential risks in a situation
will alter drivers' subsequent assessments of risk. This was intended as an
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extension to the debiasing work reported in Groeger and Chapman (1990).
To explore this possibility subjects gave risk ratings for the stimuli after
completing the main experiment. The data from this part of the experiment
will not be described in this thesis.
Method
Subjects:
The subjects were 20 of the drivers who had previously participated in
Study 2. They were chosen to represent a range of ages (mean 44 years, mm
21, max 62) and degrees of driving experience (Driving licence held for
mean 22 years, mm 4, max 40, mean annual mileage 7,450, nun 1,000, max
25,000). There were 8 men and 12 women in the sample.
Stimuli:
In order to allow the experiment to be completed by subjects in one hour
only a subset of the original films from Studies 2 and 3 were used. 24 films
were selected from the 60 originally used, these showed three exemplars
from each of eight junctions. Four of the junctions were chosen as low risk
and four as high risk on the basis of the mean ratings given to that junction in
Study 2 (the mean subjective risk rating averaged over all six exemplars of
the junction). From the six potential exemplars three films were chosen of
each junction, one low risk, one medium risk and one high risk, the three
levels of exemplar risk are assigned relative to the junction mean again using
the mean risk rating from Study 2.
In the description phase the films were divided into sections lasting five
seconds separated by a blue field lasting two seconds, different films were
separated by a blue field lasting five seconds. For the subsequent judgment
task the films were presented in their entirety with an audible tone recorded
at the moment the car passed through the centre of the junction. Different
films were again separated by a blue field lasting five seconds.
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09
35
34
33
39
40
38
52
51
50
13
16
14
19
22
23
28
27
30
60
56
55
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
LOW
LOW
LOW
LOW
2
6
7
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3
4
5
10
52.2
39.5
36.1
45.5
45.4
44.3
32.0
39.0
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37.5
33.5
24.2
20.1
25.1
18.0
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38.4
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28.2
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33.0
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6.22
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5.22
5.06
4.78
4.67
6.00
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3.44
7.67
6.22
5.44
5.56
5.17
3.78
4.67
3.78
2.78
4.94
4.39
3.56
4.89
4.22
3.17
.86
.67
.59
.67
.81
.51
.84
.73
.52
.80
.69
.62
.62
.60
.49
.55
.43
.66
.48
.62
.84
.64
.49
.87
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The films chosen show right turns at a roundabout, a crossroads and a T-
junction, left turns at a roundabout and a crossroads, and going straight ahead
either at a roundabout or past a minor road on the left or right hand sides.
Some details of the 24 stimuli used in this experiment are given in Table 7.1.
For further details about the films see Tables 4.2 from Study 2 and Table
A2. 1 in Appendix 2.
Number	 Risk Type
Length
Jun	 Film	 Jun	 Film	 /secs	 Risk P(A)
high
medium
low
high
medium
low
high
medium
low
high
medium
low
high
medium
low
high
medium
low
high
medium
low
high
medium
low
Table 7.1: Details of the stimuli. Junction and film numbers correspond to those
in Appendix 2, Table A2.1. The mean risk ratings and P(A) come
from Study 2.
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Apparatus:
Films were shown in the driving simulator as described for Study 2.
Procedure:
There were two phases to the experiment, a description phase and then a
judgment phase. In the description phase subjects viewed each film split into
five second sections, after five seconds had been viewed the experimenter
paused the video recording showing the subject a blank blue field, the subject
then had unlimited time to describe the situation they had viewed and the
events that had taken place. Subjects did not start their description until the
film section had finished, at which point they spoke into a microphone and
their description was recorded. When they had described all that they could
the film was started again and they watched the next five second section, and
so on until an entire film had been described.
There were two conditions, ten subjects took part in each. One condition
was a straight description of the objects and events in the film, the
instructions in this case were as follows.
Full Description Condition:
"You are going to see a number of films of a car negotiating a junction.
In each case I will stop the film every five seconds. Once the film has
stopped I want you to describe everything that you saw during the previous
five seconds of film. I want you to think of yourself as the driver of the car
and to concentrate on the kinds of things you are normally aware of when
you are driving. You should describe both the features of the roads/junctions
and the other road users. You will see individual junctions more than once,
please attempt to describe the road layout completely each time it appears on
a film even though you may have described the junction previously".
Potential Risks Condition:
In the other condition subjects viewed the same films in the same manner
but described only the risks and potential risks in each section of film. The
instructions in this case were as follows.
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"You are going to see a number of films of a car negotiating a junction.
In each case I will stop the film every five seconds. Once the film has
stopped I want you to think of things which could occur to make the situation
dangerous to you as the driver of the car. You should describe where the
potential risk lies and how it could develop. You do not have to think of
something every time that the film stops, but please try to describe as many
possible scenarios as possible. You can repeat scenarios which you have
previously described but please make sure that in each case you describe
things strictly in the context of the preceding five seconds of film".
Both groups performed the same task in the judgment phase, this
involved watching the same films in their entirety. When the tone in the
middle of the film sounded subjects gave a risk rating on a 20 point scale.
The instructions for the risk rating and the scale used were the same as those
used for Study 2.
Partial randomization of presentation order was achieved in a similar
way to that described for Study 2. The films in both phases were divided
into six blocks of four junctions each and the order of presentation of blocks
was randomized for each subject. Subjects performed one practice trial using
a junction not shown in the experimental stimuli before starting the
description phase of the experiment. All subjects viewed all 24 films in both
phases of the experiment.
Results
The analyses of the protocols reported in this chapter are essentially
exploratory. The analyses are used to look for patterns in the types of
information available from stimuli which may account for the previous risk
and recognition results and the relationships between risk and recognition.
Initially stimuli are compared in terms of the total numbers of descriptions
and potential risks in the protocols. Next the actual types of information are
categorised and relationships between particular coding categories and both
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risk and P(A) are assessed. This also provides a method of categorising new
driving protocols as central or peripheral with respect to risk. This
categorisation will be used in Study 6. Finally coding categories are
aggregated into larger groups to contrast, for example, the differences
between fixed and variable information in the protocols.
Coding the Data:
The transcripts for the 20 subjects were grouped according to the film
section to which they referred. A single full description and a full set of
potential risks for each section was thus produced with a note of which
subjects gave which information. Appendix 3.1 gives an example of the full
data for one of the 24 films. The transcripts were then coded according to
the detail of the scene to which individual comments referred. In order to do
this a coding system was developed.
On Road
General:	 Visibility	 1
Slope	 2
Curvature	 3
Wide	 4
Narrow	 5
Junction:	 T-Junction	 6
Crossroads	 7
Roundabout	 8
Control:	 Traffic Lights	 9
Pedestrian Crossing	 10
Road Sign or Markings 	 11
Off Road
Area	 12
Signs	 13
Table 7.2: Coding categories for fixed information.
On Road
Oncoming Traffic
Traffic in Own Direction:
Cross Traffic:
Own Manoeuvre:
Others Manoeuvre:
Off Road
General:
Parked Vehicles:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
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General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turning Right
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Waiting
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turning Right
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Waiting
Weather
Light
Pedestrians
Cyclists
Road Works
General Business
Large
Car
General Descriptor
Table 7.3: Coding categories for variable information.
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The coding system was based loosely on the categories used in the police
STATS 19 accident recording form. This is the form which police officers
use at the scene of an accident to describe the location and manoeuvres of
vehicles. Starting with the categories of information used in this form
individual comments from both the description and potential risks condition
were assigned to categories. Where frequent comments could not be
assigned to a pre-existing category a new category was created. Those
categories initially included on the form which were used least often were
discarded until 50 categories remained.
Precisely the same coding system was used for both general descriptions
and descriptions of potential risks. The coding system allows two main types
of information to be coded, fixed features - those that will be the same every
time a junction is seen, and variable features - those which could potentially
change every time a junction is passed through. Within each of these main
types there is a division into whether the object or event referred to is
actually on the road or not. Within these broad categorisations there are also
a number of subcategories. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show the full coding system.
A general descriptor means a word such as 'traffic' or 'vehicle'. Large can
refer to any large vehicle - lorry, coach, van etc. Changing road position is
used for changing lanes and sometimes overtaking.
Total Information Given:
The coding system allowed a total of 6,467 comments to be encoded,
4,587 from the description condition and 1,880 from the potential risks
condition. This corresponds to each subject giving a mean of 19.1
descriptive comments or 7.8 comments relating to potential risks for each full
film. A small number of comments were not coded, this was generally the
case when a comment did not refer to any potential or actual driving event,
for example "Have to remain vigilant" or "Maintaining a steady speed".
Such comments were relatively rare, accounting for less that five percent of
the sentences transcribed.
Risk for
Junction
•HIGH
DLOW
20
L.
z
DESCRIPTIONS AND POTENTIAL RISKS 183
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the mean amounts of information coded for
different films in the description and potential risks conditions respectively.
Here the amount of information coded is calculated by simply summing the
number of times each category from the coding system was used. To see
how the total information reported is related to the previous risk ratings
given to stimuli the films were divided according to the categories in Table
7.1 with two separate factors relating to risk, junction risk and exemplar risk.
There are two levels of the first factor (high and low) and three of the second
factor (high, medium and low).
30
10
0
high	 medium	 low
Risk for individual exemplar
Figure 7.1: Mean number of comments per subject coded in description condition.
Considering the descriptions condition first, analysis of variance with
two within-subjects factors, junction risk and exemplar risk, shows that there
is a significant main effect of junction risk, F(1,9)=195.21, p<O.O1. There is
also a main effect of exemplar risk, F(2,18)=16.66, p<zO.Ol and an interaction
Risk for
Junction
HIGH
OLOW
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between junction and exemplar, F(2,18)=18.98, p<z0.oi. Post hoc multiple
comparisons using the Newman-Keuls procedure (from Winer 1971, p.442)
show that the difference between high and low risk junctions is significant,
p<O.Oi, at all three levels of exemplar risk. The fact that risky junctions
contain generally more information than less risky ones is consistent with
earlier findings. Study 1 demonstrated that risk ratings were positively
correlated with the time spent at a junction and the number of vehicles
visible at a junction.
This interaction in Figure 7.1 is particularly interesting, the multiple
comparisons show that for high risk junctions both high and medium risk
exemplars are given significantly more descriptions than low risk exemplars,
p<O.O1. For low risk junctions, however, a quite different effect emerges,
high risk exemplars are given significantly fewer descriptions than both
medium and low risk exemplars, p<zO.O5.
10
4
2
0
high	 medium	 low
Risk for individual exemplar
FIgure 7.2: Mean number of comments per subject coded in potential risks
condition.
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For the potential risks condition, analysis of variance with two within-
subjects factors shows that there is once again a significant main effect of
junction risk, F(1,9)=43.O1, pcZO.O1, as would be expected the high risk
junctions tended to have more potential risks. There is, however, no main
effect of exemplar risk, F(2, 1 8)—O.95, and the interaction between junction
and exemplar is only marginally significant, F(2,18)=3.04, p=O.O7. The
pattern of differences shown in Figure 7.2 is nonetheless very similar to that
in Figure 7.1 for descriptions.
Removing Elaboration from the Potential Risks:
One important aspect of the methodology used is that subjects were
encouraged to describe potential dangerous events in addition to the
information already visible in the film. Some of the elaboration given was
not directly related to objects and events in the five seconds of film just
viewed. To assess the degree to which this occurred comments in the
potential risks condition from each five second section were compared with
those from the description condition over the same five seconds. When this
was done it was found that 799 comments from the potential risks condition
were given codes which were not used by any subject in the description of
that five second section. An example of a potential risk in this category is
"There might be pedestrians concealed". Since the pedestrians were not
actually visible they will not appear in the description phase.
799 out of 1,880 comments is a large enough amount to seriously
compromise any conclusions about the number of potential risks visible in
any stimulus. Although this type of information did not differ significantly
between high and low risk junctions, F(l,9)=4.43, there was a significant
main effect of exemplar risk, F(2,l8)=3.975, p<zO.05. Post hoc comparisons
showed that both high and low risk exemplars received significantly more of
this type of risk information than the medium risk exemplars (p<zO.05).
To remove any effects of the risk information not corresponding to
descriptions the original data was recoded. This time potential risks were
only coded if at least one subject from the other condition described the same
Risk for
Junction
U HIGH
DLOW
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information from the five second section of film. Figure 7.3 shows the
distribution of the recoded potential risk comments with junction and
exemplar risk. Once again there is a significant main effect of junction risk,
F(1,9)=16.25, p<O.Ol, high risk junctions having significantly more potential
risk information than low risk ones. This time, however, there is also a
significant main effect of exemplar risk, F(2,18)=7.80, p<O.Ol and no
interaction F(2, 1 8)=2.05.
high	 medium	 low
Risk for individual exemplar
Figure 7.3: Mean number of potential risks matched by at least one comment
from the description condition.
Post hoc comparisons reveal that low risk exemplars have significantly
less potential risk information than either high risk exemplars, p<O.05, or
medium risk exemplars, p<ü.0i. There is no significant difference between
high and medium risk exemplars. Although the analysis of variance for the
recoded risk information is slightly different from that for the all the
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potential risks it is clear from Figure 7.3 that with the exception of the
medium risk exemplars the general pattern of results is very similar to that
shown in Figure 7.2. Although the interaction is again not significant the
differences between exemplars are more marked for the high risk junctions
than the low risk ones.
20
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10
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Film Risk
Figure 7.4: Mean number of descriptions not matched by any comments from the
potential risks condition.
Information Not Related to Risk:
The same technique can be used to identify those descriptions which
were never matched by comments in the potential risks condition, these
might be regarded as peripheral details in the stimuli in the sense that they do
not appear to be related to risks. Figure 7.4 shows the distribution of such
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information. Once again there is a substantial main effect of junction risk,
F(l,9)=92.56, p<O.O1, an effect of exemplar risk F(2,18)=5.16, p<O.O5 and
an interaction between the two, F(2, 1 8)=25.90, p<O.Ol.
Post hoc comparisons reveal that all means are significantly different
from one another, p<O.Ol, with the exception of the low risk junction
medium risk exemplar which is not significantly different from either of the
other low risk junction exemplar types, and the difference between high and
low risk exemplars of low risk junctions where the difference is only
significant at p<O.O5.
The task was designed to minimize feelings of risk and thus prevent
attention focusing, however, it is possible that actually feeling risk is not
necessary for drivers to concentrate exclusively on the risky aspects of the
stimuli. The alternative is that because risky details are more important in a
driving task they will always be the aspects which are described, other
aspects may be noticed but are simply not regarded as important. Since this
explanation does not actually require subjects to feel risk it would predict
that subjects in this task would describe risks at the expense of other
information, thus if many risky aspects of the film were described few non-
risky ones would be. It is clear from Figure 7.4 that there is no evidence of
this actually taking place in the description task. The most risky situations,
high risk exemplars of high risk junctions are given significantly more
descriptions that are clearly not related to risk than any other type of
situation.
Discussion of Total Information Given
A primary purpose of this study was to explore the distribution of risk-
related information at both high and low risk junctions. From Figures 7.2
and 7.3 it is clear that there is indeed more risk-related information at the
high risk junctions and this is more marked for the high risk exemplars than
the low risk ones. For the low risk junctions it does not appear that high risk
exemplars actually contain more risk related information than other
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exemplars of the same junction. This is in accord with the assumptions that
were made for the attention focusing explanation given for the different
relationship between risk and P(A) in the two cases.
Although the potential risk information is in accord with the attention
focusing explanation it is possible that there are more parsimonious
explanations for the risk-recognition relationships. The information from the
general descriptions condition in Figure 7.1 shows an interaction between the
two types of risk. For high risk junctions increasing exemplar risk is
associated with an increase in the amount of information described. For the
low risk junctions, however, the opposite is the case, high risk exemplars
actually have significantly less information described. If recognition
sensitivity were directly proportional to the amount of information in a
stimulus this would give the obtained results, risky exemplars being
associated with good recognition at high risk junctions but with bad
recognition at low risk junctions. If this were the case there would be no
need to propose that risk has any effect on memory or attention at all in these
situations.
At first sight this appears a much simpler explanation of the observed
effects than the attention focusing approach, however, there are difficulties
with this explanation. The significant main effect of junction type for both
descriptions and potential risks is difficult to accommodate within this
framework. There is substantially more information both general and related
to risks at the risky junctions than at the less risky ones. Despite this both
Study 2 and Study 3 failed to show any significant differences between the
ten junctions in recognition performance. Clearly the total amount of
information in a stimulus plays an important role in recognition, however, it is
not likely to be the sole determinant of P(A).
A second point to be considered is that although there appear to be
differences between the exemplars of low risk junctions in the amount of
information in the films such differences are small compared to the
differences in P(A) that were observed. Figure 7.5 shows the differences in
Risk for
Junction
N HIGH
DLOW
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P(A) for the films that were used in this study, a comparison of this figure
with Figure 7.1 suggests that although the total amount of information in a
stimulus does play an important role in memory it is clearly not sufficient to
explain the recognition results. The next question to be answered is exactly
what details subjects were describing in the different conditions and whether
certain specific types of information are related to risk, memory, or both.
high	 medium	 low
Film Risk
FIgure 7.5: Mean values of P(A) from Study 2 for the stimuli used in this study.
Types of Information Coded:
To give an overview of the way in which the 50 coding categories were
used in each condition Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show the total number of times
each category was used in the description and potential risks conditions
0.8
•	 0.6
E0I-
0.4
0.2
0.0
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respectively. In the potential risks condition the number given in brackets
after the total is the number of those potential risks which were matched by
at least one description in the same five second section. This results in a
particularly dramatic decrease for categories 38, 39 and 44, these correspond
to the most common potential scenario statements: "If the car ahead braked
suddenly...", "If he pulled away suddenly..." and "If there were pedestrians
concealed...".
Central versus Peripheral Information:
It has been suggested that information related to risk is central to driving,
whereas other information is peripheral. It is thus possible to describe the
types of information which are most clearly central and peripheral with
respect to this definition. This can be done by comparing the relative
frequency of use of different coding categories in the potential risks and
description conditions.
In general more information is given in the description condition than in
the potential risks one by a factor of approximately 2.44:1. On this basis
expected values were computed for each of the 50 categories in the potential
risks condition, omitting those where the expected frequency was less than 5.
Table 7.5 includes an indication of the differences in the use of categories in
the two conditions. Totals followed by '+' or '-' are those which are
significantly different from their expected value, chi-squared with one degree
of freedom greater than 6.635, p<O.Ol, '-i-' where the number of potential
risks is significantly greater than would have been expected and '-' where it is
significantly less.
General:
Junction.
Control:
Off Road
Oncoming Traffic:
Traffic Own Way:
Cross Traffic:
Own Manoeuvre:
Others Manoeuvre:
General
Parked Vehicles
28
21
103
43
42
162
13
333
248
73
141
129
99
278
86
87
39
208
86
440
74
53
32
106
14
13
25
59
160
69
70
95
67
4
20
57
115
146
80
79
124
0
18
60
22
61
61
47
59
138
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Total
	
Correlation
	 Correlation
Descnptions	 wh Risk
	
with P(A)
Fixed:
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Variable:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
Visibility
Slope
Curvature
WKI8
Narrow
T-Junction
Crossroads
Roundabout
Traffic Lights
Pedestrian Crossing
Road Sign/Markings
Area
Signs
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turning Right
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Waiting
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turning R ght
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Waiting
Weather
Light
Pedestrians
Cyclists
Road Works
General Business
Large
Car
General Descriptor
0482*
0 423
-0.045
-0.114
0 102
-0 260
o 430
0.092
0.369
-O 108
-0.139
-0 101
-0 405
0.373
0.328
-0.104
0.285
0.429*
0.190
0.202
0.143
0 243
-0.066
0.072
0.248
-0.131
-0.129
-0.208
0.581**
-0 032
0 108
0193
0 491
0 116
-0 029
-0 379
0 622
0 404
0006
0 249
-0 163
NA
0 046
0 177
0 031
-0.148
-0 046
0 240
-0031
-0024
0.380
0 167
-0.092
-0047
0.202
0.482*
0.060
0.084
0.297
0.092
-0.113
-0.342
-0.238
0.360
-0.211
-0.174
0.107
-0.333
0.111
0.553"
0.287
0.313
0.064
-0.124
0.099
-0.335
0.150
0.092
0.267
0.204
0.196
0 486
0.310
0.420
0.038
0 130
0210
0301
0 293
0.415
0059
N/A
0.021
-0.122
-0208
-0.131
0.273
0 456
0.484
0.200
Table 7.4: Use of coding categories in descriptions condition, see text.
General:
Junction:
Control:
Off Road:
Oncoming Traffic
Traffic Own Way:
Cross Traffic
Own Manoeuvre.
Others Manoeuvre:
General
Parked Vehicles:
o 232
-0 249
-0081
0 302
0.151
-0340
N/A
0.207
0.133
0.090
-0.239
0.111
-0.120
0.136
-0 280
-0.154
0083
0 123
-0039
0.279
0.307
-0 424
0.018
0.210
-0.028
-0.067
0.015
-0.044
0.135
0.042
o 278
0.344
0.188
0.081
0.115
0035
-0 063
0 035
o 057
0.181
0.207
-0 169
N/A
0 096
-0079
-0053
0336
0 470
0 514
0.281
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Potential
	
Correlation	 Correlation
Risks
	
with Risk
	
wth P(A)
Fixed:
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Variable:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
Visibility
Slope
Curvature
Wale
Narrow
T-Junction
Crossroads
Roundabout
Traffic Lights
Pedestrian Crossing
Road Sign/Markings
Area
Signs
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turning Right
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Waiting
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turning Right
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Waiting
Weather
Light
Pedestrians
Cycists
Road Works
General Business
Large
Car
General Descriptor
62(18) +
7 (2)
19(16)
2(1)	 -
12(6)
94(61) +
0(0)
39 (36)
34 (33)
43(38)
31(23) -
28(10)
29(18)
101 (68)
28(19)
33 (20)
19(13)
28(17)
23(17)
91(69)
60 (44) +
89(63) +
15(6)
68(43) +
	
13(7)	 +
	
53(3)	 +
1(0)
1(0)
4(3)
43(18) +
6(3)
27(17)
15(3)
19(1)
3(1)
10(2)
53(26)
76 (34)
132 13) +
99 (37) +
	
23(6)	 -
9(0
0(0)
133 44) +
33(10) +
35 (28)
9(4)
20(18)
35 18)
73 51)
0 459
0 004
0022
-0.245
0.558
0036
N/A
0.152
0 331
-0.044
-0.046
-0.397
-0.407
-0.223
0.3 13
-0 095
0.353
-0.133
0.068
-0.179
0.165
0.009
0.103
0.462
0.233
-0.135
-0.391
-0.088
0.116
-0.099
0 017
0.221
0.472*
0.113
0 236
0018
0 363
-0 227
0.083
-0 103
0.263
-0.343
NA
0.285
0.106
-0.208
o.71r
0 065
-0216
0.171
Table 7.5: Use of coding categories in potential risks condition, see text.
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The fact that so many of these totals, 28 out of the 50 are significantly
different from those expected from the descriptions condition makes it clear
that subjects are not simply describing less in the potential risks condition;
they are describing quite different things. Examples of categories which are
used much more than would be expected in the potential risks condition are
visibility, general descriptions of cross traffic, one's own manoeuvre being
fast, other drivers accelerating, or changing road position and pedestrians or
cyclists not on the road. Some categories which are used much less than
would be expected are drivers describing a roundabout or traffic lights, cars
or general descriptions of traffic in the driver's own direction and the driver's
own manoeuvre turning right. The examples given above are simply the
most dramatic deviations from the expected totals, chi-squared greater than
40 in each case.
Information Associated with Risk and P(A):
The totals in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 give an overall impression of the types
of task subjects were performing in each of the two conditions. The question
of particular interest is now to decide which aspects of the stimuli are related
to recognition performance and/or risk assessments. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show
the total use of each category summed across films and subjects. The
number of comments of each type was also calculated separately for each
film. To give some indication of which aspects of the films are particularly
associated with their riskiness or memorability these numbers were
correlated with the mean risk ratings and values of P(A) from Study 2 across
the 24 stimuli. The resulting correlations are given beside the category totals
in Tables 7.4 and 7.5. Correlations marked with asterisks are significantly
different from zero, d.f.=22, * if p<O.05, ** if p<0.Ol. Correlations have
been calculated whenever there was any data available. In those cases where
the total number of comments is extremely small, the correlations should
obviously be treated with particular caution.
Only 15 of the 97 correlations calculated between risk rating and
category use are significantly different from zero, p<0.05. Nonetheless,
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those which are significant do appear to form a comprehensible pattern. In
the description condition those categories which correlate positively with risk
are mostly aspects of situations which one might reasonably associate with
risk, for example impaired visibility, sloping roads and right turns either by
the driver or by other vehicles. There were also two categories which were
significantly negatively correlated with risk, road signs and traffic travelling
in the driver's own direction. These categories may simply be types of
information which are often available but only commented on if there is
nothing more salient in the stimulus.
For the potential risks condition the results are similar, impaired
visibility and the narrowness of the road, cars seen as cross traffic, having to
wait and the general business of the junction are all positively correlated with
risk. The number of comments about traffic signs is again negatively
correlated with risk. It should perhaps come as no surprise that so few of the
categories are significantly correlated with risk, this may simply reflect the
fact that in normal circumstances items in no single category would be
sufficient to create a dangerous situation. Dangerous situations in fact tend
to be the result of the simultaneous occurrence of events that would
otherwise be innocuous, e.g. travelling fast when the car ahead stops.
There were even fewer categories significantly correlated with P(A) than
with risk, only 10 of the possible 97. For the descriptions condition, parked
cars or large vehicles, self or other changing road position, another driver
going fast or cars in the driver's own direction were all associated with good
recognition performance, while T-Junctions were associated with bad
performance. For the potential risks condition only parked cars or large
vehicles were associated with good recognition while cross traffic was
associated with poor performance. Although it would be possible to describe
a posteriori possible reasons for these particular categories being important
they do not provide any particularly convincing pattern. The most likely
reason for this is simply that different aspects of the situation are important
in the recognition task for different stimuli.
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Different Types of Coding Category:
To see whether certain broad types of information are generally related
to either risk or memory the data within the main categories used for coding,
data were aggregated. Table 7.6 shows the total number of descriptions in
each collapsed category and the correlation between the total amount of
information in the category for each film and both risk and P(A). The five
collapsed categories used were fixed information (categories 1-13), traffic
(categories 14-25), own manoeuvre (categories 26-33), other's manoeuvre
(categories 34-41) and all other variable information (categories 42-50).
There is a positive correlation between the total amount of information in
either condition and both risk and P(A). Although this correlation is only
significant in the case of the correlation between number of potential risks
and P(A), all categories of variable information appear to show both these
effects. For the full set of stimuli in Study 2 there was no significant overall
correlation between risk and P(A), r(58)=0.14, this seems to imply that the
effects of increasing amounts of information on risk and P(A) are
independent of one another, i.e. the information which is associated with
high risk ratings is not the same that is correlated with high values of P(A).
For the 24 stimuli that were selected for Study 5 there is still no significant
correlation between risk and P(A). However, the magnitude of this
correlation for these stimuli, r(22)=O.295, while not significantly greater than
that from Study 2 (z=0.64), may nonetheless be sufficient to mean that
effects of information on each are dependent to an important degree. In fact
the same categories seem to generally be correlated with both P(A) and risk,
at least for the description condition. This can be assessed by calculating the
correlation between the last two columns in Table 7.4. This correlation is
significant for the descriptions condition, r(48)=0.540, p<O.Ol, although
when calculated for the potential risks condition using the last two columns
from Table 7.5 it is not r(48)=0.2l 1.
In order to have the largest amount of information possible in assessing
these correlations the full data from the descriptions condition and the
All Descriptions
Fixed:
Variable:
Total:
Total:
Traffic:
Own Manoeuvre:
Othees Manoeuvre.
Other Variable:
1,880	 0.271
	 0.538
400
	 0.075	 -0.053
1 480
	 0.290	 0.366
568	 0.292
	 0.158
150	 0.162
	 0.262
415	 0 157
	 0.184
347	 0.125
	 0.373
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potential risks condition were each used. As was discussed previously it is
possible to make certain corrections to these two types of data. For the
descriptions condition it is particularly interesting to exclude any information
which was also counted as a potential risk in the same five second segment
and thus obtain a measure of only that information which is not related to
risk. For the potential risks condition it is clear that much of the information
given does not actually refer to details which can actually be seen on the
film, thus this information can be corrected by only including it if it is
matched by at least one description comment. The data was treated this way,
however, the results are broadly similar to that which were obtained from the
full data.
Total
Descriptions
4,587
1,435
3,152
1,503
558
625
466
Correlation
with Risk
0 400
0.165
0.411
0 377
0.436
0.3 19
0.033
Correlation
wfth P(A)
0.396
0.034
0.582
0439
0.473
0 490
0.337
All Potential Risks
Fixed:
Variable:
Total.
Total.
Traff c.
Own Manoeuvre
Others Manoeuvre
Other Variable.
Table 7.6: Use of broad types of coding categories in the description and potential
risks conditions, see text.
2732
803
1929
897
409
363
260
0356
-0.400
0.485
0 364
0.103
0 424
0362
0.297
0.289
0.223
0.022
0.157
0 230
0.269
0.462
0 044
0 562
0 343
0 571
0494
0.244
-O 262
..O 434
-0.094
o 189
-0009
0 159
-O 552
1855
632
1223
606
149
262
206
HIGH RISK JUNCTIONS:
All Descriptions
Fixed:
Variable:
LOW RISK JUNCTIONS:
All Descriptions
Fixed:
Variable:
Total
Total:
Traffic:
Own Manoeuvre.
Others Manoeuvre:
Other Variable:
Total
Total
Traffic
Own Manoeuvre:
Others Manoeuvre
Other Variable:
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It can be seen from Table 7.6 that although large amounts of fixed
information were described, such information appears to play very little part
in determining either the risk ratings or, as expected, the recognition
sensitivity. This is consistent with the findings in previous studies that
familiarity with junctions has very little effect on any other measures.
Differences Between Junctions
The absence of overall correlations between risk and P(A) in Studies 2
and 3 disguised separate effects for high and low risk junctions. To see
whether similar effects were present here the data from this study were
divided into two by junction type, high versus low risk (see Table 7.1). Full
tables showing the use of the 50 coding categories in both conditions are
given in Appendix 3.2. The results aggregated into main categories of
information are shown in Tables 7.7 and 7.8.
Total
	
Correlation	 Correlation
Descrqtions	 with Risk	 with P(A)
Table 7.7: Differences between high and low risk junctions in descriptions
condition. Correlations are over 12 exemplars, none are significantly
different from zero, p<0.05, 10 degrees of freedom.
846	 -0 330
	
0.105
192	 -0 536	 -0.103
654	 -0.106
	
0.210
249
	
0.455	 -0.129
75	 -0 097
	
0.215
180
	
0.247	 -0.142
150	 -0 540
	
0.371
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Total
	
Correlation	 Coirelation
Descnptions
	
with Risk
	 wth P(A)
HIGH RISK JUNCTIONS:
All Potential Risks
Fixed:
Variable:
LOW RISK JUNCTIONS:
All Potential Risks
Fixed:
Variable:
Total:
Total:
Traffic:
Own Manoeuvre:
Others Manoeuvre:
Other Vanabie:
Total:
Total:
Traffic:
Own Manoeuvre:
Others Manoeuvre:
Other Variable:
1034
	
0.326
	
0.287
208
	
0.588	 -0.068
826
	
0.190
	
0.345
319
	 0.004
	
0.175
75
	
o 429
	
0.350
235	 -0.121
	
o 247
197
	
0.484
	
0.253
Table 7.8: Differences between high and low risk junctions in potential risks
condition. Correlations are over 12 exemplars, the starred is the only
one significantly different from zero, p<O.05.
For the high risk junctions the same types of information do seem to be
correlated with both risk and P(A), the correlation over the 50 categories
between these two correlation coefficients is 0.653, p<0.Ol, in the
descriptions condition and r(48)=0.497, p<0.01, in the potential risks
condition. The same pattern of results emerges for the corrected data, for
unmatched descriptions r(48)=O.632, p<zO.Ol, and for matched potential risks
r(48)=O.603, p<O.Ol. However, for low risk junctions the opposite effect
emerges, those categories which are correlated with risk tend not to be
correlated with P(A), for the descriptions condition r(48)=-0.3 12, p<O.O5 and
for the potential risks condition r(48)=-0.232. For unmatched descriptions
only, r(48)=-0.409, p<O.Ol, and for matched potential risks r(48)=-0.382,
p<0.01.
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For the high risk junctions although the same categories are generally
related to P(A) as were related to the risk ratings no individual category is
significantly correlated with P(A) (r(1O)<O.576, p>O.O5, see Appendix 3.2).
However, for the low risk junctions five categories from the descriptions
condition and three categories from the potential risks condition are
significantly correlated with P(A). For the descriptions condition there are
significant correlations with cars in own direction, r(1O)=O.635, p<zO.05, own
manoeuvre changing road position, r(1O)=O.702, p<O.05, others accelerating,
r(1O)=O.606, p<O.O5, large parked vehicles, r(1O)=O.754, p<O.Ol, and parked
cars, r(lO)=O.728, pczO.Ol. For the potential risks condition there are
significant correlations with P(A) and the number of comments about
roundabouts, r(1O)=O.607, p<O.O5, large parked vehicles, r(1O)=O.734,
p<O.Ol, and parked cars, r(1O)=O.799, p<O.Ol.
Overall there is no significant tendency for categories of information
which are related to P(A) for the high risk junctions to also be related to P(A)
for the low risk junctions, for the descriptions condition, r(48)=O.171 and for
the potential risks condition r(48)=O.021. Using unmatched descriptions this
correlation is r(48)=-O.029 and for matched potential risks r(48)=O.1 17. This
appears to show relatively clearly that different types of information are
responsible for the recognition results at different types of junction.
It was suggested that the total amount of information coded was not a
good predictor of recognition sensitivity because large differences between
junctions in the amount of information were not reflected in differences
P(A). One reason for this could have been that differences in amount of
information were attributable to fixed information at the different junctions,
since this information would be the same for each exemplar it would not be
expected to cause recognition differences. Tables 7.7 and 7.8, however,
make it clear that the differences between junctions are almost entirely in
variable information and that fixed information plays a relatively
unimportant role. This means that a more complex explanation than the total
amount of information in a film is required to explain the recognition results.
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General Discussion
One surprising aspect of the data from this study is that in contrast with
Hughes and Cole (1986) virtually all the information reported by subjects
would be considered to be driving-related. The absence of driving-unrelated
information may be attributable to the fact that the current study was solely
concerned with junctions. Since these are situations in which the driving is
likely to be relatively demanding the salience of driving-related information
will have been higher. In contrast, subjects in the Hughes and Cole study
will have made much of their report while driving on/watching straight roads
in which no manoeuvres were required.
In the conclusion to their paper Hughes and Cole (1986) expressed
concern about the low levels of report about traffic control devices. The
negative correlations in the present study between report of road signs and
ratings of subjective risk could be interpreted as suggesting that when driving
becomes difficult, the first things which drivers stop attending to are road
signs. However, the studies discussed in Chapter 1 suggested that far more
road signs are actually attended to by drivers than can be subsequently
described. Subjects in this study were only watching five-second sections of
film and it seems likely that they could have provided relatively complete
reports of road signs if they had chosen to do so. It seems more likely that
although they were still aware of the road signs in risky situations they were
less likely to report them simply because they had many other more
important details of the situation to report first.
The primary purpose of this study was to discover more about the stimuli
which had produced dissociations between risk and recognition performance
in the previous studies. It had previously been found that high and low risk
junctions each produced a different pattern of recognition results, Study 5
made it possible to see whether these two types of junctions differ in the
information available in the films. It was clear that films of risky junctions
contained substantially more information, both related and unrelated to risks,
than less risky junctions. Although this result does not appear surprising it
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should be remembered that in the previous three recognition studies, contrary
to expectations, there has only been a very weak overall tendency for risky
films to be better recognised than less risky ones. This makes it seem
unlikely that the total amount of information in a film is the most important
factor in determining recognition results.
Between the exemplars of the high risk junctions there also seems to be a
strong tendency for more risky films to contain more information, both
related and unrelated to risk. This time the increase in information is related
to improved recognition performance, thus for the risky junctions it may be
sufficient to say that the riskiest films are also the most detailed and hence
give best recognition performance. For the exemplars of low risk junctions,
however, this result does not hold. There was no tendency for risky
exemplars of low risk junctions to contain more information than less risky
exemplars even for information concerned specifically with risks
and potential risks. This may partially explain why for the low risk junctions
the recognition results were quite different from those for high risk ones.
Although there is a slight tendency for risky exemplars of low risk junctions
to have less information described than less risky exemplars, it seems
unlikely that this is sufficient to account for a full reversal in the recognition
results.
The data was divided into a large number of categories to see which
types of information might be correlated with either risk ratings or
recognition performance. Surprisingly few categories were strongly
correlated with P(A) as measured from a previous study. This supports the
idea that there are not simply a few particularly salient details which are
always remembered and that the relationship of these salient details with risk
explains the relationship between risk and recognition performance. When
the films in this study were split into high risk junctions and low risk
junctions the most striking finding was that for high risk junctions exactly
the same categories that were associated with subjects giving a film a high
risk rating were associated with them performing well on recognition for the
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film. For low risk junctions this result reversed and the categories of
information which were generally associated with feelings of risk were
associated with poorer recognition.
There are two main conclusions from this study, firstly that there do not
appear to be any simple aspects of stimuli which are directly responsible for
the recognition results, and secondly that the distribution of information in
the stimuli is consistent with the assumptions that were made for the
attention focusing interpretation of the recognition results. Specificafly at
high risk junctions there does appear to be a great deal of information which
is related to risk and the more risky the exemplar seen the more of this type
of information there is. However, at low risk junctions there is relatively
little information relating to risk and the prevalence of this information does
not differ between exemplars.
Although this study provides information which can assist in interpreting
the memory results it is not a direct test of whether attention focusing did
cause the recognition results. To directly test the hypothesis that feelings of
risk cause memory to become enhanced for central information it would be
necessary to directly compare the contents of recalls from risky and non-
risky situations. In addition it would be necessary to have an a priori method
of categorizing information as central versus peripheral. The most important
outcome of this study is that it has provided a coding system which could be
used for the coding of information in such recalls. Moreover, because the
frequency of use of each category in the system is known both for the
description and potential risks condition it is possible to obtain a measure of
the degree to which any new information is likely to be related to risks. This
provides a method of categorizing information in recalls as central versus
peripheral and provides the opportunity for a direct test of whether feelings
of risk in driving cause attention focusing and a subsequent central/peripheral
dissociation in memory. The following study uses a recall task after an
actual drive to do exactly this.
RECALL OF SIX JUNCTIONS 204
Chapter 8
Risk and Recall on the Road II
The first study reported in this thesis demonstrated that drivers after a
drive were likely to recall particularly those situations in which they had
experienced risk. Since it was possible to interpret this result in a number of
ways, including a simple bias in subjects towards recalling the types of
situations they thought the experimenter was interested in, a number of
laboratory recognition studies were performed.
The three recognition studies differed in the types of stimuli being used
and the types of task being performed during encoding. Nonetheless, they
produced relatively consistent results. For the generally dangerous types of
situations (e.g. junctions which subjects felt many accidents would take
place, or films showing right rather than left turns) there did appear to be a
substantial enhancement of recognition sensitivity for the particular films
which subjects rated as high on subjective risk. Unexpectedly, although risk
was often reported while watching films of events at more objectively safe
junctions, there was no evidence for it improving recognition sensitivity in
these cases. In fact there was some evidence that feelings of risk actually
impaired overall recognition sensitivity at generally less dangerous junctions
by increasing the number of false alarms made by subjects.
These results were interpreted with reference to the idea that feelings of
risk cause attention focusing in line with Easterbrook's hypothesis as
described in Chapter 2. This type of approach when applied to memory
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research has generally made an important distinction between central and
peripheral information (e.g. Christianson, in press; Christianson & Loftus,
1987; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). The suggestion is that emotional arousal
causes attention to be focused on central information when performing a task
and that subsequent memory tests will show enhanced memory for this
information but impairments of memory for peripheral information. There
is, however, some difficulty in providing an objective definition of central
versus peripheral information. It was suggested in Chapter 2 that this
difficulty could be partially resolved by specifying the task being performed
by the subject at the point when arousal was experienced and defining the
centrality of information with reference to this task.
The results of the three recognition studies were interpreted as being
consistent with the idea that feelings of risk were associated with the
focusing of attention on the information which was central to the driving
task, specifically onto information related to risks and potential risks in the
driving situation. It was suggested that the effect of such focusing in a
generally complex environment would be to give a detailed memory for
many different sources of information about risks and that this would explain
the enhancement in recognition sensitivity associated with feelings of risk in
generally dangerous situations. In contrast it was suggested that generally
safe situations contain very little information which is central in this sense
and that risk would thus cause memory to be concentrated on a small subset
of the total information available in the scene. The fact that risk at generally
safe junctions was associated with high false alarm rates seemed to be
consistent with the idea that it had caused attention to be focused on
information which was actually relatively unhelpful in distinguishing
between targets and distractors.
While the methodology used in the Studies 2, 3 and 4 lends itself very
well to obtaining precise recognition scores for either stimuli or subjects and
allows experimental control over the stimuli, it also has disadvantages.
Firstly the advantage of being able to control the stimuli presented to the
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subject requires that subjects are not actually driving a car and are not in a
situation where they face any actual danger. This may both affect the types
of detail that are attended to and the nature of any subjective risk that is
experienced. Secondly, while using a recognition task makes scoring of
performance easy and precise it does not directly give any direct information
as to why performance was good for certain stimuli, whether, for example,
the details remembered tended to be central or peripheral to the task of driving.
Although Study 5 was able to provide information about what details were
present to be remembered it could not directly prove that attention focusing
was taking place in memory for these details.
Study 1 overcame many of these problems by having subjects recall
situations after actual driving. However, that study provided very little
information about the details of the recalls, and almost no information about
memory for non-risky junctions. It thus sheds little light on the possibility of
a reversal in the relationship between risk and memory as was suggested in
the laboratory studies. To explore differences between the nature of
memories from different types of situation it is necessary to have some
detailed information about the contents of such memories in each case. In
fact there was virtually no information provided about non-risky situations
from Study 1, 11 of the objectively safest junctions simply weren't recalled
by any subject. Moreover, the amount of detail recalled about any individual
junction was generally so low that comparisons between the types of
information recalled for different junctions were impossible.
The following study uses a methodology similar to that of Study 1 but
using a smaller set of junctions so that more extensive recalls could be
obtained. An important achievement from Study 5 was that it provided a
coding system in which descriptions of driving situations and potential risks
about such situations could be aggregated. It also provided information
about the relative frequency of these two types of information in each coding
category. This provides a measure which can be used to categorize new data
in terms of an item's likelihood of being related to risks or potential risks in a
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driving situation. It was proposed in discussing the recognition results that
an appropriate definition of central information in a driving task is
information which is related to driving risks. Using this definition means
that the data from Study 5 provide a measure of the centrality of any new
information which can be coded using the same system. This provides a
direct way of testing the hypothesis of attention focusing.
Study 6
Recall of Six Junctions after a Short Drive
This study was based loosely on Study 1 but designed to provide
exhaustive recall for a much more limited number of junctions. In the
previous study information was divided into fixed and variable and it was
assumed that fixed information played a relatively minor part in the
recognition studies. In a recall study fixed information can play a more
considerable role. However, its importance is likely to depend on the
previous familiarity a subject has with a junction. Because the potential
variety in the amount of previous knowledge subjects have about fixed
information at individual junctions it was decided to concentrate on subjects'
recall of variable information.
Given that only a few junctions were to be used it was clearly important
that a great deal of variable information would always be available at each
junction. The local junctions which accident statistics show to be objectively
safe in terms of the total number of accidents reported tend to have very low
traffic flows. Rather than ask for recall of variable details at junctions which
might be generally empty it was decided to use six generally busy junctions
but increase the variability in subjective risk by also manipulating the type of
manoeuvre the driver would have to make at the junction. It was assumed
that right turns are generally more risky both subjectively and objectively
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than left turns. This is the same assumption that was made for Study 4 and
which seems to be supported in the objective data from Hall (1986) and the
subjective ratings from Study 4 (see Table 6.6).
A second advantage of using both right and left turns in the route is that
it allows alternative versions of the route to be constructed such that order
effects can be controlled for. This is complicated by the fact that different
groups driving the same route in opposite directions would potentially
confound the effects of direction of turn on any particular junction with the
order in which it was driven. Instead a figure-of-eight route was devised and
four different versions of it were driven by different groups of subjects such
that any order effects would be at least partly balanced across groups of
subjects.
One difficulty previously encountered in attempting to score drivers'
descriptions of their memories for situations was the different degrees of
detail in descriptions of situations by different people. This makes it difficult
to decide whether any particular detail is forgotten by a subject or simply
regarded as unimportant. An approach was taken to solving this problem by
having an additional phase to the experiment after the main memory test.
This was a description phase in which subjects described a video of the
situations they had driven through. This description phase actually
corresponds to relatively short term intentional recall for a video of driving
situations since subjects did not actually begin description until they had
viewed the film of an entire junction. However, it contrasts with the memory
phase which obtained recall of longer term incidental memory for the
situations when actually driving. The most important reason for having
subjects describe the situations from video tape was that it allowed some
assessment of the details which were not recalled from the actual drive as
well as those details which were recalled. It thus was intended to provide a
base rate with which to compare recall performance.
In Study 5 subjects viewed films of driving situations in the simulator
and gave descriptions of events in the film. One of the concerns in designing
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a procedure for that study was the possibility that attention focusing while
watching films might cause a biased description of what was actually in the
films. In that study, however, films were broken into five second sections, a
procedure which seemed likely to prevent subjects from actually
experiencing subjective risk in the simulator. In the present study, however,
the video tapes had only just been recorded when the description task began.
There was thus no opportunity to accurately divide the tapes into shorter
sections. Instead it was decided to have subjects watch films of individual
junctions straight through. In order to minimize the likelihood of attention
focusing in this case, it was thus decided not to show films in the simulator
but on a normal sized monitor in a standard testing cubicle.
Study 1 had used both risk and accident ratings while driving. It is
clearly possible that giving these ratings, especially the accident estimate,
which was given in the driver's own time, encourages the driver to think
about risky aspects of the situation in far more detail than they might in the
course of normal driving. The results of Study 3 suggested that if this in fact
happens it does not have any major effect on the memory results in the
laboratory. Nonetheless, to make this less likely to be an important factor on
the road it was decided to use only the risk rating, which as an immediate
assessment of one's own feelings may be less likely to affect the way the
driver thinks about the situation. Moreover, this was immediately followed
with a second rating unrelated to risk which could be given in the driver's
own time. The rating chosen was one of previous familiarity with the
junction. When this was measured on a binary level in Study 1 it did not
appear to be related to either the risk ratings given when driving (r(1 140)=-
0.03) or the probability of subsequent recall r(1064)=0.02. When it was
measured on a seven-point scale in Study 3, familiarity did not appear to be
related to recognition sensitivity, r(288)=O.04.
A number of other rating tasks were also used in the present study. In
the memory phase of the experiment subjects were asked to give a rating for
the overall vividness of their memory after the recall of an individual
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situation. This rating was chosen since it is one which has often been used in
the literature on vivid memories as an overall measure of the quality of a
memory (e.g. Conway & Bekerian, 1988; Rubin & Kozin, 1984).
In the description phase of the experiment subjects gave two further
ratings after the description of each situation. One was an overall rating for
the business of the junction which was intended to correspond to the rating
for the amount of moving objects in a film that was used in Groeger and
Chapman (in preparation b, see Chapter 6). The second rating was one of the
surprisingness of events in the situation. This is a rephrasing of the
normality rating which produced somewhat unclear results in Study 3 (also
Groeger & Chapman, 1992; in preparation a). However, it represents a
change in theoretical emphasis from the idea that all situations can be graded
on the degree to which they accord to a schema. Instead it is intended to
refer to individual cases where subjects have been genuinely surprised by
events and is similar to a rating scale used in studies of vivid and flashbulb
memories (e.g. Pillemer, 1984; Rubin & Kozin, 1984 - see Chapter 2).
Method
Subjects:
The subjects were 32 drivers, 12 male, 20 female, all members of the
Applied Psychology Unit's research panel. None of the subjects had taken
part in any of the previous studies. The mean age of subjects was 45 years,
ranging from 24 to 60 years. Subjects were divided into four groups which
determined the version of the route that they drove. There were 3 men and 5
women in each group and the four groups were matched by age.
Stimuli/Apparatus:
Subjects drove a Vauxhall Astra around a seven mile route near the
Applied Psychology Unit. The main route was a figure-of-eight designed to
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pass through six specific junctions (see Figure 8.1) and could be driven in
four different configurations (see Figure 8.2). The different routes were
chosen to balance the type of manoeuvre being performed at each junction
and the stage of the drive at which it was passed through. Some details about
the junctions are shown in Table 8.1 with the order driven and direction of
turn for each of the junctions in the different experimental conditions.
All four routes began the same way, subjects left the Applied
Psychology Unit's car park (to the left of Junction C in Figure 8.1) and drove
along Chaucer Road, Brooklands Avenue, Clarendon Road, Fitzwilliam
Road and Shaftesbury Road. The main route always began after turning out
of Shaftesbury Road. A Panasonic WV-CD1E miniature video camera was
fixed to the bonnet of the car directly in line with the driver approximately
10cm in front of the bottom of the windscreen and was used to record the
entire of the drive. Films were played back on a Panasonic AG-6200 VHS
video recorder and were shown on a small Sony CVM-1350 colour monitor
with a 29cm screen approximately im away from the subject. This contrasts
with Studies 2, 3, 4 and 5 in that the screen was small, the room was not
darkened, subjects sat in an ordinary room in a chair at a desk, and no effort
was made to make the task feel like actual driving.
Procedure:
Subjects were tested individually in a session lasting approximately 75
minutes. The study consisted of three consecutive parts, first a short drive
giving risk and familiarity judgments, then back at the Applied Psychology
Unit subjects performed a recall task. Finally subjects performed a task in
which they described the driving situations they had encountered again, but
this time after having just watched the video made of the situations. Subjects
were not previously informed that there would be any further tasks to
perform alter the drive was complete.
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Figure 8.1: The six junctions used for Study 6, scale 1:18,103.
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Condition 1:	 Condition 2:
A___ B	 A___ B
Condition 3:	 Condition 4:
A___ B	 A___ B
Figure 8.2: The experimental routes through the six junctions in the four
conditions.
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Junction
A	 B	 C	 D	 E	 F
Junction
Numbers
From Study 1: 32	 34	 40	 38	 2	 4
Junction Type:
Mini-
round-	 Cross-	 Cross-	 T-	 T-	 Cross-
about	 roads	 roads	 Junction Junction roads
Accidents
Reported
(1986-88):	 10	 9	 13	 8	 7	 14
Traffic
flow /1000
vehs (1989):	 39.8	 38.6	 29.4	 29.7	 31.8	 32
Accidents
I Flow:	 0.251	 0.233	 0.442	 0.269	 0.220	 0.438
Turn Required:
Group 1	 Right	 Right	 Right	 Left	 Left	 Left
Group 2	 Right	 Right	 Right	 Left	 Left	 Left
Group 3
	
Left	 Left	 Left	 Right	 Right	 Right
Group 4	 Left	 Left	 Left	 Right	 Right	 Right
Order Driven:
Group 1	 2nd	 3rd	 1st	 6th	 4th	 5th
Group 2	 5th	 6th	 4th	 3rd	 1st	 2nd
Group 3
	
2nd	 1st	 3rd	 4th	 6th	 5th
Group 4
	
5th	 4th	 6th	 1st	 2nd	 3rd
Table 8.1: Details of the six junctions including the manoeuvre performed at each
and the order in which they were driven in the four conditions.
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Driving phase:
Subjects drove the car once around one of the four possible figure-of-
eight routes shown in Figure 8.2. Directions were given by the experimenter
who was seated in the rear of the vehicle. At each of the 6 junctions of
interest the driver made two judgments. A junction where judgments were
required was signalled by the experimenter sounding a tone when the vehicle
was at the centre of the junction. The two judgment tasks were described to
them before the drive as follows:
i) Risk rating: "Give a rating on a scale from 1 to 7 to indicate the risk
you were feeling at the moment the tone sounded. A rating of 1 would
mean that you feel there is no possible way in which an accident could
occur in this situation, a rating of 7 would mean that you feel that you
could be involved in an accident at any moment".
ii) Familiarity rating: "How well do you already know this junction?
Use a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 would indicate that you have never driven
through this junction before and 7 would mean that you drive through the
junction in this direction virtually every day".
Drivers were asked to give the risk rating immediately they heard the
tone and it was emphasized that this rating should be one of what they were
already feeling when they heard the tone rather than a subsequent assessment
of the risk present. The familiarity rating was given in their own time after
the risk rating. Although they were encouraged to generally give the risk
rating immediately on hearing the tone it was stressed that their safety should
be the main consideration, thus they should not attempt to perform any
judgment task until they felt comfortable with the driving situation. It was
also stressed that they should feel completely free to terminate the
experiment at any time. The two judgment tasks were practised when
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turning right at an unsignalized T-junction from Fitzwilliam Road into
Shaftesbury Road (See Figure 8.1).
The drives were all conducted in daylight avoiding rush hours and each
lasted about 20 minutes. Subjects were informed that the quality or safety of
their driving was not being assessed and they were encouraged to drive as
normally as possible.
Recall Phase:
On their return to the laboratory subjects were asked to recall the events
at seven particular locations, the junction at which they had given the
practice ratings and the six junctions on the route at which they had given
ratings. They started with the practice location, using this as an opportunity
to get used to describing their memories. They were cued by being told the
manoeuvre they were making at the time and the names of the roads they
were leaving and entering. Subjects were asked to try to bring as much as
possible of the situation to mind and then describe the events at the junction
in as much detail as they could. It was emphasised that they should attempt
to describe what had happened solely on the occasion on which they had
given ratings, ignoring any information about the junction they might possess
from any other source. Subjects were asked to start their description with the
approach to the junction and initially attempt to describe events in the order
in which they had occurred adding extra details later if necessary. Subjects
were instructed to concentrate particularly on the following categories of
information:
Other vehicles: - Were they parked, stationary or moving? Try to
describe colours and makes where possible.
Own behaviour: Did you have to stop, slow down or wait, if so why and
for how long?
Cyclists or Pedestrians: What did they look like, where were they and
what were they doing?
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If the subject had missed out any of these three main categories from
their description the experimenter explicitly asked the subject whether they
could remember anything from the missing category, this was done for all
descriptions whether or not such information was in fact present. Where
vehicles were mentioned without further description the experimenter
explicitly asked the subject if they could remember any extra details such as
the make or colour of the vehicle. Once they had completed a description
they were asked to give a third rating, this time about the vividness of their
memory for that situation.
iii) Vividness rating: "How vivid was your memory for that whole
situation? Use a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means that you cannot
remember anything at all about the events and 7 means that the memory is
a vivid as experiencing the whole situation again".
The seven junctions were cued in the order in which they had been
driven through, if it was clear to the experimenter that the subject was
describing the wrong junction the subject was stopped and cued again with
the road names and manoeuvre for the correct junction.
Description Phase:
After all seven junctions had been recalled subjects were asked to
describe the situations again. However, this time before describing each
junction subjects were first shown the video that had been made of that
situation during their own drive. Once again the recall started with the
practice junction. Subjects watched the section of the film corresponding to
their approach to the junction, manoeuvre and pulling away from the
junction.
The portion of a video tape corresponding to a single junction was
defined by two fixed points that were readily observable on the film, one on
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each side of the junction. The points used were different for each junction
and each direction of turn and were selected such that each junction would be
shown for approximately the same amount of time if the drive was conducted
with no other traffic present. The points were chosen such that the film
would show the main signposts before the junction, the important features of
the approach, and a short section of road on the far side of the junction. The
experimenter viewed the film on a separate monitor and was able to move
the video tape to the appropriate start point for each junction before turning
on the subject's monitor.
Subjects did not speak while the video was being played, when a single
junction had been watched the subject's monitor was turned off and the
subject was asked to describe the events at the junction. The subjects' task in
this phase was to again attempt to describe as well as possible exactly what
had happened in the situation. It was emphasised that they should not be
distracted by what they may have said in the first part, that they should repeat
exactly the same as before if appropriate and should also attempt as before to
describe things that were not visible in the video (e.g. vehicles coming from
behind). They used the same categories as in the previous recall task and the
experimenter cued them in the same way. Once a particular junction had
been fully described the subject gave a further two ratings:
iv) Surprise rating: "How surprising did you feel the events at the
junctions were when you were driving? (1 indicates that everything
happened exactly as anticipated while 7 indicates that the events were
completely unexpected)".
ii) Business rating: "How busy overall was the situation? (1 indicates
that there was very little to see at the junction while 7 indicates that it was
extremely busy - this is an absolute, not a relative judgment so try to
ignore any knowledge you have of the junction in other circumstances)".
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Once a junction had been described and the two ratings had been given,
the next junction was shown. This procedure was repeated until all seven
junctions had been described in the order they had been driven through.
Both the recalls and the descriptions of the six experimental junctions were
tape recorded and subsequently transcribed.
Results
Once again the judgment results are reported first. Initially general
patterns of responding in the various judgment tasks are described.
Comparisons are made between the six junctions and two directions of turn.
Objective data from the films are also analysed in the same way. Two
general measures of memory performance are then considered, the vividness
ratings, and the total amount of correct recall. These are also initially
analysed by making comparisons between junctions and directions of turn.
Relationships between this full set of measures are then assessed, both over
all situations and within individual junctions. The recall data is then coded in
a method similar to that employed in Study 5 to allow comparison of the
types of information recalled from high and low risk situations. This is done
to allow the direct testing of the attention focusing hypothesis.
Judgment Results:
The vividness rating will be considered with the recall results, the
remaining four ratings will be reported here. Since the groups were split into
four to control for order effects it was not possible to perform a single
analysis of variance on all the data with both direction of turn and junction
number as within subject factors. Thus the data was analysed separately for
the two sets of junctions A B C and D E F, in each case with junction as the
within subjects factor and direction of turn as a between subjects factor.
Where there was a significant main effect of junction or an interaction
between junction and direction of turn, multiple pairwise comparisons using
the Newman-Keuls method were conducted. These are reported where
differences were significant (p<O.OS).
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For risk ratings on the set of junctions A B C, there were significant
main effects of both junction, F(2,60)=1 1.52, pczO.O1, and direction of turn,
F(1,30)=5.69, p<O.05 and also an interaction between the two, F(2,60)=6.00,
p<O.Ol, multiple comparisons showed that A(Right) & B(Right) > all others.
There were no significant differences on the set D E F either between the
three junctions, F(2,60)=O.83, or on direction of turn, F(1,30)=O.68, nor was
there any interaction between the two, F(2,60)=O.04. Figure 8.3 shows the
mean risk ratings and their standard deviations for right and left turns at each
of the six junctions.
• Right Turns
o Left Turns
A B CD E F
Junction
Figure 8.3: Mean risk ratings for right and left turns at each of the six junctions and
their standard deviations.
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For familiarity ratings on the set of junctions A B C, there was no
significant main effect of either junction, F(2,60)=2.29, or direction of turn,
F(1,30)=O.18, but there was an interaction between the two, F(2,60)=6.O1,
p<O.Ol, C(Left) < all others. There were no significant differences on the set
D E F either between the three junctions, F(2,60)=1 .99, on direction of turn,
F(1,30)=O.17 or interaction between the two, F(2,60)=O.Ol. Figure 8.4
shows the mean familiarity ratings and standard deviations for right and left
turns at each of the six junctions.
• Right Turns
o Left Turns
A B CD E F
Junction
Figure 8.4: Mean familiarity ratings for right and left turns at each of the six
junctions and their standard deviations.
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For surprisingness ratings on the set of junctions A B C, there were no
significant main effects of either junction, F(2,60)=1.01, or direction of turn,
F(1 ,30)=0.25, but there was an interaction between the two, F(2,60)=5.92,
p<O.Ol , B(Right) > A(Right) & B(Left). There were no significant
differences on the set D E F either between the three junctions, F(2,60)=0.30,
or on direction of turn, F(1,30)=1.07, nor was there any interaction between
the two, F(2,60)=1 .00. Figure 8.5 shows the mean surprisingness ratings and
their standard deviations for right and left turns at each of the six junctions.
A B CD E F
Junction
FIgure 8.5: Mean surprise rating for right and left turns at each of the six junctions
and their standard deviations.
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For business ratings on the set of junctions A B C, there was a significant
main effect of junction, F(2,60)=21.43, p <O.Ol , (B > A & C) but not for
direction of turn, F(1,30)=O.92, and no interaction between the two,
F(2,60)=1 .46. There were no significant differences on the set D E F either
between the three junctions, F(2,60)=O.89, or on direction of turn,
F( 1 ,30)=3 .71, but there was a significant interaction between the two,
F(2,60)=4.16, p<O.05, D(Right) > D(Left), E(Right), E(Left) & F(Left).
Figure 8.6 shows the mean business ratings and standard deviations for right
and left turns at each of the six junctions.
R Right Turns
0 Left Turns
A B CD E F
Junction
Figure 8.6: Mean business rating for right and left turns at each of the six junctions
and their standard deviations.
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One thing which is immediately clear from inspection of the four ratings
is that even controlling for the direction of turn the variation in ratings at
individual junctions is large. This has implications for later analysis since it
means that the variation within individual junctions may be as important as
that between different junctions and directions of turn. There were in fact no
significant differences among the three junctions D E F in risk ratings, and
on this set, contrary to expectations, the direction of turn did not appear to
affect ratings of risk. Junctions A and B, however, appeared to be rather
different from the others in that they showed large differences in direction of
turn, with right turns being, as predicted, significantly more risky than left
turns.
To better understand the factors about these junctions that made them
appear different to subjects, the videos made during the drive were analysed
to collect some objective data about the situations which drivers were in.
This data was intended both to interpret and validate the judgment results and
to provide objective measures with which to compare the recalls and
descriptions which are described later in this chapter.
Objective Data:
The time taken to pass between the two points used to define the junction
in the description phase was recorded for each film. Details were recorded
about the activity at the junction, specifically, the number of motor vehicles,
parked vehicles, cyclists and pedestrians visible. Motor vehicles were
recorded separately depending on their direction of travel - same direction as
own vehicle, opposite direction to own vehicle or appearing as cross traffic at
the junction. Any items that were conspicuous either in appearance or
behaviour (e.g. a large lorry, or a pedestrian crossing immediately ahead of
the car) were also recorded. The mean scores for all these categories are
reported in Appendix 4.1. For the following analyses these data were
grouped into just two categories - the total amount of moving motor vehicles,
and the total number of cyclists and pedestrians visible in each film.
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For the time spent at the junction on the set of junctions A B C, there
was a significant main effect of junction, F(2,60)=21 .03, p<0.0l, and of
direction of turn, F(1,30)=7.37, pzO.01, and also an interaction between the
two, F(2,60)=3.62, p.<0.05, B(Right)> B(Left) & C(Right)> all others).
There was a significant main effect on the set D E F of junction,
F(2,60)=9.13, p<0.01, (D & F> E), but not of direction of turn, F(1,30)=l.51
and there was no significant interaction between the two, F(2,60)=1.98.
Figure 8.7 shows the mean time spent at each junction and standard deviation
for right and left turns at each of the six junctions.
A B CD E F
Junction
FIgure 8.7: Mean time taken and standard deviation for right and left turns at each
of the six junctions.
• Right Turns
o Left Turns
60
10
0
50cJ
40
©
I-I
30
E
z 20
RECALL OF SIX JUNCTIONS 226
For the total number of motor vehicles at each junction (excluding
parked vehicles) on the set of junctions A B C, there was a significant main
effect of junction, F(2,60)=46.53, p<0.Oi, and of direction of turn,
F(1,30)=9.80, p<ø.0i, and also an interaction between the two,
F(2,60)=1O.31, p<O.O1, B(Right)> B(Left) & C(Right)> all others. There
were no significant differences on the set D E F between the three junctions,
F(2,60)=2.43, or on direction of turn, F(1,30)=1.57 and no significant
interaction between the two, F(2,60)=1.58. Figure 8.8 shows the mean
number of vehicles at each junction and standard deviation for right and left
turns at each of the six junctions.
A B CD E F
Junction
Figure 8.8: Mean number of motor vehicles visible at right and left turns at each of
the six junctions and standard deviations.
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For the number of cyclists and pedestrians at each junction on the set of
junctions A B C, there were significant main effects of junction,
F(2,60)=35.13, p<zO.Ol, and of direction of turn, F(1,30)=4.94, p<zO.O5, and
also an interaction between the two, F(2,60)=4. 18, p<O.O5, B(Right)>
B(Left) > all others. There was a significant difference on the set D E F
between the three junctions, F(2,60)=21.76, p czO.O1, D > E & F, but no main
effect of direction of turn, F(1 ,30)=4.00 and no significant interaction
between the two, F(2,60)= 1.36. Figure 8.9 shows the mean number of
cyclists and pedestrians at each junction and its standard deviation for right
and left turns at each of the six junctions.
A B C D E F
Junction
Figure 8.9: Mean number of cyclists and pedestrians visible at right and left turns
at each of the six junctions with standard deviations.
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Summary of Ratings and Objective Data
The objective data make it clear that there were substantial differences in
the character of the six junctions used on the route. Junction A was
particularly quick to drive through since it was a mini-roundabout unlike the
other five junctions which were all light-controlled. Note also the much
reduced variance in the time taken to pass through junction A relative to the
others. The large variances for the other five junctions reflect the fact that
the lights could be either green or red when the driver arrived at the junction.
Despite the short length of time generally spent at junction A, there were
still a relatively large number of cyclists and pedestrians visible in the films.
This reflects another major difference in the types of junction used.
Junctions A, B and to a lesser extent D, were all in built up areas, and
generally had a high number of cyclists and pedestrians present. Junctions C,
E and F were not in heavily built up areas, they nonetheless tended to have
relatively high traffic flows since all were on major routes into Cambridge
town centre.
To assess the relationship between the various measures, correlations
were calculated for each subject across the six junctions and these
correlations were averaged across all 32 subjects using Fisher's z
transformation. Full comparisons between measures calculated this way are
given in Table 8.2 with the recall results. The number of vehicles visible in
the film provides some validation for the business rating given by subjects,
the mean correlation between the business rating and the number of vehicles
in the film was r(128)=O.727, p<O.O1. The number of cyclists and
pedestrians in the film also correlated significantly with the mean business
rating given by subjects, r(128)=O.643, p<zO.Ol.
There were low, but significant positive correlations between risk ratings
and all three objective measures and all the other rating scales (with the
exception of familiarity). The correlations of risk with objective measures
were of a similar magnitude to those observed in the first study, see Table
3.4. Ratings of surprisingness were similarly correlated with all objective
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measures and other ratings, except familiarity. This correlation was most
substantial with business rating (r(128)=O.422, p<O.Ol), a finding which
seems consistent with the idea that the busier a junction is, the less
predictable the events at it will be. Familiarity ratings were only
significantly correlated with the number of cyclists and pedestrians visible in
the film, this probably reflects the slight tendency for subjects to know best
the junctions nearer the centre of Cambridge, e.g. junctions A and B.
Memory Results:
The first aspect of the memory results to be considered will be the
overall ratings of vividness given by subjects after the recall of each
situation. There was no significant main effect of either junction,
F(2,60)=2.36, or direction of turn, F(1,30)=0.53, and no significant
interaction between the two, F(2,60)=0.16, on the set of junctions A B C.
There were no significant differences on the set D E F either between the
three junctions, F(2,60)=1.61, on direction of turn, F(1,30)=1.84 and no
significant interaction between the two, F(2,60)=0.17. Figure 8.10 shows the
mean vividness ratings and their standard deviations for right and left turns at
each of the six junctions.
Thus it appears that there are no differences at all between the six
junctions in the vividness of memory for them, even when different
directions of turn are compared separately. It is possible that the vividness
rating was simply not a measure of the quality of memory, certainly there
appeared to be some ambiguity in subjects' use of the scale. As will be seen,
there were cases where subjects gave detailed and accurate recalls of events
but then reported that the memory wasn't particularly vivid. In other cases a
subject could recall almost nothing about the events at a junction, but
nonetheless reported to remember having been at the junction very "vividly".
7.-
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Figure 8.10: Mean memory vividness rating and standard deviation for right and
left turns at each of the six junctions.
Despite these concerns vividness ratings were strongly correlated with
the amount actually recalled correctly as will be seen when the analysis of
the recall data is reported. Moreover, it was previously found in Studies 2
and 3 that overall recognition sensitivity scores which had been expected to
differ substantially between junctions were in fact almost identical for
different junctions, despite the known differences between the junctions in
terms of rated riskiness. That apparent lack of relationship between risk and
recognition sensitivity turned out to conceal important differences between
particular exemplars. It is possible that the vividness ratings conceal similar
differences. Before this possibility is explored the actual recall data will be
described.
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Scoring the Transcripts:
The transcripts of both memories and descriptions of each junction were
scored separately by the experimenter and a second judge. The two judges
first independently selected the information from the transcript that referred
to memories for the events at each junction. These segments correspond
loosely to the type of information Dritschel (1991) refers to as
autobiographical memory units. In this case, however, information was only
selected if it appeared to describe directly the particular drive just completed,
thus the text "That junction is normally very busy, there are always so many
cyclists and pedestrians around" would not be selected.
The selection of text was done while watching the actual film made
during the drive. Both correct and incorrect information was selected.
Information referring to particular memories was not selected if it referred to
events which happened shortly before or after the actual bounds of the
junction as defined previously, or if it repeated information already given.
The selected text was then broken down into units of information
corresponding to individual propositions relevant to the events on the drive,
thus "I remember a blue car" would be two units, one referring to the fact
that a car was present and one referring to its colour, but "The lights were
red" would be one unit (since the fact that the lights themselves were present
is not new information specific to this drive).
The two judges agreed on the selection of 2,801 sections of information,
983 from the recalls and 1,818 from the descriptions. 4.04 percent of
sections selected by the experimenter were not selected by the second judge
and 14.13 percent of sections selected by the second judge were not selected
by the experimenter. This level of disagreement between judges is higher
than might have been expected for segmentation of transcripts which is
generally a straightforward process (Ericsson and Simon 1984). This reflects
the large subjective component in choosing which information to omit. In
effect this segmentation task actually includes a coding task since it requires
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the judge to code information as either relevant or not relevant. If the task is
regarded as a coding task then the reliability between judges appears to be
quite good.
The two main difficulties in the selection of information were firstly to
decide whether particular information was actually a memory of the drive
just completed (e.g. "I think that junction must have been quite busy, it
usually is" or "I don't remember seeing any pedestrians but they might have
been there"), and secondly to decide whether two sections of information
implicitly repeated each other (e.g. "The car ahead stopped, so we had to as
well" contains information about both cars stopping but there was some
inconsistency between the judges in deciding whether these counted as two
independent units of information).
Although the second judge consistently produced a higher number of
units than were produced by the experimenter, F(l,3 l)=74.05, p<O.Ol, this
difference does not interact with the junction that was being coded,
F(5,155)=O.35. This suggests that any inconsistencies in the selection of
information were applied similarly to all junctions and are thus unlikely to
bias the overall results.
Each judge then again compared the text of both the memory and the
description to the actual film made at the time to score the sections they had
selected. Each segment of information was scored as either correct, incorrect
or impossible to determine from the film. An example of information
falling in the third category would be "The car behind us was a black Fiesta".
Information which was correct but clearly misplaced, for example a
pedestrian correctly described in some detail but at the wrong junction was
scored as incorrect.
Of the 2,801 sections which both the judges had selected there was
agreement on the categorisation of 89.7 percent. This corresponds to a
highly significant overall level of agreement between judges, K=0.62,
z=19.97, p<0.Ol, using the kappa statistic given by Siegel and Castellan
(1988). The relatively low value of K compared to the total percentage
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agreement reflects the fact that the vast majority of the information units
(84.67 percent) were coded as correct by both judges. The total percentage
agreement between judges was not significantly different across the six
junctions F(5,55)=2. 11.
Those segments where the two judges disagreed were discarded from the
analysis leaving a total of 2,502 pieces of information. For the memories this
corresponded to a mean of 3.29 pieces of information from each subject per
junction correct, 0.68 incorrect and 0.38 impossible to determine. For the
descriptions the means were 8.34 correct, 0.18 incorrect, and 0.17 impossible
to determine. An example of the description and recall for one subject and
the method of sconng is given in Appendix 4.2.
Recall and Description Results:
Primacy and recency effects are a standard finding in much memory
research. It was thus expected that there would be differences in memory for
a junction depending on the order in which the route was driven and four
different versions of the route were used to control for this effect. To see
whether this effect is in fact present the memory data was first analysed by
the order in which a junction was driven. For this analysis it is necessary to
compare all six junctions, since direction of turn is completely balanced
across the six junctions averaging across the two types of turns may increase
the variance in the data but should not affect the shape of any order effects
observed between junctions, thus data here has been aggregated over
direction of turn.
In fact there were no significant differences in the amount of correct
information given for each position, F(5,155)=0.59, see Figure 8.11. Figure
8.11 also shows the vividness ratings analysed the same way, these also
showed no significant effect of the order in which the junctions were driven,
F(5,155)=0.37. Similarly there were no significant effects of the order
driven on the amount of information recalled incorrectly, F(5,155)=1.05.
Nor were there significant order effects in the description phase for either
correct, F(5,155)=1.52 or incorrect information, F(5,55)=1.39.
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The lack of any order effects in the data may be because any decay or
interference was controlled for by the fact that the order in which junctions
were recalled was always the same as the order in which the junctions were
driven. In fact, since the time taken to drive between junctions was similar to
the time taken to recall each junction, the actual retention interval was
similar for all junctions. Any primacy or recency effects may have been
removed by the fact that subjects drove through other junctions before and
after the actual route.
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Considering now the six different junctions, for the amount of
information recalled correctly there was a significant main effect of junction,
F(2,60)=15.32, p<O.Ol, B > C> A, but not of direction of turn, F(1,30)=O.03,
and there was no significant interaction between the two, F(2,60)=1.27, on
the set of junctions A B C. There were also significant differences on the set
D E F between the three junctions, F(2,60)=6.32, p<O.Ol, F> D & E, but not
on direction of turn, F(l,30)=O.03 and no interaction between the two,
F(2,60)=O.94. Figure 8.12 shows the mean amount of information correctly
recalled and standard deviations for right and left turns at each of the six
junctions.
A B C D E F
Junction
Figure 8.12: Mean amount of information recalled correctly for right and left turns
at each of the six junctions.
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For the amount of information recalled incorrectly on the set of junctions
A B C, there was no significant main effect of junction, F(2,60)=2.02, nor of
direction of turn, F( 1 ,30)=O. 14, and there was no significant interaction
between the two, F(2,60)=1.47. There were no significant differences on the
set D E F between the three junctions, F(2,60)=O.15, nor on direction of turn,
F(1,30)=O.19, but in this case there was a significant interaction between the
two, F(2,60)=3.48, p<0.05, none of the pairwise comparisons were, however,
significant, p<ø.05. Figure 8.13 shows the mean amount of information
incorrectly recalled and standard deviations for right and left turns at each of
the six junctions.
• Right Turns
o Left Turns
A B C D E F
Junction
Figure 8.13: Mean amount of informaon recalled incorrectly and standard
deviations for right and left turns at each of the six junctions.
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For the amount of information described correctly there was a significant
main effect of junction, F(2,60)=13.38, pczO.Ol, B > A & C, but not of
direction of turn, F(1,30)=O.03, and there was no significant interaction
between the two, F(2,60)=1.67, on the set of junctions A B C. There were
also significant differences on the set D E F between the three junctions,
F(2,60)=8.66, p<O.O1, F & D > E, but not on direction of turn, F(1,30)=3.94,
and there was no significant interaction between the two, F(2,60)=1 .55.
Figure 8.14 shows the mean amount of information correctly described and
standard deviations for right and left turns at each of the six junctions.
A B C D E F
Junction
Figure 8.14: Mean amount of information described correctly and standard
deviations for right and left turns at each of the six junctions.
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For the amount of information described incorrectly there was no
significant main effect of junction, F(2,60)=1.34, nor of direction of turn,
F( 1 ,30)=O.09, and there was no significant interaction between the two,
F(2,60)=1.93, on the set of junctions A B C. There were also no significant
differences on the set D E F between the three junctions, F(2,60)=1.81, nor
on direction of turn, F(1,30)=1.86, and there was no significant interaction
between the two, F(2,60)=1.67. Figure 8.15 shows the mean amount of
information incorrectly described and standard deviations for right and left
turns at each of the six junctions.
1.4
1.20
.-
7:::
•	 0.6
E
A B C D E F
Junction
Figure 8.15: Mean amount of information described incorrectly and standard
deviations for right and left turns at each of the six junctions.
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There were no significant effects of junction or direction of turn on the
amount of information recalled which could be neither classified as correct
nor incorrect, nor was there any interaction between turn and junction for
either set of junctions. For the description phase there was a significant
interaction between junction and direction of turn in the amount of
information given in this category for the set of junctions A B C,
F(2,60)=3.19, p<O.O5, though none of the pairwise comparisons were
significant, and no other main effects or interactions were significant.
Because of the small amount of this type of information and the difficulty in
interpreting it, the information which was impossible to classify as correct or
incorrect will not be analysed further.
Two different measures of memory quality are directly available from
the above analyses, ratings of memory vividness by the subject, and the total
amount of information correctly recalled. There are a number of other
measures that can be calculated from the data. One measure which might be
used is the total amount of correct recall minus the total amount of incorrect
recall. This measure could be used to correct for guessing on the
assumption that incorrect recall represents bad guesses which will have been
balanced by an equal number of good guesses. It is, however, not clear that
this assumption is justified. In fact the amount of incorrect recall from a
subject was negatively correlated with the amount of correct recall (r(128)=-
0.323, p<O.Ol, see Table 8.2), this suggests that there is unlikely to be any
simple trade-off between incorrect and correct recall. Since the raw score is
easier to analyse interpret and amount of incorrect recall was relatively small
in comparison with the amount correct it was decided not to use this
correction.
An alternative measure of memory which could be calculated would be
to use the amount of information described correctly as a measure of the
maximum possible recall the subject could have achieved. It would thus be
possible to calculate an overall memory score by expressing the actual
amount recalled as a fraction of the amount described. This measure would
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control for the actual amount of information present and to some extent the
general quality of a particular subject's memory and any quirks in their styles
of description. However, when the measure was calculated it became clear
that it suffered from a number of problems. There was in fact very
considerable variability both within and between subjects in the quality of
the descriptions given, perhaps partly because of the memory component of
this task. In some cases subjects who appeared to have an extremely good
recall of a junction produced such a detailed subsequent description that their
overall score on the junction using this measure was relatively poor. In
contrast, subjects who actually recalled almost nothing of a situation often
received relatively high scores on this measure because they actually
described even less in the description phase. This may have been partly
because of a tendency, contrary to the instructions given, for subjects to
avoid repeating in the description phase details that had been given in the
recall phase. There were even a few cases in which no correct information
was actually given in the description phase, this caused problems in
calculating the measure.
These problems meant that correct recall divided by correct description
had a number of undesirable properties as an overall measure of memory
performance - subjects who gave very full descriptions generally performed
worse than those who gave briefer ones, busy junctions generally scored
more poorly than empty ones (because there was so much information which
could be described at a busy junction), and there were cases where the
measure could not be calculated. Because of these difficulties the measure
was not used further and in the following analyses the two overall measures
of memory quality will simply be vividness ratings and the total amount of
information correctly recalled.
Relationships Between Measures:
The relationships between the various measures were first assessed by
taking the data for each subject individually and calculating correlations
between the various measures across the six different junctions. These
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correlations for each subject were then averaged using Fisher's z
transformation. The full table of such correlations is given in Table 8.2.
This table reveals that there is no significant overall correlation between the
risk rating given when driving and memory as assessed by the total amount
of information subsequently correctly recalled by the subject, r(128)=O.127,
p=O.l5. There are, however, significant correlations between the amount of
information correctly recalled and both the time spent at the junction
(r(128)=O.543, p<O.Ol) and the number of vehicles visible in the film
(r(128)=O.543, p<O.Ol). Neither of these two measures correlates
significantly with the amount recalled incorrectly. This is interesting since it
suggests that subjects not only remember more from busy slow junctions but
that they are also more accurate in their recall. This is also reflected in the
significant negative correlation between the amount remembered correctly
and the amount remembered incorrectly, r(128)=-O.323, p<O.Oi. This leads
to the possibility that where subjects feel they have a good memory for the
event then they are normally accurate. Errors may instead generally occur
where subjects have relatively little to say but feel that they must say
something.
Vividness, similarly, is highly correlated with the amount recalled
correctly, r(128)=O.504, p<O.Ol, but negatively, though not significantly,
correlated with the amount recalled incorrectly, r(128)=-O.lOO. Note that the
vividness rating is in fact significantly correlated with the risk rating,
r(128)=O.289, p<O.Ol. this suggests that vividness is measuring some
aspects of subjects perceptions of their memories in addition to the total
amount of information that they can recall. One unexpected aspect of
vividness ratings is that, unlike the total amount recalled, they are not
correlated significantly with business ratings, r(128)=O.061. This suggests
that vividness ratings are a different type of assessment of memory quality
from the simple measure of the amount recalled.
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Famiiiarlty
Rating
Recalled	 Described	 Risk
Correct	 Incorrect	 Correct	 incorrect	 Rating
Correct	 1.000
Recalled
Incorrect	 .323**	 1.000
Correct	 0.430**	 -.100	 1.000
Described
incorrect	 0.005	 0.118	 -.044	 1.000
Risk RatInQ	 0.127	 0.148	 0.083	 -.064	 1.000
Familiarity Rating -.011	 0.065
Vividness Rating 0.504**	 -.100
Surprise Rating	 0.200*	 -.066
Business Rating	 0.41 6**	 -.073
Time at Junction 0.543**	 -.1 03
Vehicles Visible	 0.543**	 -.129
Cycles/Pedestrians 0.234**	 -.058
0.035
0. 261
0.090
0.50 1**
0.611**
0.590**
0.467**
.219*
-.061
- .025
-.062
0.042
0.022
-.105
0.078
0 289**
0 277**
o 302**
0.207*
0.203*
0.31 1**
1.000
0.018
-.053
0.104
-.068
-.034
0.258**
Vividness Surprise
Rating	 Rating
Vividness	 1.000
Surprise	 0.135	 1.000
Business	 0.061	 0.422**
Time at Junction 0 . 333**	 0.289**
Vehicles	 0.235**	 0.269**
Cycles Peds	 0.231**	 0.303**
Business Time at	 Vehicles	 Cycles and
Rating	 Junction	 Visibie	 Pedestrians
1.000
0 631**	 1 000
0 727**	 0 880**	 1 000
0 . 643**	 0.41 7**	 0 . 480**	 1.000
Table 8.2: Correlations between measures calculated for each subject individually
and averaged using F sher's z transformation. Correlations marked
with asterisks are significantly different from zero, * if r(128)>O.172,
p<0.05, ** if r(128)>0.225, p.<0.01.
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Once again previous familiarity with a junction does not appear to be
related to memory for subsequent events at that junction, either in amount
recalled, r(128)=-O.Ol 1, or in terms of vividness ratings, r(128)=O.018. It is
possible that this is because fixed information was excluded from the recall
analysis, however, it may simply be because the correlations in this analysis
were calculated within individual subjects. Since the junctions are relatively
close to one another it is likely that subjects generally knew the junctions
equally well and any substantial familiarity differences would only show up
in comparisons between subjects.
When correlations are calculated across subjects the correlations are
slightly larger though still not significant, mean familiarity rating has a
correlation of r(30)=0.261 with the amount recalled correctly, and r(30)=-
0.039 with the amount recalled incorrectly. It is interesting to note that the
correlation between these two measures is now positive, r(30)=O.237,
suggesting that although any individual is more likely to give incorrect recall
when they give relatively little correct recall, the types of people who recall
more correctly also recall more incorrectly, though this correlation is again
not significantly different from zero. Similarly there is no significant
correlation between vividness ratings and familiarity calculated this way,
r(30)=0.l 59.
Division of the Data:
In the recognition studies it has been possible to divide films into groups
of objectively more and less dangerous situations in assessing the
relationship between risk and memory. For this study the differences
between junctions in objective risk measured by the total number of
accidents at the site are sufficiently small that it is difficult to group them
unequivocally into dangerous and safe junctions, see Table 8.3. Moreover,
from the subjective ratings given both in Study 1 and in the present study it
seems that the junctions that would be chosen on the basis of high objective
risk did not in general receive higher risk ratings from subjects.
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Junction
A	 B	 C	 D	 E
	
F
32	 34	 40	 38	 2
	
4
Junction
Numbers
(Study 1):
Accidents
Reported
(1986-88):
Risk
Ratings
(Study 1):
Accidents
Estimates
(Study 1):
Risk
Ratings
(Study 6):
Turning
Right:
Turning
Left:
Table 8.3: The six junctions - Measures of risk from Study 1 and Study 6.
When using the ratings from Study 1 it is necessary to bear in mind the
fact that for junctions C, E, and F, the manoeuvres performed by subjects in
that study while giving ratings were different to those being performed by
the subjects in the current study. Nonetheless, there appears to be agreement
between the studies in the ordering of the six junctions in terms of risk
ratings or accident estimates, on this basis junctions A, B, and D appear to be
associated with high levels of risk, and junctions C, E, and F are relatively
less risky.
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There were a priori reasons for expecting right turns to be more
dangerous than left turns (e.g. Hall, 1986, or the results from Study 4). In all
cases in the present study the mean risk rating for right turns was indeed
higher than that for left turns, see Figure 8.3. However, this difference was
only significant for junctions A and B. Although the remaining differences
in direction of turn were surprisingly small it still seems appropriate to
consider the memory results separately for subjects turning left and right at
each junction as a way of dividing the data in terms of objective risk.
When patterns of results across all six junctions were considered (as in
Table 8.2), it was possible to calculate correlations for each subject
individually and average correlations to assess overall effects. However, if
the data is further divided into high and low risk junctions, or into right and
left turns, it is no longer possible to sensibly calculate correlations for
individual subjects. Making comparisons across subjects is, however, likely
to be relatively insensitive since different subjects will have used the rating
scales differently and will have had generally different qualities of recall
overall. In order to reduce these problems the data for each subject was first
converted to z-scores and then correlations were calculated between
measures for each junction and direction of turn. Each correlation is thus
calculated from the data of 16 subjects. Table 8.4 shows correlations
between risk ratings and both the amount recalled correctly and vividness
ratings.
The correlation between risk rating and the amount correctly recalled is
significantly different from zero for only 2 of the 12 cases (6 junctions by 2
directions), right turn at junction D, r(14)=O.537 and left turn at junction E,
r(14)=-O.606. The correlation between risk rating and vividness rating is also
significant for right turns at junctions D, r(14)=O.606, p<O.O5 though in no
other cases. Correlations calculated on the raw (unnormalized) data showed
a similar pattern (see Appendix 4.3), however, the only two significant
correlations were between risk and vividness, for right turns at junctions A
and B, r(14)=O.728, p<O.Ol and r(14)=O.718, p<O.Ol, respectively.
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Junction
A	 B	 C	 D	 E	 F
Correct Recall:
Turning
Right: 0.352	 -.071	 -.205	 0 . 537*	 .606*	 0.124
Turning
Left:	 -.360	 -.014	 0.222	 0.478	 0.431	 0.235
Vividness Ratings:
Turning
Right:	 0.325	 0.490	 -.039	 0.600* -.171	 -.018
Turning
Left:	 -.031	 0.017	 0.210	 0.368	 0.267	 0.003
Table 8.4: Correlations between risk and amount recalled correctly/vividness
rating for the six junctions on both directions of turn (14 degrees of
freedom, correlations marked * are significantly different from zero,
p.<0 .05).
When situations are grouped into high and low risk, either on the basis of
junction (A, B & D vs. C, E & F) or direction of turn (right vs. left), the
average correlation between risk and amount of correct recall is not
significantly different from zero in any case. The average correlation
between risk and vividness is, however, significant for right turns generally,
r(84)=O.219, p<O.O5 (though this is not significantly greater than the average
correlation for left turns, z=O.51), and for high risk junctions, r(84)=O.312,
p<0.01 (this is significantly higher than the correlation for low risk junctions,
z=1.80, p<0.05).
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Discussion of Memory Results:
The two different measures of overall memory quality - vividness ratings
and total amount of correct information recalled, were strongly related to one
another, r(128)=O.504, p<O.Ol. Nonetheless there were important
differences between the two, particularly in terms of their relationships with
ratings of subjective risk, thus the two results will be considered separately.
Vividness ratings did not differ significantly between the six junctions or
on direction of turn, see Figure 8.10. This may reflect a useful property of
vividness ratings in that subjects have already controlled for aspects such as
the business of the situation when they make their assessments of vividness.
This may have an effect similar to that which was attempted by using
descriptions to correct the recalls. Vividness ratings would thus reflect a
subject's assessments of the quality of a memory taking into account the total
information which was potentially available and assessed relative to the other
situations encountered. Although these factors may remove any overall
differences between different junctions, they would allow vividness ratings
to be more sensitive to other factors which affect the general quality of
memories.
Vividness ratings showed a significant overall correlation with risk
ratings, r(128)=O.289, p<0.Ol. There was also evidence that this relationship
between risk and vividness was strongest for more risky situations (for the
most risky cells in Table 8.4, right turns at junction A, B and D, r(42)=O.479,
p<O.Ol). These findings appear to be consistent with those from the previous
studies. The junctions used in this study are similar to the generally high risk
situations used in the recognition studies and in those cases a general
improvement in recognition sensitivity was observed with increases in risk.
In the recognition studies these effects were interpreted as a result of
subjective risk causing attention to be focused on the dangers in the driving
environment and enhancing subsequent memory for them. It seems probable
that memories which were focused on such information would represent a
coherent picture of a dangerous situation and thus be subsequently given
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higher ratings on the vividness scale than memories for more peripheral
information from a situation. This could provide an explanation for
memories of risky situations being generally rated as more vivid than less
those of less risky ones. An alternative possibility is that when subjects
recalled risky situations they remembered the feelings of risk in addition to
other information and it is simply the memory for these feelings which
causes them to be rated as particularly vivid memories.
Unlike vividness ratings, the total amount of correct recall did differ
significantly between junctions and was clearly related to the amount of
traffic at a junction and the amount of time spent there. Amount of correct
recall, however, did not appear to be significantly related to the ratings of
subjective risk given when driving, either overall (r(128)=O.127), or when
the data was subsequently divided into high and low risk situations (see
Table 8.4). These results are initially surprising when they are compared to
the results from previous studies. Study 1 showed a clear tendency for
subjects to preferentially recall risky situations, and the recognition studies
showed strong relationships between risk and recognition sensitivity
separately for generally high and low risk situations. However, Study 1
simply measured whether a junction was recalled or not. In the current study
there was some correct recall of all junctions in almost all cases. In order to
ensure that there would be enough variable information potentially available,
the junctions used in this study were some of the objectively riskiest of those
used in Study 1. If some of the less risky junctions on the route in the
present study had also been cued (e.g. junctions 3, 33, 35, 36,37 and 39 from
Study 1) it seems likely that this study would also have shown a positive
correlation between amount recalled and risk ratings given, if only because
these additional junctions generally required no manoeuvre from the driver,
were quick to drive through, and relatively few vehicles would have been
visible while at the junction (see Table 3.2).
The predictions that attention focusing would make about the total
amount of information recalled are in fact relatively unclear. Although
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excessive attention focusing at very high levels of personal threat has been
suggested to impair memory for important information (e.g. 'weapon focus',
see Chapter 2), the lower levels of subjective risk that have been present in
the studies reported in this thesis appear more likely to be associated with a
general change in the distribution of attention and consequent memory rather
than an overall impairment. The direct test of attention focusing is thus to
see whether the type of information recalled about risky situations is
systematically different from that recalled about less risky ones. To do this
the information recalled needs to be coded in such a way that a comparison
between types of memories can be made.
Discovering exactly what information was recalled in situations differing
in subjective risk may also shed light on the relationship between risk and
vividness ratings. It was suggested that vivid memories for risky situations
could reflect either the different nature of these memories as a result of
attention focusing or simply the memory of having experienced risk. If there
were no systematic differences between recalls of risky and non-risky
situations the case for the second of these two explanations of the vividness
ratings would be considerably strengthened.
Types of Information Recalled:
One approach to deciding whether risk was affecting memory as a result
of attention focusing would be to have judges categorize memories as central
versus peripheral using some form of procedure such as that employed by
Heuer and Reisberg (1990). The difficulty with such an approach is
providing appropriate definitions of central and peripheral information.
Heuer and Reisberg used the idea of a basic level as a definition of central
information, defining details falling below this level as peripheral. An
advantage of this approach is that it is relatively easy to operationalise.
Mentions of major objects in driving situations (e.g. vehicles, pedestrians)
and their behaviour would appear to count as basic level information, while
subsequent details about such objects (e.g. vehicle make/colour, pedesthans'
clothing) would count as information below this basic level. Although this is
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an interesting approach it should be remembered that the Heuer and Reisberg
study did not actually show any central versus peripheral differences with
emotional arousal when this definition was used.
It was stressed in Chapter 2 that any definition of central information
should relate to the task being performed by the subject. Almost all of the
information recalled in the present study was in some way connected with
driving, so simply defining central information as that which was related to
driving would mean that almost no information would be coded as
peripheral. Defining central information as that which was related
particularly to risk, as was suggested from the recognition studies, thus
seems a more promising approach. It is clear that recalls would almost
certainly show more risk-related information from risky situations since, as
shown in Study 5, there is more of such information at generally dangerous
situations. The advantage of having had subjects subsequently describe
situations is that this provides some form of base rate with which to compare
the effects on memory of risk. The specific prediction of attention focusing
would be the same whether central is defined as risk-related or basic level
information. This prediction would be that in risky situations the ratio of
recalled to described central information would be high relative to the same
ratio calculated for lower risk situations, with the reverse being true for
peripheral information.
One problem with simply coding the data as basic level/below basic
level or risk-related/unrelated is that it obscures all other aspects of the data.
In Study 5 a coding system was developed for coding descriptions and
potential risks in driving situations. The study also provided information
about which of these categories tend to be associated with potential risks. It
is thus possible to use a modified version of that coding system to both
describe the recalls and descriptions from this study and to categorize them
as risk-related/unrelated. However, the coding system from that study first
needs to be extended to make the distinction between basic level and lower
levels of information.
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Study 5 had encouraged subjects to describe both fixed and variable
information in a situation. In the present study subjects were directed not to
give information which could have come from previous knowledge of a
junction, thus almost no fixed information was provided. Categories
referring to fixed information in the scene were thus removed and additional
categories of variable information were added where necessary to ensure that
virtually all the information given could be coded. This provided 35
categories of basic level information, 19 of which correspond directly to
categories used in Study 5.
Additional information given about objects at levels that might be
considered to be below the basic level were coded in one of six detail
categories associated with each object. In Study 5 information about the
manoeuvre a vehicle was performing was recorded in a general category
which did not identify the particular vehicle. The modified coding system
preserved this information by treating the manoeuvre a vehicle performed in
the same way that a detail about the vehicle would be, thus 11 manoeuvre
categories were included after the 6 detail categories.
The categories of information used and categories of detail scored are
shown in Tables 8.5 and 8.6 respectively. The categories marked with a plus
are those which were used substantially more in the potential risk condition
that the description condition in Study 5 (See Table 7.5). Those categories
marked with a minus are ones which were used substantially less in the
potential risks condition (in both cases, p<zO.O1). Information about the
manoeuvre that the drivers themselves made was coded as a 0 for type of
information and the actual information itself was given as a detail about the
manoeuvre. Thus "I had to wait." would have been coded as:
0, 15.
Traffic:
Oncoming
Own direction
Cross traffic
Traffic behind
1
2
3
4
5
6
7-
8
9-
10
11 +
12
13 +
14
15 +
16
17 +
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Off Road Information:
Pedestrians	 28 +
Off Road Cyclists	 29 +
Traffic Lights:
At Red
	 30
At Green	 31
Changing	 32
General Information
Poor Visibility	 33 +
Generally Busy	 34
General y Empty	 35
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Own Manoeuvre	 0
General Descriptor
Large Vehicle
Normal Car
Motorbike/Moped
Bicycle
Nothing
General Descriptor
Large Vehicle
Normal Car
Motorbike/Moped
Bicycle
Nothing
General Descriptor
Large Vehicle
Normal Car
Motorbike/Moped
Bicycle
N 0th i ng
General Descriptor
Large Vehicle
Normal Car
Motorbike/Moped
Bicycle
Nothing
Parked
	 General Descriptor	 25
Large Vehicle	 26
Normal Car	 27
Table 8.5: Categories of information coded, + and - refer to the potential risks
condition of Study 5, see Table 7.5.
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Item Detail:
Colour	 1
Make of Vehicle	 2
Other Details	 3
Gender	 4
Number of Objects	 5
Clothing	 6
Manoeuvre:
Moving Fast
Moving Slowly
Turning Left
Turning Right
Going Ahead
Braking
Accelerating
Overtaking
Waiting
Stalling
Unobstructed
Own: Other:
7	 +
8	 -
9	 -	 -
10	 -
11
12	 +
13	 -	 +
14	 +
15	 -
16
17
Table 8.6: Categories of detail coded, + and - refer to the potential risks condition
of Study 5 separately for the drivers own manoeuvre and
manoeuvres by other vehicles, see Table 7.5.
The category, "General Descriptor" was used when objects were
described using phrases such as "vehicles", "traffic", or "something" without
the subject specifying the type of vehicle in any further detail. The category
"Large Vehicle" was used for any vehicle larger than a car, for example, van,
lorry, coach or bus. The "other detail" category in Table 8.6 was used for
any other type of information about an object which would be considered as
below the basic level of information (e.g. the registration year of a car, the
hair colour of a pedestrian etc.). All codes referred to what was said and not
necessarily what was actually visible in the film.
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Correct	 Maybe	 Incorrect
Mem Desc Mem Desc Mem Desc
Own Manoeuvre	 112 112	 0	 0	 14	 1
Oncoming Traffic:
General Descriptor	 24	 42	 0	 0	 2	 0
Large Vehicle	 4	 28	 1	 0	 2	 1
Normal Car	 19	 57	 1	 1	 5	 0
Motorbike/Moped	 1	 3	 0	 0	 2	 0
Bicycle	 3	 13	 0	 0	 2	 1
Nothing	 5	 5	 0	 0	 1	 0
Own direction
General Descriptor 	 55	 48	 1	 0	 9	 0
Large Vehicle	 21	 52	 1	 0	 3	 1
Normal Car	 76	 187	 5	 2	 6	 1
Motorbike/Moped	 1	 10	 0	 0	 0	 0
Bicycle	 24	 59	 0	 0	 7	 2
Nothing	 36	 39	 0	 0	 12	 2
Cross traffic
General Descriptor	 33	 80	 2	 5	 5	 1
Large Vehicle	 1	 56	 1	 1	 2	 1
Normal Car	 14 86	 7	 0	 3	 2
Motorbike/Moped	 0	 5	 0	 0	 0	 0
Bicycle	 2	 31	 0	 1	 1	 0
Nothing	 3	 3	 0	 1	 4	 0
Traffic behind
General Descriptor	 0	 0	 10	 0	 0	 0
Large Vehicle	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
NormalCar	 1	 0	 4	 2	 0	 0
Motorbike/Moped	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
Bicycle	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
Nothing	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0
Parked
General Descriptor 	 5	 5	 0	 0	 0	 0
Large Vehicle	 0	 5	 0	 0	 1	 0
Normal Car	 4	 11	 0	 0	 0	 0
Off Road Information:
Pedestrians	 17 84	 2	 0	 3	 2
Ott Road Cyclists 	 4	 15	 0	 0	 1	 0
Traffic Lights:
AtRed	 35 52	 0	 0	 8	 0
AtGreen	 24 32	 0	 0	 2	 0
Changing	 26 44	 0	 0	 6	 0
General Information
Poor Visibility	 5	 5	 0	 0	 0	 0
Generally Busy	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
Generally Empty	 2	 5	 0	 0	 0	 0
Table 8.7: Use of main coding categories.
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Using this coding system each object was coded on a single line, the first
number describing its category and all subsequent numbers referring to
additional details about the object. Thus the text "There was a car ahead of
me waiting at the lights, I think it was a red Volvo" would have been coded
as:
9, 1, 2, 15.
This coding system allowed virtually all the agreed information in both
the recalls and the descriptions to be coded, information was coded
separately depending on whether it was correct, incorrect or impossible to
determine from the information available in the film. The few items that
were not able to be coded by this system tended to be from the impossible to
determine category, in particular drivers' memories of their own thoughts
while driving or actions such as changing gears.
Table 8.7 shows the total number of times each of the basic coding
categories was used in the recall part of the experiment (labelled Mem) and
the description phase (labelled Desc). Information is shown separately
depending on whether it was scored as correct, incorrect or impossible to
determine from the film (labelled Maybe). Table 8.8 compares the correct
and incorrect information categories from the 19 categories of Table 8.7
which clearly correspond to categories used in Study 5 with the descriptions
and potential risks conditions from that study.
There was relatively high consistency across the two studies in the use of
these 19 categories. The amount in each of the categories from the
description phase of Study 5 correlates significantly with both the amount of
correct recall, r(17)=O.82, p<zO.O1 and correct description, r(17)=O.67,
p<ø.oi, in the same 19 categories from the present study. The amount of
information given in the potential risks condition of Study 5 correlates
significantly with the amount in the description phase of the current study,
r(17)=O.52, p<O.O5, but not the amount in the recall phase, r(l7)=O.42. Thus
despite the fact that junctions in this study generally corresponded to the
riskier ones from Study 5, there was no tendency for their descriptions to
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resemble the potential risk condition from Study 5 more strongly than the
description condition. If attention focusing towards risk-related information
were taking place in all conditions it might be predicted that there would be a
general tendency for recalls to become more like the potential risks condition
than descriptions. There was no evidence for this occurring generally in the
above data, however, it will be important to see whether such an effect can
be observed for the riskier situations alone.
Study 5	 Study 6
Correct	 Incorrect
Desc Risk	 Mem Desc	 Mem Desc
Oncoming Traffic:
General Descriptor
Large Vehicle
Normal Car
Bicycle
Own direction
General Descriptor
Large Vehicle
Normal Car
Bicycle
Cross traffic General Descriptor
Large Vehicle
Normal Car
Bicycle
Parked
General Descriptor
Large Vehicle
Normal Car
Off Road Information:
Pedestrians
Off Road Cyclists
General Information
Poor Visibility
General Business
278 101
86 28
87 33
39	 19
208 28
86 23
440 91
74 60
53 89
32 15
106 68
14	 13
138 73
47 20
59 35
60	 133
22 33
28 62
61	 9
24 42	 2	 0
4	 28	 2	 1
19 57	 5	 0
3	 13	 2	 1
55 48	 9	 0
21	 52	 3	 1
76 187	 6	 1
24 59	 7	 2
33 80	 5	 1
1	 56	 2	 1
14 86
	
3	 2
2	 31	 1	 0
5	 5	 0	 0
0	 5	 1	 0
4	 11	 0	 0
17 84	 3	 2
4	 15	 1	 0
5	 5	 0	 0
3	 5	 0	 0
Table 8.8: Use of main coding categories.
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None of the correlations with Study 5 were significantly different from
zero for the amount of incorrect recall or description, this is relatively
uninformative given the small amount of incorrect information in these 19
categories.
Table 8.9 shows the total use of the detail and manoeuvre categories in
the present study. The most commonly given detail in both the recall and the
description condition was the colour of vehicles. This is also the type of
detail most often given incorrectly, both in the recall and more surprisingly,
in the description phase. This may simply reflect the difficulty in correctly
identifying colours from the videos, particularly when filming conditions
were difficult (e.g. strong sunlight or rain).
Correct	 Maybe	 Incorrect
Mem Desc Mem Desc Mem Desc
Item Detail:
Colour	 48
	 265	 15	 4	 16	 10
Make of Vehicle	 14
	 82	 8
	 5
	
3
	
1
Other Details	 28
	 168	 9
	 4
	
5
	
5
Gender	 19
	 42
	
11
	 5
	
2
	
0
Number of Objects 	 37	 106	 0	 0	 14	 2
Clothing	 6	 18
	
0
	
0
	 0	 1
Manoeuvre:
Moving Fast	 2
	 3
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
Moving Slowly	 2
	 1	 0
	
0
	
0
	
0
Turning Left
	 11	 25	 0	 1	 2
	
0
Turning Right	 16
	 59	 1	 1
	
5
	 1
Going Ahead
	 14	 29	 1
	
1
	 2	 1
Braking	 8	 11
	 0
	
0
	
0
	
0
Accelerating	 2
	 5	 1
	
0
	 1	 0
Overtaking	 12	 41
	 0
	
0
	
1
	
0
Waiting	 113 169	 2	 1
	 19	 1
Stalling	 2
	 2
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
Unobstructed	 17
	 51	 0
	
0
	
I
	
0
Table 8.9: Use of detail categories.
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In almost all categories in Tables 8.7 and 8.9 more correct information
and more correct details are given in the description phase than are given in
the recall part of the experiment. The most notable exception to this is
information about the driver's own manoeuvre, here a large amount of
information is given in both parts, a total of 112 items in each case. For
comparison, if every driver gave a single correct piece of information related
to their manoeuvre at every junction the total in this category would be 192.
To understand the reasons for this it is necessary to see which manoeuvres
were actually included in the information about own manoeuvre. Tables
8.10 and 8.11 display the detail and manoeuvre information in the recall and
description phases with the object category to which each refers.
The first column of Tables 8.10 and 8.11 shows the frequency with
which each category was used correctly as previously shown in Table 8.7,
the remaining columns show the frequency with which each of the six types
of detail and eleven types of manoeuvre were given for each category
individually. Table 8.10 shows data from the recall part of the experiment,
Table 8.11 shows data from the description phase. Note that although the
column totals that could be calculated from these tables represent the total
use of detail and manoeuvre categories as shown in Table 8.9, the row totals
do not necessarily equal the figure in the first ("any mention") column. The
row totals can be either lower (since details or manoeuvres were not given
for all objects) or higher (since more than one manoeuvre, detail, or both
could be given for each object).
For the own manoeuvre row in Tables 8.10 and 8.11 it can be seen that
the detail given with this category is most often simply whether the driver
had to wait at the junction (the "nostop"f'unobstructed" manoeuvre category
was used when the subject said they were able to drive through a junction
without waiting). Since this category was specifically prompted for in both
the recall and description phase it is not surprising that it was included so
often in both cases.
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OwnM	 112 ......
General 24 1 .	 .	 . 1
Large	 4	 3 . 1
Car	 19 6 1 3 . 1
Mbike	 1
Bike	 3	 .	 .	 .	 .1.
Nothing 5
General 55 .	 .	 .	 . 7
Large	 21 7 . 3 1
Car	 76 23 8 10 1 20
Mbike	 1
Bike	 24 . . 4 5 1 3
Nothing 36
General 33
Large	 1 1
Car	 14 5 5 1 . 2
Mbike	 .
Bike	 2
Nothing 3
General .
Large	 1
Car	 1
Mbike	 .
Bike	 .
Nothinq .
General 5
Large	 .
Car	 4	 2
Peds	 17 . . 4 103 3
Bike	 4	 . . 2 2
Red	 35
Green	 24
Change 26
Visib	 5
Busy	 1
Empty	 2
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Table 8.10: Correct recall; total number of times each category was recalled and
the number of times each correct detail was given with that category.
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2	 Details	
Manoeuvre
	
C)	 0.
a	 C) . C)	 .0	 a.,	 ti	 C)	 .—I	 1)	 .-4	 0
>,	 0	 0)	 C)	 0	 .0	 1.	 1)	 LI	 j	 13	 -	 C)	 Ci	 LI	 .-i	 LI
I	 c	 —4	 .I,	 .0	 C	 0	 I)	 0	 l'-1	 0	 C)	 13	 0	 3)	 •1	 13	 U)
<	 0	 '3	 1-'	 C)	 3	 ,1	 IC	 .-4	 3)	 •.-I	 .0	 11	 I)	 >	 '3	 LI	 0
	
0 Z 0Q Z C)	 Li. 1/) I-) tt 4 0	 0 Z U) Z
Own K	 112 ......1	 .	 .	 1	 1 8 2 20 68 2 13
General 42 5	 .	 1	 .	 1	 .	 .	 .	 .	 5	 .	 .	 .	 2	 4
Large	 28 183	 9	 .	 2	 .	 .	 .	 1	 1	 .	 .	 .	 .	 5
Car	 57 28 9 5 . 15 .	 1	 .	 2 6 1 . 1	 .	 13
M.bike	 3
Bike	 13	 .	 .	 2	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 1	 2	 1	 .	 .	 .	 2
Nothing 5
General 48 2 1	 .	 . 13 .	 .	 .	 3 1 6	 .	 .	 3 8
Large	 5221.22.1.	 .	 .3112223.
Car	 187 99 44 45 1 25 .	 1 1 10 21 10 1 . 9 14 . 2
Mbike	 10 .	 . 2 . 2 .	 .	 3 2
Bike	 591.10955	 .	 .127.. 33.
Nothing 39
General 80 1 . . . 6	 10 1	 24
Large	 56 31 1 21 . 2	 .	 1 . 1 .	 . 1 7
Car	 86 54 24 17 . 9	 . 7	 .	 . 1 13
Mbike	 5.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 1	 .
Bike	 31	 .	 .	 6	 2	 5	 .	 ........4
Nothing 3
General .
Large	 .
Car	 .
Mbike	 .
Bike	 .
Nothing .
General 5
Large	 5 3 . 5
Car	 11 2 . 2 1
Peds	 84 . . 19 25 16 12
Bike	 15 . . 2 4 2 1
Red	 52
Green	 32
Change 44
Visib	 5
Busy	 .
Empty	 5
Table 8.11: Correct description; total number of times each category was
described and the number of times each correct detail was given with
that category.
•1
RECALL OF SIX JUNCTIONS 261
In other cases for both general categories and details the amount
described was consistently higher than the amount recalled though relatively
similar in distribution across categories. The most frequently occurring
detail in both conditions is the colour of a car travelling in the driver's own
direction (typically this would mean the car in front).
Risk and Information Recalled:
Although Tables 8.10 and 8.11 provide good summaries of the types of
information given in both the recall and description conditions, they do not
directly provide any evidence about the effects of subjective risk on recalls.
To obtain such evidence it is first necessary to select from the 192 situations
which made up these tables those situations in which risk was actually
experienced. It will then be possible to see whether the distribution of
information in these tables differs systematically from the distribution in
tables calculated from situations in which no risk was experienced.
Ideally it would be possible to divide the situations encountered by each
subject into risky and non-risky ones to simplify the analysis. However, this
relies on the highly questionable assumption that all subjects experienced
some situations in which they genuinely felt high levels of subjective risk.
Since only six junctions were used for each subject and traffic conditions
differed considerably between subjects it seems more likely that some
subjects encountered no particularly risky situations while others may have
encountered several. This means that the clearest comparison which can be
made between risky and non-risky situations will be from among the 192
situations as a whole independent of the subject driving at the time. To make
the contrast between high and low risk situations as clear as possible the 39
situations which received a risk rating of 1 were selected as low risk
situations. To obtain a comparable number of relatively risky situations
those 34 situations which received ratings of 5 6 or 7 were selected as high
risk situations.
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OwnM	 21 .	 .	 .
General 7	 .	 .	 .
Large	 .	 .	 .	 .
Car	 1	 .	 . 1
Mbike	 1	 .	 .	 .
Bike.	 .	 .	 .
Nothing 2	 . .	 .
General 10 .	 .	 .
Large3	 .	 .	 .
Car	 22 5 5 2 . 7
Mbike	 1	 .	 .	 .
Bike	 4	 .	 .	 .
Nothing 7	 .	 .	 .
General 6
	 .	 .	 .
Large.	 .	 .	 .
Car	 3	 1 1 .
Mbike	 .	 .	 .	 .
Bike.	 .	 .	 .
Nothing 1	 .	 .	 .
General .	 .	 .	 .
Large	 .	 .	 .	 .
Car1	 .	 .	 .
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Large.	 .	 .	 .
Car	 1	 1	 .	 .
Peds	 4	 .	 .	 .	 2
Bike	 1	 .	 .	 .
Red10	 .	 .	 .
Green	 7	 .	 .	 .
Change	 6	 .	 .	 .
Visib	 .	 .	 .	 .
Busy.	 .	 .	 .
Empty	 .	 .	 .	 .
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Table 8.12: 39 least risky situations - total number of times each category was
recalled correctly and the number of times each correct detail was
given with that category.
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Table 8.13: 39 least risky situations - total number of times each category was
described correctly and the number of times each correct detail was
given with that category.
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	 .	 .	 •
Large	 1	 1 .	 .
Car	 9	 5 . 1
Mbike.	 •	 .	 .
Bike	 1	 .	 .	 .
Nothing 1	 .	 .	 .
General 12 .	 .	 .	 . 2
Large	 6	 3 . 1
Car	 15 5 . 4 1 3
Mbike	 .	 .	 .	 .
Bike	 3	 .	 . 1
Nothing 4	 .	 .	 •
General 6	 .	 .	 .
Large.	 .	 .	 .
Car	 4	 2 1 .
Mbike.	 •	 .	 .
Bike	 1	 .	 .	 •
Nothing 1	 .	 .	 .
General .	 .	 .	 .
Large•	 .	 .	 .
Car.	 .	 .	 .
Mbike.	 .	 •	 .
Bike	 .	 .	 •	 .
Nothing .	 .	 .	 •
General .	 •	 .	 .
Large.	 •	 •	 .
Car	 1	 1	 .	 .
Peds	 4	 .	 •	 2 4	 . 2
Bike	 3	 .	 . 2 2
Red	 4	 .	 .	 .
Green	 4	 .	 •	 .
Change	 4	 .	 •	 .
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Table 8.14: 34 most risky situations - total number of times each category was
recalled correctly and the number of times each correct detail was
given with that category.
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OwnM	 27 .	 .	 .
General 5
	 .	 .	 .
Large	 3	 2 .	 .
Car	 14 9 2 1 . 2
Mbike	 1	 .	 .	 .
Bike	 4	 .	 .	 1
Nothing .	 .	 .	 .
General 8
	 1 1 .	 . 3
Large	 13 7 . 6
Car	 33 22 10 8 1 1
Mbike.	 .	 .	 .
Bike	 11 1 . 3 1 1
Nothing 6
	 .	 .	 .
General 14	 .	 .	 .	 . 2
Large	 1	 1 . 1
Car	 19 13 5 3 . 3
Mbike	 1	 .	 .	 .
Bike	 6	 .	 .	 .	 .	 2
Nothing .	 .	 .	 .
General	 .	 .	 .	 .
Large	 .	 .	 .	 .
Car.	 .	 .	 .
Mbike.	 .	 .	 .
Bike.	 .	 .	 .
Nothing .	 .	 .	 .
General .	 .	 .	 .
Large.	 .	 .	 .
Car	 3	 1	 .	 .
Peds	 12 .	 .	 2 4	 . 3
Bike	 5	 .	 . 2 2 1
Red9
	 .	 .	 .
Green	 7	 .	 .	 .
Change	 10 .	 .	 .
Visib	 1	 .	 .	 .
Busy.	 .	 .	 .
Empty.	 .	 .	 .
Manoeuvre
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Table 8.15: 34 most risky situations - total number of times each category was
described correctly and the number of times each correct detail was
given with that category.
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For all situations together there was a mean of 2.91 categories used
correctly per situation in the memory condition and 6.11 categories in the
description condition. For the riskiest situations alone the mean was 3.35
categories in the memory condition and 6.26 in the descriptions condition.
For the least risky situations the mean was 2.87 in the memory condition and
6.74 in the descriptions condition. Generally then it appears that the risky
situations are not clearly distinguished from the least risky situations either in
the number of categories used in descriptions of the situations or the number
of categories that are used in recall.
For all situations together there was a mean of 0.272 details and 0.356
manoeuvres given to each category in the memory condition and 0.579
details and 0.306 manoeuvres per category in the description condition. For
the riskiest situations alone the mean was 0.404 details and 0.35 1
manoeuvres in the memory condition and 0.6 10 details and 0.343
manoeuvres in the descriptions condition. For the least risky situations the
average was 0.250 details and 0.3 57 manoeuvres in the memory condition
and 0.677 details and 0.274 manoeuvres in the descriptions condition. The
number of manoeuvres given per category appears to be largely unaffected
by the division of situations according to risk rating, however, there do
appear to be interesting differences in the amount of detail given in the
different situations. Recalls of risky situations appear to be characterised by
containing substantially more detail with each category than recalls of non-
risky situations. Note that this effect is present despite the fact that risky
situations actually have fewer details given per category given in the
description condition.
Although the number of categories used in recall appeared to be similar
for high and low risk situations, it is possible that there are systematic
differences in the use of categories between high and low risk situations. It
was previously found that over all recalls there was no general tendency for
recalls to appear more like the coded data from the potential risks condition
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than the description condition of Study 5. However, it seems more likely
that this effect would be present for the risky situations alone. To test this,
correlations with Study 5 were calculated across the 19 shared categories
separately for high and low risk situations. For the low risk situations there
was a significant correlation of recalls with the description condition from
Study 5, r(17)=O.91, p<O.O1, and with the potential risks condition,
r(17)=O.50, p<O.05. For the high risk situations there was a significant
correlation of recalls with the description condition from Study 5,
r(17)=O.76, p<O.Ol, but no significant correlation with the potential risks
condition, r(17)=O.34.
The differences in correlations between the two sets of situations are not
significant for either the descriptions condition, z=l .41, or the potential risks
condition, z=O.52. Moreover, the difference in the potential risks condition
is actually slightly in the opposite direction to that which might have been
predicted. Clearly there is no tendency for the basic categories used in
recalls of high risk situations to appear more like the potential risks from
Study 5 than recalls of low risk situations.
To see whether the amount of detail in each of these categories follows
the same pattern it is necessary to select the categories of information from
Study 5 which discriminate best between the description and potential risks
conditions. In Table 7.5 from that study the categories which were given in
the potential risks condition more often than would have been expected from
the descriptions condition (chi-squared greater than 6.635, p<O.Ol) were
marked with a plus sign and those given significantly less often than
expected were marked with a minus sign. Tables 8.5 and 8.6 in this chapter
show the coding categories in the current study which correspond to both
these types from Study 5. Note that in addition to the basic coding categories
in Table 8.5 it is also possible to classify many of the manoeuvre categories
in Table 8.6 in this way, for these categories the other s manoeuvre category
can refer to any vehicle at all other than the driver's (e.g. any row from Table
8.10 except the first one). The division of data this way provides a method
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of classifying at least some of the data given in the present study into risk-
related versus risk-unrelated information. It has an advantage over the
simple correlations calculated above that it allows information about
manoeuvres performed by the driver and other vehicles to be included as
well as the basic categories. Table 8.16 shows the recalls and descriptions of
the high and low risk situations classified this way. The columns marked "-"
show the amount of risk-unrelated information given and those marked "+"
show the amount of risk-related information. These totals are calculated
from the data in Tables 8.12-8.15.
Categories and Manoeuvres:
Recalls
	 Descriptions
+
	
+
LOW RISK
	
40	 21
	
86	 90
HIGH RISK
	
33	 26
	
66	 72
Details:
LOW RISK
HIGH RISK
Recalls
+
20	 6
15	 19
Descriptions
+
67	 56
47	 50
Table 8.16: Recalls and descriptions of high and low risk situations pIit into risk-
related information (marked +) and risk-unrelated information
(marked -). Results are gven separately for basic
categories/manoeuvres and subsequent details about the categories.
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The total amount of information calculated this way shows the same
effects that were reported earlier - relatively little difference between high
and low risk situations in recalls or descriptions on the total number of basic
categories used. However, there are more details given in recalls of high risk
situations than would be expected, especially since descriptions show more
details for low risk situations. Now it is possible to see that this increase in
recall of detail for high risk situations is confined to details about risk-related
information. To make this clearer Figures 8.116 and 8.17 show the ratio of
risk-related to risk-unrelated information given in the various conditions.
Using basic categories and manoeuvres together there is a slight
tendency for both recalls and descriptions to show a greater proportion of
risk-related information in the high risk situations (see Table 8.16).
However, the dramatic difference is in the amount of detail given in these
different categories. Again there is a slight tendency for more risk-related
information to be described in high risk situations, but there is a much
greater effect in recalls. While recalls of low risk situations contain over
three times more risk-unrelated information than risk-related information,
recalls of high-risk situations actually contain more details about risk-related
categories than risk-unrelated ones by a factor of 1.27 to 1.
The major differences between recalls of high risk situations as opposed
to low risk ones thus appear to be related to the details that are included.
Generally more detail is recalled from high risk than low risk situations
(even when the amount described is controlled for). Moreover, the types of
detail that are recalled in high risk situations are generally from categories
that were related to potential risks in Study 5. In contrast details in recalls of
low risk situations are much more likely to come from categories that appear
to be unrelated to risk. It seems likely that these differences in the amount
and type of detail available are responsible for the higher vividness ratings
which were associated with recalls of high risk situations.
Description
Recall
Description
Recall
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1.4
1.2
Ratio of
	
1.0
Risk-Related to
Risk-Unrelated	 0.8
Information
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
LOW RISK	 HIGH RISK
Situation Type
Figure 8.16: Basic categories and information about manoeuvres: The ratio of
risk-related to risk-unrelated information given at high and low risk
junctions, shown separatety for the descriptions and the recalls.
1.4
1.2
1.0
Ratio of	 0.8
Risk-Related to
Rsk-Unrelated	 0.6
Information
0.4
0.2
0.0
LOW RISK	 HIGH RISK
Situation Type
Figure 8.17: Details only: The ratio of risk-related to risk-unrelated information
given at high and low risk junctions, shown separately for the
descriptions and the recalls.
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General Discussion:
Research in the field of eyewitness testimony has suggested that
emotional arousal may be associated with a subsequent enhancement of
memory for central details of a situation and impairment of memory for
peripheral details. This study was designed to directly test the hypothesis
that feelings of risk when driving are similarly associated with subsequent
memory for central rather than peripheral information from the driving
situation, a hypothesis which might explain the otherwise puzzling
recognition results of Studies 2, 3 and 4.
In attempting to see whether there was evidence for attention focusing
with high levels of risk two different definitions of central versus peripheral
information were used. One came from Heuer and Reisberg's (1990) study
in which they defined information at the basic level as central and
information below this level as peripheral. This was operationalised as
simply defining details about objects as peripheral. A second definition
came from attempting to define information as central to the task of driving
in a risky situation. This was operationalised by using the data from Study 5
to categorized different types of information as risk-related versus risk-
unrelated.
The study did appear to provide for sufficient variation in subjective risk
to be interesting. However, there was no evidence that risk ratings were
related to the amount of information recalled. It did appear that subjects
regarded the memories they had reported as more vivid in the case of risky
situations. This variation in the ratings of vividness without related
variation in the amount of information correctly recalled suggests that
memories were not simply better for risky situations but different in some
other way. One simple possibility would be that subjects regarded the
memory of risk as vivid in itself and that this was the only reason for the
relationship. A more interesting possibility would be that the distribution of
information in risky memories was systematically different from that in less
risky memories and it was this changed distribution which made risky
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memories appear more vivid. The data was thus coded to see whether there
were systematic differences, particularly with respect to the definitions of
central versus peripheral information.
The first way of defining central versus peripheral information - basic
level versus details about objects, produced results which appear to be
contrary to the predictions of attention focusing. More detail was actually
given in risky situations than non-risky ones with almost no difference in the
amounts of basic level information. The second definitions - risk-related
versus risk-unrelated, also failed to produce clear differences between risky
and less risky situations, however, the combination of the two methods
proved rather more informative. It appeared that memories of risky
situations were best characterised by the fact that in these cases subjects gave
a large amount of detail about risk-related objects. Although this pattern of
results was not one that was predicted a priori, it is one which can be clearly
seen to be in accordance with some interpretations of attention focusing,
particularly the original descriptions of 'weapon focus'. Moreover, this type
of attention focusing would appear to provide an explanation for the results
from the recognition studies. The question that remains is how enhanced
memory for risk-related details should be interpreted with respect to the
existing literature on attention focusing.
Recent Research on Central and Peripheral Information
One of the major difficulties encountered in the above study was
deciding on the basis of the literature what constituted appropriate definitions
of central and peripheral information and one of the definitions used was
taken from Heuer and Reisberg (1990). A recently published study by
Burke, Heuer and Reisberg (1992) has extended the earlier Heuer and
Reisberg study to further explore this distinction. Heuer and Reisberg had
previously used the distinction of basic level versus detail information in
analysing their results and had found that emotion appeared to enhance
memory for both types of information. In the more recent study, however,
Burke et al. have further divided this coding system into four types of
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information. They split the previous basic level category into information
concerned with the gist of the story and basic level visual information and
they split the detail category into central and background details. In two new
studies similar to the earlier Heuer and Reisberg study they found weak
enhancements in memory in the arousal condition for both the basic level
categories (gist and basic level visual information). More strikingly, having
subdivided the detail category they now found that arousal was associated
with substantial enhancements in memory for central detail information and
substantial impairments in memory for background detail information. This
reinterpretation of the original Heuer and Reisberg findings places them in
agreement with the types of results reported by Christianson and co-workers
who have generally contrasted central detail (e.g. the colour of a victims
coat) with background detail (e.g. the colour of a passing car) in their studies.
The largest effect of arousal in the Burke et al. studies was the enhancement
of memory for central detail information. Taking risk-related as a definition
of central, these results of course also accord very closely with the findings
of the present study.
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Chapter 9
Summary and Discussion
The aim of this thesis was to explore drivers' memories for everyday
driving situations and to see whether any relationship exists between feelings
of risk while driving and subsequent memory. Memory per se is not a topic
which has generally concerned researchers interested in the psychology of
driving, however, it has been explored indirectly, for example in research on
drivers' attention to road signs (e.g. Summala & Hietamäki 1984), general
errors (Reason et a!. 1988), and memory for parking locations (Baddeley
1986; da Costa Pinto & Baddeley 1991) or traffic accidents (Diges 1988).
Feelings of risk, on the other hand, have frequently been given important
roles in theories of road-user behaviour (e.g. Näätänen & Summala 1974,
1976; Wilde 1982, 1988, 1989).
The principal reason for suspecting that subjective risk is important in
understanding memory for driving situations is that numerous studies in
other areas have found relationships between emotional arousal and memory.
Subjective risk is very similar to emotional arousal as defined in such studies
and appears to be experienced regularly in the course of everyday driving
(e.g. Taylor 1964; Rutley & Mace 1972; Preston 1969; Wilde 1982, 1988,
1989). It thus seemed likely that important relationships between risk and
memory would be observed in the driving domain similar to the relationships
described in studies considering emotional arousal and memory.
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Unfortunately studies from different areas have not all described the
same relationships between arousal and memory. Instead some authors
suggest that emotional arousal generally enhances memory (e.g. Brown &
Kulik 1977; Heuer & Reisberg 1991; Leippe et al. 1978; Rubin & Kozin
1984), while others suggest that it causes an impairment (e.g. Johnson &
Scott 1978; Loftus & Bums 1982; Peters 1988). Moreover, it has been
suggested that any relationship may depend on other factors such as
personality (Howarth & H. J. Eysenck 1968), retention interval (Kleinsmith
& Kaplan 1963, 1964; Parkin et al. 1982; Revelle & D. A. Loftus 1990) and
the valence (Freud 1915/1957; Wagenaar 1986, 1992) or intensity
(Deffenbacher 1983, 1991) of the arousal. Another suggestion which has
recently been made is that the results may depend crucially on exactly what
information is required from memory, a distinction being made between
memory for central versus peripheral information (e.g. Christianson 1992, in
press; Christianson & Loftus 1987, 1991).
A Summary of the Studies
Study 1: Selective Recall of Risky Situations
The first study in this thesis was designed to measure feelings of risk
while subjects were driving and subsequently to explore their memories for
some of the situations they had encountered. The study considered three
different aspects of risk in driving - objective, estimated and subjective risk.
Objective risk clearly differs from situation to situation in the course of
normal driving and previous research has suggested that estimates of risk are
likely to reflect this (e.g. Brehmer 1987). The first question of interest in
Study 1 was whether subjective risk, the feeling actually experienced by the
driver, also fluctuates similarly in the course of everyday driving.
The results showed that subjective risk did fluctuate considerably in the
course of normal driving. Estimated and subjective risk were substantially
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correlated with one another, r(1 140)=O.512, p<0.üi. However, they showed
only modest correlations with either of two measures of objective risk.
Despite the correlation between the measures it appeared that subjects used
the scales of estimated and subjective risk very differently. Ratings of
estimated risk were approximately evenly distributed across the scale
whereas ratings of subjective risk were generally low but with subjects
giving occasional higher ratings (see Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3).
Since little was known about memory in this context a relatively open
ended recall task was used. Overall performance was highly variable with
many subjects able to recall very little detail about any of the situations
encountered. However, there was no clear evidence for the complete failures
of memory characterised by 'time-gap experiences' (Reason & Mycielska
1982) as discussed in Chapter 1. Because of the general lack of detail in
recalls, further analyses concentrated on which situations were recalled at all
rather than the amount of detail given about particular situations. There was
a strong tendency for subjects to recall situations in which they had given
high ratings of either estimated or subjective risk. This could be partly
explained by the fact that such situations tended to occur at junctions where
subjects had needed to wait and seen a large number of vehicles. However,
when further analyses were performed it became clear that subjective risk
was associated with an additional increase in the probability of recalling a
junction quite separate from that related to the amount of time spent at the
junction, the number of vehicles seen there, and the estimated risk.
It was thus clear that subjective risk was associated with an increased
probability of a subject recalling any particular junction, although there was
some question about whether this was true for the very highest risk ratings.
This seems to be consistent with evidence, particularly from studies of
relatively long term autobiographical memories, suggesting that emotionally
arousing events can form some of people's most vivid memories. A problem
with interpreting this as unequivocal evidence for feelings of risk generally
causing a memory enhancement in a driving context is that giving verbal
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ratings of risk while driving may have had confounding effects. It may have
affected the way situations were encoded and could have caused drivers to
particularly concentrate on recalling risky situations. The easiest way to
avoid these problems was to explore the effect in a laboratory setting.
Studies 2, 3 and 4: Two Relationships between Risk and Recognition
Having demonstrated fluctuating levels of subjective risk in actual
driving, a series of three recognition studies now explored the relationship
between risk and memory under simulated conditions in the laboratory.
Moving the driving task into the laboratory could leave it subject to many of
the criticisms levelled at other laboratory studies of emotional arousal and
memory. However, in this case it was possible to directly compare
performance in the laboratory with that on the road by using the same rating
tasks and films recorded during the on-road study. This comparison
demonstrated a good agreement between ratings given on the road and in the
laboratory, at least in terms of subjective risk. The memory results, however,
appeared to be very different from those obtained in the previous study.
There was no evidence from Study 2 that high ratings of subjective risk
were generally associated with enhanced memory performance as assessed
by the recognition sensitivity measure P(A), nor did they appear to be related
to the response bias measure B. A number of possible reasons for this
disparity between Studies 1 and 2 were suggested. One possibility was that
this difference depended crucially on the type of memory test used. One
aspect of this might have been that free recall was particularly susceptible to
response bias in the form of subjects specifically attempting to recall risky
situations. Another more disturbing possibility was that despite the
agreement in risk ratings the second study had failed to actually induce any
feelings of subjective risk in subjects.
However, the suggestion that the risk manipulation was not successful
was weakened by the discovery that there were in fact two separate
relationships between risk and recognition operating on different types of
stimuli. Films of the more dangerous junctions produced a strong positive
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correlation between the recognition sensitivity on a particular film and the
mean subjective risk rating it had received. Just the opposite occurred for the
films of less dangerous junctions - here high risk ratings appeared to be
associated with poor recognition sensitivity. The absence of any overall
relationship between risk and recognition sensitivity apparently resulted from
a combination of these two effects.
This pattern of recognition results was replicated in Study 3, a version of
Study 2 in which no risk ratings were given in order to remove any possible
biases in initial attention to or rehearsal of risky situations. It was also
obtained in Study 4, another version of Study 2 but this time using new
stimuli. However, in Study 4 the evidence for an actual reversal in the
relationship between risk and recognition sensitivity for less risky junctions
was less convincing than in Studies 2 and 3.
Studies 3 and 4 also allowed the roles of some additional variables to be
assessed. Study 3 considered previous familiarity with a junction and ratings
of the normality of a situation. The familiarity ratings appeared to be
unrelated to memory performance. This was an unexpected result but one
which was found in all the studies which assessed previous knowledge of
junctions. Normality ratings were chosen as a measure of how well a film
might accord with a schema the subject already held for a situation. There
was some question as to whether the rating adequately measured this concept
but there was certainly no evidence that normality ratings were related to
recognition sensitivity. Interestingly, however, normality ratings did seem to
be related to response criterion bias in the way predicted by schema theory -
schema consistent items appeared more likely to receive an 'old' response
(Locksley et al. 1984).
Study 4 additionally considered ratings by subjects of the number of
fixed and moving objects in a film. The ratings for moving objects were
related to risk in a similar way to previous measures such as the number of
vehicles visible in a film, but were otherwise uninteresting. Ratings for the
number of fixed objects were unrelated to recognition sensitivity but did
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appear to be strongly related to response criterion bias, high ratings being
associated with 'new' responses. This result was particularly striking for
generally low risk films (also those with low ratings for the amount of
moving objects). This suggested that with these films fixed objects were
often noticed for the first time in the recognition task. This is what would be
expected if subjects had been actually driving. Only in a subsequent
recognition test would they have looked at information in the film which was
not used in the course of normal driving.
Although the consistent relationships between risk and recognition
sensitivity suggested that the risk manipulation had been successful, the
relationships were initially puzzling since it was not clear how the two
different patterns could be explained within a single theory of emotional
arousal and memory. A potential explanation was given in terms of attention
focusing when risk was experienced (c.f. Easterbrook 1959). Attention
focusing makes no direct predictions about overall levels of memory
performance, instead it claims that the types of information remembered will
be systematically altered when emotional arousal is experienced. The effect
of attention focusing on overall memory scores will thus depend on the
precise test used. If the test stresses memory for central information it is
likely that emotional arousal will appear to enhance memory. If instead the
test stresses peripheral information emotional arousal may appear to be
associated with an overall impairment in memory.
The difficulty with interpreting data in terms of attention focusing is that
the definition of central and peripheral information has not been made
particularly clearly in the literature. Using different definitions of central
versus peripheral appears to affect the general results that are obtained
(contrast Christianson & Loftus 1987 with Heuer & Reisberg 1990). Chapter
2 had argued that subjective risk might cause memory to be enhanced for
information relevant to the driving task. However, almost all the information
recalled about driving situations in Study 1 appeared to be in some way
related to the driving task. It was suggested that a more limited definition of
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central information in this context would be information which was directly
connected with risks and potential risks in the driving situation. When
central information was defined in this way it was possible to understand the
pattern of recognition results obtained. At dangerous junctions accurate
memory for the large amount of information related to risks would enhance
overall performance. At safer junctions accurate memory for the few risks
present might not be informative enough to improve recognition sensitivity,
instead it could cause false alarms because the information proved to be
shared with other stimuli. This explanation was supported by an analysis of
the pattern of hits and false alarms at different types of junction.
Studies 5 and 6: Central versus Peripheral Information
Although the results of Studies 2, 3 and 4 were interpreted in terms of
emotional arousal causing attention focusing towards risk-related
information, they did not constitute a direct test of this hypothesis. Studies 5
and 6 attempted this by obtaining descriptions of risk-related information and
then seeing whether feelings of risk did cause systematic biases towards the
recall of this type of information.
Study 5 defined risk-related information by having subjects give detailed
descriptions of the risks and potential risks in films used as stimuli in Studies
2 and 3. It was confirmed that the dangerous junctions did appear to contain
substantially more information related to risks and potential risks than the
less dangerous ones. Moreover, a system was developed for coding
descriptions of driving situations, and the descriptions of potential risks were
used to assess which categories in this coding system referred most often to
risk-related information and which to risk-unrelated information. This made
it possible to code descriptions of similar situations as either central or
peripheral in terms of risk.
Study 6, like Study 1, had subjects actually driving on real roads. Unlike
Study 1 only a small number of junctions was used. All six of these were
relatively major intersections. Initially two different aspects of memory were
analysed, the total amount of information correctly recalled from a situation,
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and a subjective rating of the vividness of the memory. While these two
measures were strongly correlated (r(128)=0.504, pczO.01) it was clear that
there were also important differences between the two. Unlike the total
amount recalled, vividness ratings were not significantly correlated with
ratings of the business of a junction. Although there were no obvious
relationships in Study 6 between risk ratings and the total amount of
information recalled, there was evidence that risky situations were rated as
being remembered most vividly, particularly when they included a risky
manoeuvre (turning right) at a generally dangerous junction. It was
suggested that this could be because attention focusing was causing the
memories for risky situations to form a more cohesive whole than memories
which might contain more peripheral information. However, to test the
attention focusing hypothesis directly, it was necessary to categorize the
information recalled as central versus peripheral.
Two different definitions of central versus peripheral information were
used in Study 6. The first definition was concerned with risk; the data from
Study 5 was used to categorize recalls and descriptions as either risk-related
(central) or risk-unrelated (peripheral). The other definition was taken from
Heuer and Reisberg (1990) who suggested that central information is
concerned with the level at which people normally interact with an object
and defined this in terms of Rosch's concept of basic level information. They
thus defined all further details about objects as peripheral information. In
Study 6 this distinction was operationalized by coding information about the
existence and position of vehicles separately from subsequent details such as
their colour or make, and similarly the existence of pedestrians separately
from details such sex or clothing.
The possible effects of attention focusing were assessed by comparing
descriptions of a video-tape of a situation with recall of actually driving in
the situation. Surprisingly, there was no strong evidence that recalls of
events which were previously rated as risky were systematically biased
towards central information when defined using either of the above methods.
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Although there was a small increase in risk-related recall (compared to
description) for risky situations, there was actually a slight tendency for risk
to be associated with less basic level information and for more detail to be
given. However, the comparison that proved particularly interesting resulted
from a combination of the two definitions. It appeared that the most
important effect of risk on memory was on the amount of detail recalled
about risk-related information. Essentially, when no risk had been
experienced very little detail could be recalled about risk-related objects.
When risk had been experienced far more detail could be subsequently
recalled about such objects. The most important effect of risk thus appeared
to be to enhance memory for risk-related details.
Although this was not an effect which was a prediction of either single
definition of central information used in the study, it is consistent with what
appears to be an emerging consensus in the literature. Christianson and co-
workers (e.g. Christianson & Loftus 1987, 1991; Christianson et al. 1991)
have often classed both the emotion-inducing object and detail associated
with it as central information. Although the distinction between basic level
and detail information as used by Heuer and Reisberg (1990) appeared to be
interesting it must be remembered that they found no evidence for attention
focusing towards basic level information from their results. In fact in a
recently published follow-up study Burke, I-Ieuer, and Reisberg (1992) found
that in the emotional condition memory is actually enhanced for lower level
(detail) information "when that detail information was spatially and
temporally linked to the arousal event" (p. 287).
It thus seems that Study 6 does provide evidence for attention focusing
occurring in risky driving situations and having similar effects on memory to
those observed in laboratory research on eyewitness testimony. This of
course strengthened the attention focusing interpretation of the patterns of
results observed in the three recognition studies.
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Brief Summary of Findings
This thesis set out to investigate the experience of subjective risk in
normal driving, memory for everyday driving situations, and the relationship
between the two. Subjects seemed to have no difficulty in giving ratings of
subjective risk both when actually driving and when in the laboratory
simulator watching films of driving situations. There also appeared to be
good agreement between the ratings given in the two different situations.
Memory for driving situations throughout appeared generally to be relatively
poor, whether tested by free recall, recognition, or cued recall.
Studies 2 to 6 all seemed to be consistent with the idea that the major
effect of subjective risk on memory was to cause memory to be enhanced for
detailed information related to risks and potential risks in the driving
situation. None of these studies, however, showed evidence that memory
performance overall was either enhanced or impaired by the experience of
subjective risk. Study 1 did suggest that there might be a tendency to
preferentially recall risky situations in a free recall task. This might be
interpreted as enhanced memory for central details in risky situations causing
such situations to form more coherent memories which were thus easier to
recall. This would be consistent with the finding from Study 6 that although
no more correct information was given about risky situations than less risky
ones, memories of risky situations were still rated as more vivid than
memones of less risky ones.
Limitations and Extensions
Individual and Group Differences
Unlike much research in driving, this thesis has not concentrated on
individual or group differences. There is no doubt that age, sex and
experience combined have a dramatic impact on accident likelihood (e.g.
Evans 1991; Maycock 1991). Moreover, it appears that changes in expertise
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have important effects on risk perception (e.g. Brown & Groeger 1988;
Groeger & Chapman 1992, in preparation a; Kruysse 1990; Kruysse &
Wijlhuizen 1992; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein 1986). This does suggest
that such variables are important to consider in assessing relationships
between risk and memory. Where possible, individual differences were
recorded (e.g. age, sex, annual mileage, years since passing driving test,
previous knowledge of route, chosen driving speed, self-reported accidents
and near misses). However, effects of these variables were not the primary
concern of the thesis and the relatively small number of subjects in individual
studies renders it unlikely that interesting effects could have been
convincingly demonstrated (see for example the analysis of individual
differences in Study 1 given in Appendix 1, Table A1.2).
Levels of Arousal
The studies in this thesis did not record physiological measures of
arousal (e.g. GSR or heart rate). Although there is evidence from other
research in driving that such measures would have been likely to reflect the
risk ratings, it would clearly have been interesting to have had such
measures, both on the road and in the laboratory. Such information might
have allowed the relationship between risk ratings and arousal to be explored
in greater detail and could have allowed the degree of agreement in arousal
between the road and the simulator to be assessed. It may also have made it
easier for the types and degrees of arousal experienced by subjects in these
studies to be directly compared with that experienced in the type of studies
reported in the eyewitness testimony field.
The reason physiological measures were not recorded was of course the
known difficulty of obtaining, analysing and interpreting such measures.
Compare for example the heart rate data from Heuer and Reisberg (1990)
with those from Burke, Heuer and Reisberg (1992) and the skin conductance
and heart rate results from Christianson (1984) and Christianson and Nilsson
(1984). Although all these results appear to be consistent with some form of
emotional arousal in traumatic conditions, the consistency between
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experiments it not great enough to even allow the traumatic phase in each
experiment to be unambiguously identified from the physiological measures
alone. It is particularly striking that in the four experiments reported in
Christianson and Nilsson (1984) heart rate increased in the traumatic
condition. In the other three studies heart rate always decreased in the
traumatic condition. Analysing and interpreting such measures becomes
even more complex in an actual driving situation such as those used in
Studies 1 and 6 (see Preston 1969; Rutley & Mace 1972; Taylor 1964).
Nonetheless the levels of arousal employed in these studies are lower
than those which occur in genuinely traumatic events. One of the most
attractive extensions to the research would be to explore drivers' memories
for naturally occurring situations of higher risk, e.g. accidents and near
misses. Although some preliminary data of this type has been gathered, there
are additional problems with this type of research. The major problem is the
one which has provided difficulties for research on vivid and flashbulb
memories, the fact that it is not normally possible to have objective data with
which to compare recalls. One way to address this problem would be to
compare recall for staged situations shown in a driving simulator with recall
of actual near misses which drivers remember being involved in. However,
this raises the question of whether it would ever be possible to simulate the
higher levels of risk that can be experienced in actual driving.
Differences between Laboratory and On-Road Research
In addition to the fact that subjects in the simulator are never in
conditions of true objective risk there is the problem that they are not
actually required to drive the car. This may affect memory both because no
physical actions are required (e.g. Mohr, Engelkamp & Zimmer 1989) and
because the subject is not in any way responsible for the events. Wagenaar
(1992) makes an interesting point in this context. His data suggest that there
may be differences in the relationship between autobiographical memory and
emotion which depend on whether unpleasant events were perceived to have
been caused by the subject. Wagenaar (1986) reported a general impairment
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in his memory for unpleasant events. It appears that this in fact occurred
only for unpleasant events related to other people, while memory for
unpleasant events related to his own behaviour was enhanced (Wagenaar
1992). There is some evidence that this distinction is important in
classifying unpleasant driving situations. For example McKenna (1992) has
shown that imagining serious accidents can alter subsequent estimates of
driving skill and accident likelihood but only when the accidents which
subjects imagines were their own fault.
Every attempt was made to make the laboratory environment in the
recognition studies as similar as possible to actual driving. Risk ratings on-
road and in the laboratory were closely comparable and changes in the actual
task being performed between Studies 2 and 3 did not appear to affect the
memory results. Additionally ratings of the amount of fixed information in a
film were obtained for the stimuli used in Study 4. These ratings suggested
that stimuli in a risk judgment task are normally attended to as if the subjects
were driving and that irrelevant fixed details were only noticed when
subjects subsequently performed a memory task. Nonetheless there is clearly
a sense in which the laboratory tasks are more like being a passenger than
being the driver. A simple and potentially interesting way to tell whether this
is likely to be having important effects would be to have on-road studies
performed with both a driver and passenger as subjects (c.f. Hendrickx &
Viek 1991).
If there are important differences of this type between on-road and
laboratory tasks it would be necessary to use a simulator which required at
least some degree of interactive control from the subject. Because the
simulator used in the research so far has used video tapes of scenes it is not
possible to make it interactive in any realistic way. Work is underway on
implementing an interactive computer generated driving task which may be
able to address some of these issues. Within this context it would certainly
be possible to compare memory for events under a subject's control with
memory for those which are not.
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General Discussion
Memory for Everyday Driving Situations
In Chapter 1 the driving task was divided into three types of sub-task in
order to make predictions about memory performance. Sub-tasks were
categorized as falling at the operational, tactical or strategical levels. It was
assumed that in everyday driving performance of tasks at the operational
level would be automatic and there would be consequently no memory for
such events. Of course it is not clear that even tasks at the operational level
would have been perfectly automatized in Studies 1 and 6 since subjects
were driving a route they did not know in advance, in an unusual car, being
watched by an experimenter, and giving verbal ratings while driving.
Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 1, people may have some memory for
tasks which are performed automatically. One difficulty with testing this is
that automatic tasks are often so stereotyped that a subject could generally
correctly guess the sequence and timing of such events without actually
having to remember particular episodes. A few examples of this were found
in the recalls given by subjects in Studies 1 and 6. Subjects occasionally
described approaching a junction, changing down gears, braking and
stopping. Then when the lights had changed they might describe putting the
car into first gear, accelerating, changing up through the gears and driving
away from the junction. Actions like braking, accelerating and changing
gear may indeed have been accurately recalled from memory. Without
probing for additional detail about such events and actually recording the
true behaviour it is not possible to test this. However, it seems equally likely
that such reports were made on the assumption that if the driver could
remember encountering a red traffic light at the junction then the other
actions must necessarily have been performed. Events at the tactical level
have the advantage that they can be readily recorded and hence recall
accuracy can be easily tested.
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Although events at the operational level may be performed
automatically, this does not mean that they necessarily occur identically in all
circumstances. Clearly the timing of such events is driven by a variety of
relatively complex cues from the environment. In this sense it is quite
possible that actions apparently at the tactical or strategical levels like
"deciding" to stop at a junction could also be driven by environmental cues
(for an example see Bargh 1992). In Chapter 1 time-gap experiences
(Reason & Mycielska 1982) were interpreted as examples of this
automaticity of tasks at higher levels. Although subjects in Study 6
occasionally failed to recall any correct details at all from a junction, it is not
clear that this represents a time-gap experience. If such experiences do arise
from automatization of normal driving it seems that they would result from a
failure to encode information about events in long term memory. Memory
failures in Study 6 could just as easily have resulted from failures at the time
of retrieval or interference from other similar situations in memory. In fact
large amounts of incorrect recall were often given in Study 6, this seems
unlikely to be the result of a time-gap experience which is after all
characterized by the absence of explicit memory. Nonetheless, for the
reasons given above it seems unlikely that tasks at the operational level
would be fully automatized in Studies 1 and 6. These arguments apply
equally to tasks at other levels and suggest that this is not an appropriate
context in which to look for time-gap experiences.
One reason that events at the operational level are assumed to become
automatic is that they occur in a completely predictable sequence. There are
occasions when unexpected events can occur even at this level, for example,
the car stalling. There were in fact two occasions in Study 6 in which
subjects described the car stalling. Both of these occasions were recalled
correctly. This could be interpreted as a normally automatic task breaking
down and requiring controlled processing. A different type of explanation
might to be to say that such events are remembered simply because they are
unusual. This of course raises a question which was considered in some
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detail in Study 3. Does memory for driving situations depend on the degree
to which they accord with a pre-existing schema?
The Role of Schemata
In Chapter 1 automatization of tasks at the tactical level was discussed in
the context of drivers possessing particular concepts or schemata which are
activated on encountering a driving situation (Dubois 1991; Fleury et al.
1988; Groeger 1988, 1989; Riemersma 1988). One way of characterising the
results of Study 2 is to say that at risky junctions, risky situations are
remembered well; whereas at safe junctions, safe situations are remembered
well. This could be described as good memory for schema-consistent
information. One problem with this approach is that although recall studies
have often shown such an effect (e.g. Brewer & Treyens 1981), Study 2 in
fact used a recognition test. There is much less theoretical reason to expect
enhanced recognition sensitivity for schema consistent items (Brewer &
Nakamura 1984; Locksley et al. 1984; Pezdek et al. 1989). Indeed although
the results of Study 3 suggested that schema consistency might account for
differences in response bias, there was no evidence that it accounted for the
recognition sensitivity results.
Another reason to suspect that schema-consistency effects were not
important in any of the studies is that previous knowledge of junctions did
not appear to affect the memory results. Of course the studies were all
designed to minimize the effects of such knowledge by not testing memory
for fixed objects at the junctions. Nonetheless it was slightly surprising that
the expectations subjects would have had about variable information at well
known junctions did not effect the memory results. This suggests that if
subjects do have some form of schemata for events at particular junctions,
such schemata are of a sufficiently general nature that they can be easily
mapped onto junctions a driver has not previously seen.
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Selective Recall of Risky Situations
Study 1 was unlike the others in the thesis in that it demonstrated a clear
and general enhancement of memory for risky situations. One reason for this
may have been that unlike those in the laboratory studies risky situations on
the drive did represent rare distinctive events. This, however, does not
account for the failure of Study 6 to show any such effect. One difference
between these two studies which may have been important is the fact that the
recall task in Study 1 was substantially more difficult than that in Study 6.
As well as using free rather than cued recall, Study 1 used an average
retention interval of approximately 45 minutes, filled with a substantial drive
and a self-assessment questionnaire. Study 6 used an average retention
interval of only 20 minutes filled with driving or recalling just five other
junctions. As discussed in Chapter 2 the effects of arousal on memory may
interact with retention interval. Impairments in memory for arousing events
at short retention intervals may become enhancements with longer retention
intervals (Revelle & Loftus 1990). However, in addition to any effects of
retention interval, Study 6 may have suffered from a form of ceiling effect in
the sense that subjects were generally still able to access some memory for
all the six situations tested. If the task had been made more difficult, for
example by including a further 20 minutes of driving between the original
junctions and testing, it is possible that memory for risky events may have
again appeared relatively enhanced because of their distinctive nature. This
would of course have rendered it far more difficult to test for
central/peripheral differences in recall and may thus have obscured other
aspects of the results.
This treatment of the recall results suggests that arousal does not
necessarily cause any form of unusual processing of risky events. Instead
selective recall of risky situations as observed in Study 1 could simply result
from such events being rare and distinctive (equivalent to a von Restorff
effect). The subsequent studies, however, demonstrated that in addition to
any such distinctiveness effects, risky memories differ from others in the
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type of detail remembered. It is possible that the tendency to remember
central details of risky situations may also have made such memories more
vivid and easier to recall.
Attention Focusing in Risky Situations
Although these results appear to show that subjective risk is associated
with enhanced memory for risk-related details, there is more than one way to
account for this relationship. The simplest of these is that, in line with
Easterbrook's hypothesis, arousal causes the focusing of attention on central
information and memory for such information is thus enhanced. There does
not seem to be anything in the studies reported in this thesis to suggest that a
more complex mechanism is required to explain the effects observed.
Christianson et al. (1991), however, have argued that the central/peripheral
distinction in memory for emotionally arousing stimuli does not occur solely
because more attention is devoted to central information about emotional
stimuli. They suggest that early perceptual processing (e.g. special automatic
processing of emotional events) and late conceptual processing (post-
stimulus elaboration and rehearsal) also have important roles in the overall
effects. Because this is a potentially interesting position it is worth
considering the experiments on which their arguments are based in some
detail.
The experiments reported in Christianson et al. (1991) explored the role
of attention in memory for emotionally arousing slides such as those used in
the Christianson and Loftus (1991) studies by restricting or monitoring eye
movements. The results indicated that with a single eye fixation (150 or 180
ms) on a central detail from a slide, memory was enhanced for that detail if
the slide showed an emotionally arousing event. When eye movements were
permitted and recorded they found that emotionally arousing slides provoked
many brief fixations on the central detail and that memory was subsequently
enhanced for this central detail. Moreover, even when the actual number of
fixations was equated, memory of a central detail was better for emotionally
arousing slides than for neutral or unusual ones.
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These results indicate that enhanced memory for arousing events
depends on more than just increased attention at the time (as assessed by eye
movements). However, the evidence from these studies with respect to
peripheral information was not nearly as clear. There was certainly no
evidence in these studies for any impairment in memory for peripheral
information from emotional slides with respect to unusual or neutral slides.
Moreover there may have been no memory at all for peripheral details in the
first experiment. Since the emotional stimulus in these studies was always a
single distinctive slide from a series it is possible to interpret this type of
result as a von Restorff effect (note that although Christianson et al. include
an unusual condition to investigate this possibility, previous ratings of these
slides have shown that the emotional slide was far more attention catching
than the unusual one - Christianson & Loftus 1991).
The implication of this is that it is not necessary to propose that
traumatic slides in the Christianson et al. (1991) experiment, or risky
situations in the present studies, are processed in any particularly unusual
way. The types of effect observed may simply result from distinctiveness
effects because arousing events are unusual, combined with attentional
effects of the type which can be adequately monitored by eye movements.
The reason for attention focusing in driving would thus be no more complex
than drivers looking more often at potentially risky objects than at other
ones. This seems to make perfect sense on the assumption that the driver's
task is to avoid danger. The reason some laboratory tasks may prove more
difficult to interpret is that it is harder to decide what task a subject is
actually performing in such situations.
One of the recurrent themes in this thesis is that it is necessary to
understand memory results in terms of the task a subject is performing at the
time of encoding. This concept has been used in a number of ways, first to
understand 'time-gap experiences'. In this context it was assumed that if
tasks at both the operational and tactical levels required no controlled
processing at all then it would be possible for drivers to have no explicit
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memory at all about even recently encountered situations. Subsequently it
was argued that memory for driving situations and the definition of central
versus peripheral information should both depend crucially on the task being
performed by a subject at the time of encoding.
Implications and Applications
Implications for the Psychology of Driving
The work in this thesis is based on the finding that most drivers find it
easy and natural to give ratings of a fluctuating level of risk experienced
while driving. This finding itself is not without theoretical interest.
Summala's (1988) claim that drivers would not drive under continual
emotional stress was discussed in Chapter 1 in the context of zero-risk
theory. It is not clear whether the fluctuating levels of risk found in the
present studies would count as continual emotional stress. Nonetheless such
reports initially seem more consistent with the requirements of risk
homeostasis theory than zero-risk theory. In fact neither theory is
sufficiently well-specified at the level of subjective experience to be directly
contradicted or supported by such a finding. It would clearly be possible to
make the case that although drivers can report fluctuating levels of risk all
the time, generally these levels are so low that the driver would be unaware
of them. The ease of obtaining such ratings and their relationships with
memory still adds weight to the contention that subjective risk has to be an
important aspect of any theory of driver behaviour. The memory results of
course show that, even at relatively low levels, changes in subjective risk are
associated with changes in the way in which driving situations are
remembered. The attention focusing interpretation of these results
additionally suggests that attention in everyday driving is closely related to
subjective risk.
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Perhaps the most obvious implications of the central/peripheral
distinction come in the interpretation of drivers' reports of road accidents.
Although none of the situations encountered in the current studies
approached the levels of risk which might be experienced in such
circumstances, there was no evidence that risk had any substantial effect on
the general amount or accuracy of recall about situations. The data do,
however, suggest that memory for peripheral information about risky
situations may be impaired. A direct prediction would thus be that reports of
details directly connected with dangerous events leading up to an accident
may be highly accurate. Information which would not have seemed relevant
to the dangers in the situation is, however, unlikely to be subsequently
recalled well. This may help to account for inaccuracies in reports of traffic
accidents (e.g. Egberink et al. 1988; Humphreys 1981).
Although police reports of road accidents may provide particularly
dramatic evidence of memory distortions, the most important implications of
the memory results may be for everyday driving. Accurate memory for
dangerous situations encountered when driving should be extremely
important to the driver in learning to prevent such situations in the future.
Some of the research in other areas has suggested that emotional arousal in a
dangerous situation leads to general impairments in memory for the event
(Kassin et al. 1989). One reason that this might affect driving is that safety-
related decisions (e.g. speed, seat-belt use, choice of car) may be based on
judgments of the actual dangers faced. Research in decision making has
suggested that judgments are often made on the basis of the availability of
information in memory (Tversky & Kahneman 1973). If information about
danger is not easily available from memory then subjects may underestimate
the true threat of a situation. Indeed Groeger and Chapman (1990) have
shown that thinking about the danger involved in various driving errors can
systematically increase assessments of accident likelihood. McKenna (1992)
has demonstrated that thinking about some forms of accident can also
increase such estimates. Hendrickx and Viek (1991) have shown that some
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forms of risk information given before a drive can reduce drivers' speed
choice in blind curves. These types of study suggest that increasing the
availability of information about accidents can affect drivers' decision
making, a possibility which initially seems to represent a way of encouraging
safer driving.
The results reported in this thesis, however, do not suggest that any
overall impairments of memory for risky situations occur, at least not at
generally low levels of risk. In fact the studies in this thesis would suggest
that if anything memory for risky situations will be systematically enhanced
since they are more likely to be spontaneously recalled (Study 1) and
memories of such events are generally more vivid than others (Study 6).
Although increasing the availability of risk-related information may still
provide a method of encouraging safer driving, it is worth remembering that
there is no evidence that the frequency of dangerous situations is normally
underestimated. Although authors have generally termed the above approach
'debiasing' (c.f. Fischhoff 1982) it may in fact rely on encouraging drivers to
adopt an even more biased view of driving than normal.
The aspect of the memory results which may cause more direct problems
in the assessment of risk is the central/peripheral distinction. If only events
which were perceived as central to driving at the time of a dangerous event
are later available in memory it is likely that it will be difficult for drivers to
subsequently reinterpret the events leading up to a dangerous situation. This
means that information initially regarded as peripheral to a dangerous driving
situation may have no way of becoming attended to in the future. This may
increase the problems associated with the lack of feedback in normal driving
(e.g. Brown, Groeger & Biehl 1987; Fuller 1988).
Implications for Memory Research
Chapter 2 highlighted the problems which apparently closely related
areas (laboratory research on arousal and memory, work looking at the
effects of emotion on autobiographical memory, and studies of eyewitness
testimony) have had in reconciling apparently contradictory findings -
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compare the conclusions from Kassin et a!. (1989), Deffenbacher (1991), and
Heuer & Reisberg (1990). Some authors have argued that laboratory
research on the effects of emotional arousal on eyewitness memory is largely
irrelevant to the effects which are observed in actual crimes or accidents (e.g.
Yuille & Cutshall 1986, 1989; though see Christianson 1992).
Although it is possible to provide theoretical accounts which may
explain differences between laboratory and real life studies (e.g.
Deffenbacher 1983; Christianson 1992, in press), there still tends to be a
clear distinction between the two types of research. A fundamental problem
is that studies which achieve high levels of experimental control are almost
always obliged to avoid placing subjects in any objective danger.
Experimenters have thus concentrated on achieving high levels of arousal by
using extremely graphic stimuli and given the subjects themselves a purely
passive role. Although this may be appropriate in some cases, it has led to
researchers failing to recognize the importance of the task a subject is
performing in determining their memory for events.
One major problem for recent laboratory studies of memory for
emotionally arousing stimuli has been the definition of central versus
peripheral information. Although there now seems to be a general agreement
that central detail is "spatially and temporarily linked to the arousal event"
(Burke, Heuer & Reisberg 1992, p. 287), it is not clear that this constitutes an
adequate definition for use in real situations. It was argued in Chapter 2 that
it was more satisfactory to define the centrality of information with respect to
the information necessary for task performance in a situation. This has the
twin advantages of linking memory research more closely to that on
Easterbrook's hypothesis and of providing a framework which is more
naturally extended to real world situations.
Driving provides an everyday task which can be ethically used to explore
the effects of low levels of emotional arousal on memory. Study 6
demonstrated that it is possible to use ar a priori categorisation of the
centrality of information in terms of its relationship with potential risks in
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driving situations, the assumption being made that the most important task
for the driver was the avoidance of danger in such situations. This type of
approach is necessary to extend results from laboratory studies to more
realistic circumstances in which a person is able to interact with a constantly
changing environment.
Conclusions
Risk appears to be a quantity which is important in the subjective
experience of driving and is easily measured using simple verbal ratings.
The experience of subjective risk in driving also appears relatively easy to
simulate in a laboratory setting and variations in reported subjective risk both
in the laboratory and on the road appear to be related to subsequent memory
for events. Generally, memory for risky driving situations appears to be
characterised by enhanced recall of details related to risks in the situation and
relatively impaired recall of peripheral information. In laboratory
recognition tasks it appears that this difference causes feelings of risk to
enhance overall recognition performance for generally dangerous situations
but impair recognition performance in generally safe situations. These
results support the recent studies of eyewitness testimony which have
concluded that arousal is associated with a subsequent enhancement of
memory for detail which is centrally related to the arousing event. In
addition the research highlights the need to define the concept of centrality
with respect to the task being performed by a person at the time arousal is
experienced. Because of the relative precision with which this can be done
in the case of memory for driving events this research has advantages over
the more common methodologies used in the study of arousal and memory.
This thesis opened with a quote from Neisser (1976) urging cognitive
psychologists to study cognition as it occurs in ordinary environments. The
studies in this thesis have demonstrated some of the costs but also some of
the benefits of such an approach. The costs were related to the enormous
complexity of the driving environment in terms of the bewildering number of
potentially relevant variables and the difficulties of obtaining and
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subsequently describing laboratory stimuli which adequately represent this
environment. The major benefit of this approach, however, is the possibility
of linking laboratory and applied research in such a way that it is possible to
make realistic predictions about what will happen in real situations.
Hopefully the benefits have outweighed the costs in this case. It was
particularly pleasing to identify the effects of established laboratory
phenomena in an everyday environment and to demonstrate that general
patterns of results from one applied domain can also be relevant to a new
area.
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Appendix 1.1
Details of the Test Route from Study 1
The Department of Transportation for Cambridgeshire County Council
provided summaries of police accident reports over the previous three years
(1986-8) for the entire route. Accidents were included in this analysis if at
least one motor vehicle was involved and the reported site of the accident
was within 50 yards of the centre of the junction. The Department also
provided current (1989) traffic flow figures, these figures correspond to the
average total traffic flow recorded over a 16 hour period on weekdays
(excluding Fridays). Table Al.1 shows this data for actual accidents (total
over 3 years) and traffic flow figures (in thousand vehicles) and other details
of the junctions used. An enlarged version of figure 3.1 showing the actual
route is shown in figures Al.! to A1.4. The scale of the map in these figures
is 1:21,917.
APPENDIX 1 327
Junction
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
Actual	 Flow
Accidents /1 000
o	 26.2
7	 31.8
2	 17.3
14	 32.0
1	 21.7
2	 14.7
20	 32.4
3	 11.0
15	 20.7
3	 14.3
7	 16.5
0	 10.0
20	 23.0
4	 23.2
2	 14.9
4	 14.9
2	 19.4
2	 13.4
3	 30.3
8	 22.0
6	 23.2
4	 15.1
6	 8.00
9	 11.0
4	 10.5
9	 20.0
21	 25.1
6	 24.2
2	 19.5
8	 27.9
0	 27.3
10	 39.8
8	 21.6
9	 38.6
12	 20.9
3	 20.9
2	 24.9
8	 29.7
3	 13.2
13	 29.4
Manoeuvre and Junction
Left onto Main Road
Right at 1-Junction
Ahead past Minor Road
Ahead at Crossroads
Left at Roundabout
Ahead past Minor Road
Right at Roundabout
Ahead past Minor Road
Left at Crossroads
Ahead past Minor Road
Ahead past Minor Road
Ahead past Minor Road
Left onto Dual Carriageway
Right at 1-Junction
Ahead past Minor Road
Ahead at Crossroads
Enter Dual Carriageway
Left at Roundabout
Ahead at Roundabout
Ahead at Crossroads
Ahead at Roundabout
Right at T-Juncfon
Ahead at Crossroads
Left onto Main Road
Ahead past Minor Road
Right at 1-Junction
Right at Crossroads
Ahead/Left at Roundabout
Ahead past 1-Junction
Ahead at Crossroads
Left at Roundabout
Rght at Mini-Roundabout
Ahead past T-Juncton
Rght at Crossroads
Ahead past M nor Road
Ahead past M nor Road
Ahead at T-Juncton
R ght at T-Junct on
Ahead past M nor Road
Left at Crossroads
Traffic
Lights
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Speed
Limit/mph
30
40
40
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
60
60
30
30
30
70
70
40
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
40
Table Al .1: Details of the 40 junctions.
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Appendix 1.2
Full Correlations Between Variables from Study 1
Tables Al .3 and Al .4 give full correlations matrices for all the variables
which were considered in study 1. Correlations between subject variables
are calculated over all subjects possible. For some variables this means
using all 30 subjects who participated in the study. For variables which
require the analysis of the films of the drives (for example the chosen free
speed or the mean amount of time spent at junctions) data is available for 28
subjects only because of equipment failures. For variables which were
obtained in a subsequent study (Number of previous accidents and near
misses) data is available for only 25 subjects.
For the junction variables where data is available for all junctions and
subjects the correlations given are calculated for each subject individually
and subsequently averaged using Fisher's z transformation. Depending on
the variable these averages will be calculated from either 28 or all 30
subjects. Underneath each correlation in the table is the associated degrees
of freedom used in assessing whether it is significantly greater than zero.
The different variables are briefly described in Table Al .2 below.
CRASH
NEAR
AGE
SEX
YRSL
ANMIL
FREE
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Junction Variables:
ACCS
FLOW
AC/FL
Total number of accidents recorded at the junction over the three
years 1986 to 1988.
16 hour average annual weekday (Monday to Thursday) traffic flow at
each junction.
ACCS divided by FLOW.
Subject Variables:
The number of accidents/collisions the driver reported having had
over the previous five years (Available for 25 subjects only).
The number of near misses the driver reported having over the
previous year (Available for 25 subjects only).
Age of driver.
Sex of driver, coded as 1 for male and 0 for female.
Number of years driving licence held for.
Current annual mileage.
Average of up to four free speeds recorded on straight empty
sections of road expressed as a proportion of the speed limit in the
area (Available for 28 subjects only).
Junction by Subject Variables:
RISK	 Risk rating given.
ACEST	 Accident estimate given.
TIME
VEHS
KNOW
RECAL
SPEED
Time taken to pass through the junction defined by two fixed points
(Available for 28 subjects only).
Number of vehicles visible in the film while pas&ng through junction
defined by two fixed points (Available for 28 subjects only).
Did the subject know the junction previously, coded as 1 for yes and
0 for no.
Did the subject recall the junction in the recall phase, coded as 1 for
yes and 0 for no (Available for 28 subjects only).
The actual distance between the two fixed points for a junction
divided by T ME (Available for 28 subjects only).
Table Al .2: Brief descriptions of the variables in tables Al .3 and Al .4.
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CRASH	 1.000
NEAR
AGE
SEX
YRSL
ANNM
FREE
RISK
ACEST
TI ME
VEHS
KNOW
RECAL
SPEED
	0.359	 1.000
23
	
-.302	 0.310	 1.000
23	 23
	
-.080	 -.114	 -.257
23	 23	 28
	
-.414	 0.226	 0.884
23	 23	 28
	
0.139	 0.418	 0.064
23	 23	 28
	
0.620	 0.120	 -.315
23	 23	 26
	
0.013	 -.125	 -.338
23	 23	 28
	
-.202	 0.414	 0.288
23	 23	 28
	
-.043	 -.180	 0.174
23	 23	 26
	
0.024	 -.126	 -.079
23	 23	 26
	
0.031	 0.150	 -.002
23	 23	 28
	
-.367	 -.330	 -.117
23	 23	 26
	
0.180	 0.057	 -.456
23	 23	 26
CRASH NEAR AGE
1.000
-.186
28
0.290
28
0.070
26
0.279
28
0.259
28
0.124
26
0.283
26
0.262
28
-.211
26
0.045
26
SEX
1.000
	
0.126	 1.000
28
	
-.294	 0.087	 1.000
26	 26
	
-.319	 -.128	 -.186
28	 28	 28
	
0.298	 0.019	 -.249
28	 28	 28
	
0.033	 -.122	 -.174
26	 26	 26
	
-.210	 -.146	 -.102
26	 26	 26
	
-.005	 0.367	 0.211
28	 28	 28
	
-.062	 -.028	 -.014
26	 26	 26
	
-.274	 0.097	 0.467
26	 26	 26
YRSL ANNM FREE
Table Al .3: Correlations between subject variables from study 1, correlations in
bold are significant, p<0.05.
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ACCS 1.000
FLOW 0.407 1.000
38
AC/FL 0.839 -.051 1.000
38	 38
RISK	 0.201 0.251 0.076 1 .000
1140 1140 1140
ACEST 0.318 0.398 0.156 0.512 1.000
1140 1140 1140 1140
TIME	 0.235 0.364 0.105 0.275 0.354 1.000
1064 1064 1064 1064 1064
VEHS 0.228 0.555 0.009 0.274 0.364 0.755 1.000
1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064
KNOW 0.032 0.200 -.047 -.026 0.050 0.054 0.107 1.000
1140 1140 1140 1140 1140 1140 1140
RECAL 0.142 0.236 0.033 0.294 0.278 0.246 0.201 0.022 1.000
1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064
SPEED -.252 -.421 -.171 -.185 -.318 -.557 -.564 -.147 -.118 1.000
1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064
ACCS FLOW AC/FL RISK ACEST TIME VEHS KNOW RECAL SPEED
Table Al .4: Correlations between variables available for all 40 junctions,
correlations in bold are significant, p<0.05.
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Appendix 1.3
Sample Transcripts from Study 1
Results are given for two subjects. The first subject was scored as
correctly recalling four junctions, the second as correctly recalling five
junctions. Note, however, the considerable difference in the amount of detail
given by these two subjects. The first of the two subjects is much more
typical of the group in terms of the amount of information given about
individual junctions.
Subject 3:
S: ... One on Newmarket Road where we turned right to go towards Fen
Ditton. I almost made an accident, made a mistake there.
E: What was the traffic, what were you doing precisely?
S: Turning right, but a car was coming, two lanes coming, the car
coming from the other direction in the right lane was going straight on, you
see, and I almost cut in front of him. I considered going when they were still
coming, that could have been ... sticks in mind as what might have been an
accident.
[CORRECT - JUNCTION 14]
S: The next one was turning right again, you see I don't like turning
right. Turning right again onto the motorway, wasn't it the A45. Turning
right into the traffic that was rushing past to get onto the motorway before us.
[CORRECT - JUNCTION 17]
S: And then another ... Turning left actually at the end of Gilbert Road
onto Histon Road. There was a lot of traffic there and an old boy opposite
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who wasn't quite sure when to go or when not to go so I decided to let him
go and get out of the way first.
[CORRECT - JUNCTION 22]
S: ... I suppose as we turned right from Hills Road, from Hills Road into
Brookiands Avenue that can sometimes get into a bit of a muddle.
[JUNCTION 38- BUT INSUFFICIENT DETAIL TO BE SCORED
AS CORRECT RECALL]
S: And then left and then an immediate right to here
[JUNCTION 32 OR 40-INSUFFICIENT DETAIL TO BE
SCORED AS CORRECT RECALL]
E: Any other ones stick in your mind as particularly vivid?
S: Joining the main road from Newmarket from Teversham where we
turned ... joining the main road there.
E: What were you doing there?
S: ... Turning, joining from the left but we were joining some traffic
coming from the slip road, it had come from Newmarket. We were on a slip
road joining a bit of traffic coming from there.
[CORRECT - JUNCTION 13]
S: That's all I can do.
Subject 6:
S: Right, I was leaving the dual carriageway A45, there was a green
Japanese car a good 200-300 yards behind me and he wasn't approaching me
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or catching me up and there was a yellow AA recovery lorry in front of me
and I was just following him. He indicated left to ... carriageway at the same
time as I did and we both went up to the roundabout there was no traffic on
the roundabout so we both proceeded onto it and I went left and he carried
round.
[CORRECT - JUNCTION 18]
E: Great, okay, another situation.
S: Another one. Turning right at the traffic lights coming into Fen
Ditton and I approached those and they just turned green, I think, as I got
there and had to wait for some traffic and then that was clear and I went
across.
[CORRECT - JUNCTION 14]
E: Okay, another one.
S: ... Coming into Cambridge we met the two mini-roundabouts turning
left at the first and right at the second there was a couple of light goods
vehicles, vans, turning right at the first one, I was turning left, so I turned in
their shadow and a white car was waiting for them to turn, that followed me
across fairly quickly, I think a Sirocco, and then we came up to the second
mini-roundabout and there was a chap pulling a trailer coming straight
toward me, he waited as I manoeuvred right
[CORRECT - JUNCTION 32]
E: Keep going.
S: ... I remember coming onto the A45 as well, there was a red Montego
behind me and another Maestro, I think, in front that indicated and turned left
and I went onto the slip road and accelerated down the slip road and the
carriageway was fairly clear and made a completely unannounced entry into
a clear road.
[CORRECT - JUNCTION 17]
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E: Great.
S: What else? As we were coming straight back into the city from the
A45 roundabout ... there was another set of traffic lights which I saw were
red and three cars waiting in the left hand lane, there was also a straight on
lane which was empty so I got into that and those lights went green as I
approached so I went straight over those came to a second set of lights which
were red had to pull up and I was first in the queue and there were three cars
on the left lane still in the queue the lights went green and I went over and
they all sat there I remember and I was into the 40 limit by the time they
actually moved off, there was no problem there.
[BETWEEN JUNCTIONS 18 AND 19- MEMORY IS CORRECT
BUT NO RATINGS WERE REQUIRED OR GIVEN FOR THESE
JUNCTIONS]
S: Coming onto, back onto Trumpington Road before we turned into
Chaucer had to wait at a red set of traffic lights there and there was a Post
Office lorry immediately behind I had to stop for the red light and then there
was a car in front of me so I was second in the queue, the lights turned green
and we pulled out no problem.
[CORRECT - JUNCTION 40]
E: That's great, think of a couple more if you can.
S: Couple more, hmm, none I remember distinctly.
E: That's fine.
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Appendix 2
Details of the 60 Stimuli from Study 2
Table A2. 1 gives some details of the 60 stimuli used for both Study 2
and Study 3. Junction numbers are those from Table 4.2. The mean speed at
the junction is calculated using a measurement of the distance between
objects near the road that are just visible at the point at which each film starts
and those which are when the film stops. The speed given is thus the average
speed over the entire junction simply calculated from the film time and this
distance measure.
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Junction
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Film
Number
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Film lime
(seconds)
320
37.1
16.2
183
528
50.7
32.7
458
36 1
523
398
55.4
47.3
423
254
28.3
383
33.8
20 2
180
30.6
25.2
25.1
36.0
399
31.8
37.4
38.7
39.2
30.9
28.3
29.0
44.4
45.6
458
31.0
32.1
378
32.0
390
488
49 5
38.2
56 1
239
220
52 4
600
234
24 4
33 8
378
625
59 8
270
31 6
466
59 2
484
346
Mean Speed
(mph)
23.3
20 1
46.1
40 8
14 1
14.7
26 1
18.7
23.7
16.3
21.5
15.4
17.7
198
33.0
29 6
21.9
24.8
374
42 0
24.7
30.0
30.1
21.0
424
53 2
45.2
43.7
43 2
54.8
270
264
172
168
16.7
24.7
25.2
21 4
25 3
208
166
164
188
128
30 1
32 7
137
118
208
199
144
129
78
81
223
19 1
129
102
125
174
Number of
Vehicles
12
11
10
11
19
22
12
21
15
14
12
22
19
16
16
22
10
17
8
6
11
7
7
24
6
2
7
6
6
0
14
25
30
23
20
17
10
8
10
14
12
17
6
10
2
5
11
12
8
5
15
18
33
16
20
18
22
18
14
18
Cyclists I
Pedestrians
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
2
1
I
1
2
0
0
3
5
1
6
6
1
2
0
0
Table A2.1: Details of the 60 sections of film used in Study 2.
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Appendix 3.1
Sample Protocols from Study 5:
The protocols reported below are for film number 9, a low risk exemplar
of a high risk junction, turning right at a roundabout. For each section the
first paragraph is the data given by subjects in the description condition and
the second paragraph shows the data from subjects in the potential risks
condition. Comments are followed by a single letter identifying the subject
that made the comment, where similar comments are given by more than one
subject these subjects are grouped together under one comment. Where the
precise phrasing differed for individual subjects, the comment which best
represents the different versions is given. Since a different group of subjects
took part in each condition subject A in the description condition is not the
same person as subject A in the potential risks condition.
The films are split into 5 second sections except for the last two sections.
Here the final section would have been only 1.1 seconds long, since this is an
uncomfortably short section of film to view one second was taken from the
previous section. This means that the last two sections are in fact 4.0
seconds and 2.1 seconds in length respectively. In cases where the last
section of film would have been less than one second in length this extra was
simply added to the previous section to make a final section between five and
six seconds in length.
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0 to 5 seconds:
Descriptions Condition:
Good weather (E) but quite dark (E). Driving along a wide(G) straight
(A, F) road, without markings (G), in a residential (C) area, at a slow (E, A)
steady (D) speed. There are trees (E), and parked cars (C, B), on both sides
of the road. Coming up towards a junction (B, G), a roundabout (I, H), whose
sign is obscured by trees (H). There is a steady stream of traffic in the other
direction (A, B, C, H) including a lorry or something (A). These are
gradually pulling out to overtake a parked car on the right-hand side of the
road (B). There is a car about 50 yards (H)/fair distance (B) ahead (A, B, H,
J). It is either a Police car or it's white and blue (A). There are also other cars
ahead (A). It may (B) or may not (J) be necessary adjust our road position in
the light of other vehicles.
Potential Risks Condition:
The forward view is somewhat obscured by the traffic ahead going in the
same direction (A). We need to prepare for sudden stops (A, G) since, for
example, the car in front could stop suddenly (H) or the lorry could pull out
to overtake a bike or something like that (H). There is a lot of traffic on the
right quite close together (B). There do not seem to be any side turnings you
have to watch out for (D).
5 to 10 seconds:
Descriptions Condition:
Driving straight along the road (A), towards a roundabout (A, C, D, E,
G, H, I, J), which is about 50 yards away (D). A sign for the roundabout has
just been passed (A, B, J). A car is parked to the left, on the verge
(B)/diagonally on the pavement (C). There is traffic (lots, Al a few cars, J)
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coming off the roundabout (A, H, J). The car ahead begins to brake (A, B, C,
D, E, F, G, H, I) as it approaches the roundabout (J).
Potential Risks Condition:
The car parked on the footpath at right-angles to the road, might conceal
a child (A), or it could reverse out into the carriageway (C, E, F, 0, H).
There was a van turning to the left, which might also conceal something (A).
There is a roundabout coming up (C). There is a car braking in front of us
(D), which means we have to brake so we do not run into its rear (J).
10 to 15 seconds:
Descriptions Condition:
Coming up to the roundabout, moving into the right hand lane (A, J),
slowing down (D), about to come to a stop near the entrance to it (I). A bus
shelter on the left hand side and just been passed (A), and a grey car that
seems to be about to reverse out of a driveway (A). There are cars ahead (A,
B); that immediately in front (C, D, E, H) is straddling both lanes (G) and
appears to want to turn right also (J). It slows (E, H)! brakes (B, C, G, H)/
stops (D), to avoid conflict with other traffic (A, B) using the roundabout. A
car goes past on the other (F) (i.e. left).
Potential Risks Condition:
We need to prepare in case someone stops suddenly (A) at the
roundabout (A, C), and to watch out for traffic coming up from behind on
our nearside (A). The car ahead is poorly positioned for a right turn (B) at the
roundabout. Children might be playing in the bus shelter, which might be
dangerous (C), as it would be if the (parked ?) car came out too wide (G), or
if we were in the wrong lane (D). The car in front is braking continually so
we must watch our speed in case we bump into it (J).
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15 to 20 seconds
Descriptions Condition:
Travelling in the centre (C)! right hand (E, F) lane, either going straight
ahead or turning right (C, E). The three (A, E, G, H) vehicles ahead seem to
be going easily straight across the roundabout (A, B, E, G, H, J) without
having to stop. The white car (A) immediately in front of brakes and then
carries on moving slowly (A) and pulls away (D, I). It is not indicating (J).
There is quite a lot of traffic around (D, E), including oncoming traffic
coming around the roundabout (B), but the roundabout itself is relatively
clear (E, G).
Potential Risks Condition:
The complete danger of the roundabout looking at traffic manoeuvring in
all directions (C). We must be sure to check right before moving off (D, E),
and be prepared to give way (A, E). It is also important to make sure that no
traffic is coming up from behind on the inside (H). A particular problem with
this roundabout is that it is quite small so we must ensure to allow sufficient
room for other traffic (F). It would have been more dangerous if we had not
seen brake lights of the car in front come on (G, E), it also has not indicated
which way it intends to go so we must be vigilant (J).
20 to 25 seconds:
Descriptions Condition:
The cars in front carry out straight ahead across the roundabout (A, C, F).
We wait at the roundabout (A, B, C, H, I, J) until a silver (A)/silver car
(E)/car (B, C) which comes from right to left. A car (A, B, F)/moped rider
(G) is waiting on the left to come on to the roundabout. We move off on to
the roundabout (A, B, D, F, H, I), almost hitting another vehicle (D).
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Potential Risks Condition:
We must be prepared for something to happen when the motorcyclist on
the left to crosses onto the roundabout in front of us (A, H). The car that just
passed us may have been travelling too quickly (B). It would have been more
dangerous had there been more traffic coming from the right (E), we must be
vigilant in any case about traffic actually coming from the right (I, J), which
often travels very quickly at this roundabout (F). Also the cars could start off
on the roundabout (H).
25 to 30 seconds:
Descriptions Condition:
There are some buildings on the left-hand side, it looks like a row of
shops (A). We take the right exit at the roundabout (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I,
J). There are no cars waiting to use the roundabout (B, J). Nothing ahead
using the exit being taken (C, E) but theres a white van just approaching the
roundabout on the road being taken (E, J).
Potential Risks Condition:
We must keep looking ahead to the traffic lights and assessing the
situation (C). We must also watch out for the shoppers, the garage people
coming out there and also children crossing (D). There could be something at
any one of those junctions trying to pull out (E). There is also a scooter there
on the left, which we must watch out for (F).
30 to 34 seconds:
Descriptions Condition:
Taking the right exit from the roundabout (C, D), leaving the roundabout
to the left (F) into a clear (H, I) wide road (A, B) which narrows a little
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further ahead (B). There is not much traffic around (B, D, H, I). There's a car
in the distance ahead (A), about 100 yards away (J). We pass a bus-shelter on
the left (A, F), and some double white stop lines on the left where cars wait
to come out of the supermarket, but there are no cars there at present (G). In
the distance also are is a pedestrian crossing (E, G), the traffic lights of
which are amber (C). There are one or two oncoming vehicles (B, F), a
white van on the other side of the road's coming up to the roundabout with a
car behind that (A, E).
Potential Risks Condition:
Another bus-stop but this time it is clear, and so there is less danger.
There is a shopping road on the left (C, E, H), emerging traffic creates
another danger (C, E, H). A pedestrian crossing suddenly (I), or hitting the
bollards (G), would have made it more dangerous.
34 to 36.1 seconds:
Descriptions Condition:
There is a side road on left, and a bollard in the middle of the road (A). It
is a built up area (D). A set of lights (F)! traffic lights (D, J)/ pedestrian
traffic lights (B, C, D, E, H, I), is approached. The lights are green (B, C, D,
E, I, G). Nobody is waiting by the lights (B, I). The road is clear in front (B,
E, J) in both directions (J).
Potential Risks Condition:
We are approaching light controlled crossing (A, C, F), so we should
look-out for pedestrians (A), and the lights changing (F) from amber to red
(C). There is a side turning on the right (C, B), at which there might be
vehicles waiting to emerge (B).
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Appendix 3.2
High and Low Risk Junctions Compared for Study 5
23
15
33
31
17
56
10
240
180
24
87
50
37
174
46
56
35
76
51
258
68
37
20
70
6
6
15
3
154
44
60
68
59
2
8
17
61
102
61
52
60
0
10
33
17
22
26
24
31
97
0.270
0.002
0 260
-0 477
0.417
-o 558
0.242
-0.203
0.176
-0.055
-0.539
0.010
-0.213
0.191
-0.099
-0.341
0.066
-0.196
0.229
0.413
0.189
0.159
0.395
-0.427
0.365
-0.081
0.155
0021
0.086
-0.048
-0 043
0.132
0.012
0454
0476
-0377
0470
0.376
-0011
0443
-0100
N1A
0448
-0266
-0463
0 442
0382
0 235
0415
0.127
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Total
	
Correlation	 Correlation
Desons	 wdh Risk	 wh P(A)
Fixed:
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Variable:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
General:
Junction:
Control:
Off Road:
Oncoming Traffic.
Traffic Own Way:
Cross Traffic:
Own Manoeuvre:
Others Manoeuvre:
General:
Parked Vehicles
Visibility
Slope
Curvature
WSe
Narrow
T-Junction
Crossroads
Roundabout
Traffic Ughts
Pedestrian Crossing
Road Sign/Markings
Area
Signs
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turning Right
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Waiting
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turnng Right
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Waitng
Weather
Light
Pedestnans
Cyclists
Road Works
General Business
Large
Car
General Descnptor
0.495
0457
0.641•
-0527
0.643
-0.654
0.354
-0.144
0.364
0.138
-0.541
0.419
-0.314
0.295
0.470
-0.510
0.512
-0.288
-0.017
0.225
-0.109
-0.060
-0.141
-0.369
0.169
-0.245
-0.290
-0.039
0.349
-0.442
-0.332
0.088
0.512
0 221
-0 057
-0.435
0 729*
0 158
-0.103
0 294
-0262
NA
-0049
0043
-0225
0521
0 179
0 666
0 144
-0201
Table A3.1: Use of coding categories in descriptions condition for high risk
junctions, see text.
41
2
8
0
9
40
0
29
31
14
19
10
5
43
13
18
19
17
9
39
55
41
10
48
7
20
0
0
3
23
3
14
12
9
3
3
28
38
88
53
13
2
0
80
17
12
9
7
18
52
0099
0211
-0.106
N/A
0.283
-O 282
N/A
-O 103
-0.077
0.065
-0.221
0.339
0.151
0.243
0.057
-0.360
-0.049
0.173
-0.008
0.185
0.300
-0.417
0.197
0.192
-0.163
0499
N/A
N/A
0.084
-0.199
-0.094
0342
0.176
0.170
0.038
-0.293
0.16 1
0.156
-0.176
0266
0.386
-0.288
N/A
-0200
-0 101
0 417
0.324
0 251
0 195
0290
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Total
	
Correlation	 Correlation
Descrtions	 wh Risk	 wth P(A)
Fixed:
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Variable:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
General
Junction.
Control:
Off Road:
Oncoming Traffic:
Traffic Own Way:
Cross Traffic:
Own Manoeuvre:
Others Manoeuvre:
General
Parked Vehicles
Visibility
Slope
Curvature
Wide
Narrow
T-Junction
Crossroads
Roundabout
Traffic Ughts
Pedestrian Crossing
Road Sign/Markings
Area
Signs
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turning Right
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Pos tion
Waiting
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turning Right
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Pos tion
Waitng
Weather
L ght
Pedestrians
Cyclists
Road Works
General Business
Large
Car
General Descnptor
0 521
0 644
0.192
N/A
0.724
0.058
N/A
0 000
0 075
0 249
-0.230
0.068
0.136
0.153
0 535
-0.472
0.265
-0.243
-0.216
0.078
-0.136
-0017
0.169
0 101
-0.010
0.292
N/A
N/A
-0.059
-0261
0.18 1
0399
0.448
0.156
0 124
0.087
0 557
-0361
-0 287
-0.154
0.186
-0.307
NA
0 132
0 092
0518
0771..
0 750"
-0 122
0.204
Table A3.2: Use of coding categories in potential risks condition for high risk
junctions, see text.
5	 -O 482
6
	
0.157
70	 -O 273
12	 -0 317
25	 -0.053
106
	
0.130
3
	
0.262
93	 -0.124
68	 -0028
49	 -0 104
54	 -0.251
79	 -0 192
62	 -0.473
104
40
31
4
132
35
182
6
16
12
36
8
7
10
56
6
25
10
27
8
2
12
40
54
44
19
27
64
0
8
27
5
39
35
23
28
41
-0.022
0.211
0 202
0.078
-0.392
0.406
-0.173
0.055
0.424
-0.196
0.259
0.489
-0.256
-0.162
0.125
0 309
0.127
0.065
-0.218
-0.255
-0.010
0.177
-0.129
0 685
0 441
-0.620
-0.307
-0.059
NA
0085
0395
0.188
-0453
-0042
-0314
-O 524
-0.495
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Total
	
Correlation
	
Correlation
Descriptions	 with Risk
	
wth P(A)
Fixed:
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Variable:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
General:
Junction:
Control:
Off Road:
Oncoming Traffic.
Traffic Own Way:
Cross Traffic:
Own Manoeuvre:
Others Manoeuvre:
General
Parked Vehic es
Visibility
Slope
Curvature
Wide
Narrow
1-Junction
Crossroads
Roundabout
Traffic Lights
Pedestrian Crossing
Road Sign/Markings
Area
Signs
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turning Right
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Waiting
Fast
Sow
Tumng Left
Turning Rght
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Wa ting
Weather
Light
Pedestrians
Cyclists
Road Works
General Bus ness
Large
Car
General Descnptor
0540
0407
-0 141
0 156
0 198
-0411
-0395
0212
0.269
0 266
0015
-0435
-0.194
0439
-0378
-0.257
-0.356
-0.310
-0.048
0.635*
0.034
0.386
-0.216
-0.060
0.020
-0.524
0.071
0389
-0.106
0.347
0.308
0.702
0.529
0470
-0251
0 6788
-0.079
-0.037
0 606
0451
0.236
N/A
-0.343
-0.024
-0 113
-0.304
0.356
0 754**
0.728
0.081
Table A3.3: Use of coding categories in descriptions condition for low risk
junctions, see text.
General:
Junction:
Control:
Off Road:
Oncoming Traffic.
Traffic Own Way:
Cross Traffic:
Own Manoeuvre:
Others Manoeuvre
General.
Parked Vehicles
21
5
11
2
3
54
0
10
3
29
12
18
24
58
15
15
0
11
14
52
5
48
5
20
6
33
20
3
13
3
10
0
7
25
38
44
46
10
7
0
53
16
23
0
13
17
21
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Total
	
Correlation	 Corralaon
Descriptions	 with Risk	 wh P(A)
Fixed:
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Variable:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
Visibility
S ope
Curvature
Wide
Narrow
T-Junction
Crossroads
Roundabout
Traffic Lights
Pedestrian Crossing
Road Sign/Markings
Area
Signs
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
General Descriptor
Large
Car
Bicycle
Fast
Slow
Turning Left
Turning Right
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Waiting
Fast
Sow
Turning Left
Turning R ght
Braking
Accelerating
Changing Road Position
Watng
Weather
Light
Pedestrians
Cycists
Road Works
General Business
Large
Car
General Descnptor
-O 232
-0216
-0112
-0.255
-0.079
o 232
N/A
-0326
0055
-0.029
-0.062
-0 722
-0.585
-0.442
0.259
0.469
N/A
-0.452
0344
-0.321
0.055
0.166
-0.172
0.61 4
0.489
-0.183
-0544
0055
0 241
-0 087
-0 125
0.106
0.432
0195
NA
0313
0 229
-0081
0003
-O 292
0479
-0 175
NA
0 171
0 138
-0 561
NA
-0 239
-0448
-0585*
0 293
-0.427
0015
0529
-0.413
-0.332
N/A
o.60r
0 034
0.220
-0.377
0.114
-0.084
0.199
-0.563
0.036
N/A
-0.137
-0.022
0.488
0.034
-0.428
-0.263
-0.001
0.020
-0.198
0.119
0.034
0.105
0.184
0.540
0.364
0.028
0.057
N/A
0.344
-0.286
-0.150
0.026
0 009
-0.037
0.020
N/A
0 171
-0088
-0.168
N/A
0.734
0 799
0.037
Table A3.4: Use of coding categories in potential risks condition for low risk
junctions, see text.
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Appendix 4.1
Objective Data on the Six Junctions from Study 6
When objective data was recorded from the films the direction of travel
of different vehicles was initially recorded and unusual vehicles were
recorded separately. Table A4. 1 reports the mean number of vehicles in each
of the three directions separately for left and right turns (16 observations
make up each mean). The numbers beneath the main figure are the mean
number of vehicles per junction which were noted as being in some way
unusual, for example, lorries, vans or buses. Numbers of pedestrians and
cyclists are also reported separately, in these cases the numbers underneath
the main figure refer to then mean number of pedestrians or cyclists which
were distinguished by crossing directly in front of the driver's vehicle.
Junction	 A
Vehicles
Own Way:	 2.562
0.125
Opposite:	 5.375
0.812
Cross	 4.375
Traffic:	 0.375
Parked:	 0.250
0.188
Pedestrians:	 5.062
0.312
Cyclists:	 1.312
0.062
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Junction
	 A
Vehicles
Own Way:
	 1.438
0.125
Opposite:	 5.062
0.875
Cross	 1.688
Traffic:	 0.188
Parked:	 0.375
0.125
Pedestrians:	 3.625
0.188
Cycsts:	 1.750
0.062
Turning Right:
B	 C	 D	 E	 F
	7.87 	 2.312	 3.438	 2.750	 5.750
	
0.875	 0.438	 0.750	 0.188	 1.125
	
17.562	 5.75	 9.000	 7.312	 12.500
	
2.188	 0.938	 0.875	 1.188	 1.000
	
15.312	 12.625	 17.625	 10.188	 9.062
	
2.250	 2.438	 1.688	 0.688	 0.938
	
0.312	 1.438	 0.125	 0.438	 0.188
	
0.062	 0.062	 0.062	 0.188	 0.062
	
11.562	 1.125	 2.562	 0.688	 0.625
	
1.688	 0.312	 0.000	 0.125	 0.000
	
7.062	 1.875	 3.938	 0.688	 1.375
	
0.562	 0.000	 0.125	 0.125	 0.062
Turning Left:
B	 C	 D	 E	 F
	5.25 	 3.750	 7.500	 4.562	 3.562
	0.438	 0.188	 0.875	 0.188	 0.688
	
9.438	 3.562	 12.438	 10.188	 10.375
	
0.688	 0.438	 1.438	 0.938	 1.062
	
9.000	 4.125	 3.438	 7.188	 7.750
	
1.188	 0.562	 0.125	 0.812	 0.750
	
0.625	 0.625	 0.188	 1.125	 0.062
	
0.250	 0.062	 0.125	 0.188	 0.000
	
7.875	 0.250	 2.500	 0.250	 0.938
	
0.500	 0.000	 0.062	 0.000	 0.125
	
2.938	 0.812	 1.562	 0.500	 0.688
	
0.688	 0.188	 0.125	 0.062	 0.000
Table A4.1: Objective data on the six junctions. Mean number of normal and
unusual objects in each category - see explanation on previous page.
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Appendix 4.2
Sample Transcripts from Study 6
Results are given for subject number 30 who drove the junctions in the
order C A B E F D, turning right at the first three and left at the last three.
Information is simply marked as either CORRECT or INCORRECT on the
basis of what was actually seen when replaying the video with the ability to
pause or repeat the video if necessary. The scoring in brackets shows the
results of combining the scoring of both judges. Only information on which
both judges agreed is marked.
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RECALL PHASE
Junction C:
E: ... you remember we came out of Shaftesbury Road and turned left into
Brookiands Avenue, then we went along Brookiands Avenue and you
turned right at the end of Brookiands Avenue to go into town along
Trumpington Road.
S: Yes, there was a wait there (CORRECT) with about 7 or 8 cars
(INCORRECT). The traffic lights changed quite quickly and I got over
quite quickly (CORRECT), but it's a sharp right turn so you have to be a
bit cautious. A lot of parking on the left (CORRECT), the road cleared so
I was able to move along quite happily.
E: Thinking about the turn, do you remember the particular vehicle that was
in front of you?
S: It was, there were cars in front of me, there were about 4 cars, but they
pulled round quicker than me, so the road was clear by the time I'd gone
round.
E: OK. did you actually have to come to a stop?
S: No, no, that was able to - the lights changed and I was able to move.
OK. Do you remember any other vehicles at the other entrances to the
junction?
S: No I don't remember other vehicles.
E: Any cyclists or pedestrians around?
S: There were no cyclists and no pedestrians.
Junction A:
E: OK. Right. the next one we did was at the second of the two mini-
roundabouts, turning right from Trumpington Road, into Lensileld Road.
S: Turning Into Lensfield Road. There was a car in front of me (CORRECT)
so I had to slow down but didn't have to stop. I stopped to let - that was
- yes I stopped (INCORRECT) to let a vehicle pass from the right
(INCORRECT) - two cars passed from the right and then I moved on to
Lensfield Road Into the right-hand lane. There was a van (CORRECT)
waiting and he was rather anxious and pulling his van nearer and nearer
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(CORRECT), so I had a Job to go round the mini island. I had to slow
down, I had to mount the island to avoid him (CORRECT). Other than
that the turning went quite happily.
E: Remember what colour van?
S: White (CORRECT).
E: Any other vehicles around?
S: There was a car (CORRECT) on his right waiting to come (INCORRECT).
E: Any cyclists or pedestrians?
S: There were no cyclists or pedestrians at that time, no.
E: ___________ is that probably where ___________
S: Yes, facing, coming towards, from the hospital way, the old hospital, there
was a car on his right.
Junction B:
E: OK. The next one is the other end of Lensfield Road turning right by the
Catholic Church to go into Hills Road.
S: Once again I was lucky, the lights were at go (CORRECT). There were five
(INCORRECT) cars or so In front of me, all turning right (CORRECT), we
got round quite happily without any problems.
E: Any other vehicles waiting anywhere else?
S: Vehicles waiting at the other junctions, waiting to come across our lane
(CORRECT), and waiting to come from the right (CORRECT), 'cos that's
a very busy place, but they've all got traffic lights control.
E: Remember any particular ones waiting?
S: No.
E: Any cyclists or pedestrians around?
S: No cyclists, no pedestrians.
Junction E:
E: OK. Right, then we went along Hills Road and you turned right into
Brooklands Avenue, but I didn't make a rating there. Then you turned
left at the end of Brookiands Avenue into Trumpington Road again. The
next one you actually gave a rating at was at the far end of Trumpington
Road, turning left into Long Road.
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S: Yes, approaching left into Long Road, I think there were two vehicles in
front of me (CORRECT) but once again they pulled round quicker than
me, I'm rather cautious. It's a very sharp, narrow turn. You have your
own lights so you don't have a lot of problems but you do have to
manoeuvre it very sharply. Arriving into the road the way was clear, I
was OK.
E: Any vehicles waiting at the other entrances?
S: There were vehicles waiting at the right of me to go straight ahead
(CORRECT), there were about four (CORRECT), but the ones coming
towards us I can't remember.
E: Did you have to stop at the junction?
S: I slowed down, I didn't stop.
E: What colour were the lights at when you came onto the junction?
S: The lights were, turned from caution to green.
Junction F:
E: And the next one is at the other end of Long Road, turning left from Long
Road at the lights into Hills Road, to go into town.
S: Yes there were two or three cars in front (CORRECT). One went straight
ahead (CORRECT), one went right (INCORRECT), and I was the only one
that turned left (INCORRECT), so again my way was reasonably clear. I
just took It with caution but there's no problem there. Turned right,
straight ahead the road cleared.
E: Did you actually have to stop at the lights?
S: Yes we stopped (INCORRECT) and then moved on quite quickly, it wasn't
a long stop.
E: Do you remember what you waited behind?
S: I waited behind two cars, don't know anything about them.
E: OK, any other vehicles waiting at the other entrances to the junction?
S: I can't remember.
E: Cyclists, pedestrians?
S: No cyclists, no pedestrians.
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Junction D:
E: And the last one was the left turn coming over the bridge down Hills Road.
turning left into Brookiarids Avenue.
S: Again I was lucky, the lights were go (CORRECT). Cautious turn, it's
rather a sharp right turn there - left turn, left turn. No, no traffic
(CORRECT), I turned that and there was cars ahead of me but quite a
distance away, there wasn't any slow down, no problem.
E: Any vehicles ahead of you as you came up to the lights?
S: No, the road was clear but there was a cyclist (CORRECT).
E: Whereabouts?
S: The cyclist was going Into the cycle lane which was at stop (CORRECT),
Just left me room to come down the bridge happily. There was a very
heavy van (CORRECT) on my right (CORRECT).
DESCRIPTION PHASE
Junction C:
S: Right, took the right turning, I had to stop (CORRECT) there was a - lights
were about to change (CORRECT). The lights changed. There was a
lorry (CORRECT) coming from the other side the cars waited for. Then
there was a lorry my side (CORRECT). Two vehicles (CORRECT) and a
yellow (CORRECT) van (CORRECT) in front of me. Took the right
turning, straight ahead. Plenty of cars parked on the left (CORRECT) so
we had to keep well over to the right and cars and vans coming on the
oncoming side.
E: Any other particular vehicles? Do you remember what the car straight in
front of you was?
S: That was a yellow van, small van.
E: That's great. Any cyclists of pedestrians about?
S: There were no cyclists and no pedestrians.
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Junction A:
E: Great. OK, and the next one Is the right turn at the second mini
roundabout, going from Trumpington Road Into Lensfield Road.
S: I approached the junction still in front of the yellow (CORRECT) van
(CORRECT). There was a white (CORRECT) van (CORRECT) waiting
but the car was on his nearside coming round to the left with me
(CORRECT). So I took the turning, had to mount again the roundabout
(CORRECT) because the car was rather too far over. The van that was in
front of me must have turned right 'cos he disappeared (CORRECT). The
way ahead was reasonably clear and the car waiting followed me.
E: Do you remember - you said there was a car in front of the van there.
S: Yes a black car (CORRECT), black or dark coloured car on his left not on
his right.
E: OK. anything else around? Cyclists?
S: There were no cyclists and no pedestrians noticeable.
Junction B:
E: OK. Right, the next one is the right turn by the Catholic Church going
from Lensfield Road Into Hills Road.
S: Coming up to the next crossing we had to stop (CORRECT) although the
lights changed to go (CORRECT) because the traffic coming the other
way had blocked the road (CORRECT). Then a large lorry turned right
(CORRECT), a white (CORRECT) car turned right (CORRECT), a red
(CORRECT) car turned right (CORRECT) and I followed the marooney-
red car. On my left was a cyclist who went straight ahead (CORRECT).
And at the left junction there was a white (CORRECT) car waiting
(CORRECT), and then the road cleared ahead.
E: OK. anything else around, pedestrians?
S: No pedestrians, lots and lots of vans and cars on the right creating
trouble.
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Junction E:
E: OK, and the next one we actually gave a rating at was at the far end of
Trumpington Road, turning left into Long Road.
S: There was nothing ahead of me at this Junction (CORRECT). It was quite
clear, it went to go, there was a lot of traffic on my right going straight
ahead (CORRECT). There was a coach coming the other way
(CORRECT). Turning the corner there was a lot of traffic waiting on my
right (CORRECT), cars, a Post Office (CORRECT) van (CORRECT) and
as I turned left there was a blue ( INCORRECT) car parked illegally on
the left (CORRECT), so I had to take caution there.
Junction F:
E: OK, the next one Is the left turn at the other end of Long Road, going left
into Hills Road.
S: There were three vehicles in front of me (CORRECT). We had to stop, the
lights changed quite quickly. One vehicle went straight ahead
(CORRECT), the car In front which looked a marooney colour
(CORRECT) went to the left with me (CORRECT). There was plenty of
traffic waiting on our right (CORRECT). There were pedestrians
(CORRECT) waiting for buses and two (CORRECT) people talking.
Junction D:
E: That's fine. OK, and the last one is the left turn coming down the bridge.
turning left from Hills Road into Brookiands Avenue.
S: I approached the traffic lights, there was a cyclist on my left (CORRECT)
who went into the cycle lane so he wasn't a problem. There was a heavy
van (CORRECT) on my right bearing down a little bit. Two vehicles
(CORRECT) ahead turned ahead of me to the left, and by the time I
reached It was clear.
E: What was the road like you went into?
S: The road I went Into, Brookiands Avenue was clear for two hundred yards.
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Appendix 4.3
Correlations for Right and Left Turns (Raw Data)
Table 8.4 shows correlations between risk ratings and both the total
amount recalled and the vividness ratings for right and left turns. The data in
Table 8.4 was first normalized for each subject before correlations were
calculated. Table A4.2 below presents the same correlations but calculated
using the raw (not normalized) data from each subject.
Junction
A	 B	 C	 D	 E	 F
Correct Recall:
Turning
Right:	 0.467	 0.027	 0.372	 0.195	 -.187	 -.232
Turning
Left:	 -.325	 0.263	 -.427	 0.233	 0.479	 0.327
Vividness Ratings:
Turning
Right:	 0.728** 0 . 718* 0.165	 0.393	 -.107	 -.074
Turning
Left:	 -.026	 -.054	 0.072	 0.410	 0.227	 0.067
Table A4.2: Correlations between risk and amount recalled correctlyMvidness
rating for the six junctions on both directions of turn (14 degrees of
freedom, correlations marked * are signif cantly different from zero,
p<0.05, ** if p<0.01).
